

172106

JPRS-EPS-85-055

10 May 1985

19981106 137

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

5
110
A06

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

a

10 May 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Warsaw Pact Ships Visit GDR Port (H. Mehl; VOLKSARMEE, No 2, 1985)	1
---	---

ALBANIA

History of Conflict With Religion Traced (Beqir Sinani; MESUESI, 20 Feb 85)	5
--	---

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Former CPCZ Secretary Recalls Student Days With Gorbachev (KURIER, 19, 20 Apr 85)	7
--	---

Havlin Article on Culture, Art (Josef Havlin; NOVA MYSL, No 4, 4 Mar 85)	9
---	---

Religious Representatives Mark Country's Independence (Prague Television Service, 24 Apr 85)	14
---	----

Beno Speaks at Reopening of Lenin Hall in Prague (Prague Domestic Service, 22 Apr 85)	15
--	----

Chnoupek's Activities, Talks in Kuwait (RUDE PRAVO, 16 Apr 85)	16
---	----

Chnoupek Meets With PDRY Ministers (CTK, 18 Apr 85)	18
--	----

Briefs

'Demagogic, Provocative' Program Aired	20
Jakes Holds Talks With Cuban Official	20
CSSR-Libya, CSSR-PDRY Trade Sessions Begin	20
Spanish CP Delegation Continues Visit	21
Talks With Yemen Arab Republic	21
Hungary, CSSR Discuss Language Training	21

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Stoph Interprets Victory Celebration Significance (Willi Stoph; NEUER WEG, No 6, Mar 85)	22
Church Paper Criticizes Emigrants (Editorial, Gottfried Mueller; GLAUBE UND HEIMAT, No 11, 17 Mar 85)	28
Latest Crime Statistics Show Minimal Change (INFORMATIONEN, No 4, 22 Feb 85)	30
Alcoholism, Crime, Despair Noted in Berlin District (Roland Mischke; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 18 Mar 85)	32
GDR Defense Minister Cites NATO First Strike Preparations (Heinz Hoffman; VOLKSARMEE, No 51, 1984)	36
Research Library Holdings, Circulation Described (PRESSE-INFORMATIONEN, No 28, 7 Mar 85)	41

HUNGARY

Writer Defends Harsh Criticism of Stalinism (Erzsebet Galgoczi Interview; MAI MAGAZIN, Mar 85)	44
Scope of 40th Anniversary Amnesty Described (Gyorgy Moldovanyi Interview; MAGYAR HIRLAP, 3 Apr 85)	50

POLAND

Debate on Amended Higher Education Law Continues (Various sources, various dates)	53
View From Lodz University, Leszek Wojtczak Interview	53
Sejm Education Committee Meeting, by Andrzej Skrzypczak	57

ROMANIA

Report on Joint History Symposium With Israelis in Bucharest (ANALE DE ISTORIE, No 1, Jan-Feb 85)	61
Horthyist Occupation, by Aurica Simion	61
Union of 1913, by Livia Dandara	78
Antisemitic Policies, by Ion Calafeteanu	95

YUGOSLAVIA

SFRY Youths Pressured To Skip Meeting in Rome (Vatican City International Service, 9 Apr 85)	105
Ljubljana LC Discusses Achievements, Shortcomings (TANJUG Domestic Service, 13 Apr 85)	106

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

WARSAW PACT SHIPS VISIT GDR PORT

East Berlin VOLKSARMEE in German No 2, 1985 (signed to press 7 Jan 85) p 8

[Article by Cmdr H. Mehl: "Groznyy and Hutnik in Rostock"]

[Text] Postscript to a Fleet Visit: On the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the existence of the GDR, a Soviet and a Polish naval formation visited Rostock/Warnemuende during the period 5-8 October 1984. The visiting formation, under the command of Admiral I.M. Kapitanez, commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet, and including the guided missile cruiser GROZNY and the large antisubmarine ship BODRY, thus took part in the eighth official visit by the Soviet naval fleet to the GDR.

The ships of the Polish naval fleet, ORP GRYF, ORP HUTNIK, and ORP GOPLO, under the command of the commander of the Polish Navy, Admiral L. Janczyszyn, made fast in Rostock for their fifth official visit. (ORP is the acronym for Okret Rzeczypospolite Polskiej--ship of the Polish Republic.)

The days of the visit by the ships and their crews were marked by friendly contacts of many kinds, in which the brotherhood-in-arms of the allied Socialist Baltic Sea fleets was further strengthened. Residents, school classes, and work brigades in Rostock made ample use of the opportunity to inspect the ships. Here, too, there were cordial contacts with the ships' crews, who for their part took in the sights of the port city and paid a visit to the large socialist enterprises of Rostock.

The Groznyy Continues a Tradition

The Soviet guided missile cruiser GROZNY was the first representative of this class of ships to visit Rostock, which also includes the well-known sister ships WARJAG and ADMIRAL GOLOKOV.

The cruiser GROZNY, which now belongs to the Baltic Sea Fleet, previously belonged for several years to the Pacific Fleet. It bears the traditional name of the former destroyer GROZNY (GNEWNY type), which on 6 March 1945 was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for valor in combat while assigned to the Northern Sea Fleet during the USSR's Great War of the Fatherland. According to official figures, the new GROZNY has a displacement of 4,400 tons and a length of 141.7 m. Its output is 73,500 kW (100,000 HP), giving

the ship a speed of 36 knots. The missile armament consists of two traversable four-rail launchers for surface target missiles and one two-rail launcher for air defense missiles. Artillery armament includes two 76 mm twin-barreled guns and several 6-barreled close-range defense weapons with radar fire control stations. In addition the ship has two 533mm 5-tube sets for firing torpedoes of various types. Electronic equipment includes long-range sea and airspace surveillance stations as well as equipment for navigational purposes and for radio-electronic warfare.


The BODRY belongs to the class of large antisubmarine ships, whose sister ships NEUKROTIMY and DRUZHNY had already been in Rostock. These ships, with varying artillery armament, have a displacement of 3,100 tons and a length overall of 125.5 m. They are powered by a gas turbine engine with a total output of 52,900 kW. The maximum speed is likewise 36 knots. The main armament of these ships consist of a four-rail launcher for surface target and antisubmarine missiles on the bow, as well as two retractable twin-rail launchers for surface-to-air missiles. Antisubmarine armament also includes two 12-tube reactive depth charge launchers and two 533mm 4-tube sets for antisubmarine torpedoes. Artillery weapons aboard this ship likewise consist of two fully automatic 76mm twin-barreled guns.

A Novelty: Small Guided Missile Ship


Polish naval forces were represented by two modern warships and the training ship GRYF of the naval officers' academy "Heroes of the Westerplatte" in Gdynia. Of particular interest was the small guided-missile ship HUTNIK, which according to the Polish periodical MORZE 5/84 was commissioned in March 1984. A sister ship of the same type bears the name GORNIK (in service since 28 December 1983). The main armament of the HUTNIK consists of two twin-rail launchers for surface target missiles installed on each side. Artillery weapons include a fully automatic 76mm universal gun on the bow and two 6-barreled 30mm guns on the aft superstructures. Of the crew, seven teams have already been awarded the title "socialist service collective" on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the People's Republic of Poland. Under the command of Lieutenant Engineer W. Danek, a rating of "very good" has been achieved at all firing exercises held thus far. With the GOPLO, this formation also included a representative of Polish mine countermeasures forces. The ship, classified as a mine countermeasures vessel, is a product of the defense industry of Poland, in which the latest findings for assuring a reliable defense against mines have been considered.

The training ship GRYF, a sister ship of the training ship WILHELM PIECK of the People's Navy, was built in 1976 by the Polish North Shipyard in Gdansk. This ship type has a displacement of 1,750 tons and a length/width/draft of 72/12/4 m. These ships are armed with 2 X 30mm double mounts (for further details see the Military Technology glossary in VOLKSARMEE 21/80, p 8). The name GRYF preserves the memory of the brave crew of the former Polish minelayer of the same name which was sunk by fascist dive bombers in the harbor of Hel on 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the attack


by Hitler Germany on Poland. The training ship GRYF visited Rostock in 1979 already, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the GDR's existence. Since then, training cruises brought the ship and her crew to the Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, with port calls at Murmansk, Sevastopol, Split, Tripoli, and Benghazi.




1. The Soviet guided missile cruiser Grozny during the docking maneuver in Rostock-Warnemünde



2. The Polish guided missile ship Hutnik entering the harbor



3. The Soviet antisubmarine Ship Bodry



4. The Polish mine countermeasures ship Goplo

Photos: Central Photo Archive of the People's Navy/U. Dombusch

12689
CSO: 2300/341

ALBANIA

HISTORY OF CONFLICT WITH RELIGION TRACED

Tirana MESUESI in Albanian 20 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Beqir Sinani: "The First Clashes Between Clericalism and Secularism"]

[Text] To achieve their goal of liberating the fatherland from the Ottoman yoke, and to unify and develop the country, our activists had, among other things, to confront obstacles that were created by the clergy of the three religions within our country. Our activists struggled for a national, unified school, without religious distinctions, for a secular school without priests and Moslem clergymen. This brought about the first clashes between secularism and clericalism, which were more or less contained, because national liberation was the primary goal at that time. The press of the day reflected these confrontations and became their spokesman.

The deep clashes between clerical and secular thought and attitudes were revealed in the wake of events that followed the founding by the young patriotic teachers in Shkoder in 1907 of a society of workers and craftsmen, as well as of night schools in the Albanian language, without religious distinctions, which were immediately successful. However, a free organization of workers and the establishment of public schools, without the tutorial influence of the church, was not acceptable to the Catholic clergy. These initiatives drove the clergy "mad." With sermons in their churches and articles in their journal ELCIA E ZEMRE SE JEZU KRISHTIT [The Messenger of the Heart of Jesus Christ,] the clergy began to denounce and excoriate "lay schools without a god" (including night schools), as dangerous for religion and the working people, whom they considered to be socialistically inspired. By unrestrained threats and obstacles the clergy was able to close our society. Measures were taken against Mati Logoreci, a patriotic school teacher. The advanced and patriotic press of the time, especially the newspaper SHPMESA E SHQYPNIS [The Hope of Albania,] which was published in Trieste and KOMBI [The Nation,] published in Boston, gave these problems wide publicity and maintained a determined anti-clerical position.

The patriotic lay people's struggle became more determined after 1980, when, regardless of various obstacles, public schools were opened one after another.

During this period the clergy from the three religions became more active, and resorted to violence and murder.

In October 1909, the pro-clerical Spanish government condemned to death for his revolutionary ideas an anti-clerical thinker who had founded a kind of rational lay school. This crime caused strong manifestations of anti-clerical feeling in our press at the time, especially in the newspapers SHPNESA E SHQYPNIS [The Albanian Eagle,] BASHKIMI I KOMBIT [The Unification of the Nation,] DIELLI and others. The journal, THE ALBANIAN EAGLE, of the revolutionary democrat Josif Bageri condemned in some articles the reactionary Spanish monarchist regime and the parasitic army of the Spanish priests, who kept the people ignorant and divided. Obliquely and openly the journal attacked the Turkish regime which governed in Albania, as well as the work of the reactionary clergy from the three religions. It unmasked the priests and the Moslem clergy, who under the garb of religion were perpetrating "many evils," keeping the masses in terror and pitting brother against brother with mystical fanaticism. At the same time, this newspaper advised the Albanian people to embrace progressive ideas and escape the talons of "priests and clergy."

The newspaper THE ALBANIAN EAGLE emphasized the advantages of modern lay schools, which educated children with the spirit of scientifically based, free and fraternal thought. "The Albanian nation - the paper wrote - has great need...for public schools, where Albanian children will be enlightened by teachers who know how to encourage free thought...and not religious thought."

Later, harsher and more widespread clashes between secularism and clericalism will develop and increase during the Educational Congress of 1922 and 1924, which discussed the problem of public schools. Nevertheless, secularism was fully successful only in the glorious era of the party, when socialist-atheist schools were sanctioned by the 1946 and 1976 constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

6160

CSO: 2100/33

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FORMER CPCZ SECRETARY RECALLS STUDENT DAYS WITH GORBACHEV

AU231220

[Editorial Report] Vienna KURIER in German on 19 and 20 April 1985 carries a 2-part article--700 and 800 words, on page 5--by former CPCZ Secretary Zdenek Mlynar headlined "My School Friend M. Gorbachev." In an introduction, the paper notes that Mlynar was purged after the Prague spring of 1968, signed the Charter 77 and emigrated to Austria in 1977, where he is now a staff member of the Laxenburg Institute for International Politics.

In his article, Mlynar says that he studied law together with Gorbachev in Moscow 1950-55. "We were both in the same study group, prepared together for the exams, and graduated with honors. But we were more than just colleagues--everyone knew us as good friends." In 1952, when they studied the history of the CPSU, Mlynar says, and were taught that anyone deviating from the party line must be liquidated, Gorbachev told him: "But Lenin did not have Martov imprisoned, but let him emigrate." In 1952, in the Stalinist era, this meant that "the student Gorbachev doubted that people could only either be loyal to the party or criminals. In those days it was not at all usual to reveal such views to a foreigner."

Mlynar states that the last time he saw Gorbachev was in 1967, 1 year before the Prague spring; on the occasion of the study trip to Moscow he visited Gorbachev in Stavropol, where he was party secretary. It was their first meeting after the downfall of Khrushchev. While to us in the CSSR Khrushchev represented the consistent criticism of Stalinism, Mlynar says, "Gorbachev did not regret Khrushchev's downfall. He judged him primarily from a domestic policy point of view and regarded Khrushchev's constantly new, mostly not fully thought-out and often completely subjectivist interferences in the economy and the system as harmful. From Brezhnev he expected more independence and wider powers for the lower-echelon functionaries in the republics and regions." Mlynar writes in this context: "At that time I also discussed with him my views about reforms in the CSSR. We mutually understood each other. We both knew that the Soviet Union is not the CSSR, and that my ideas concerned only Czechoslovak conditions and possibilities. Just as Gorbachev pleaded for more independence and responsibility in the Soviet republics and regions, he was also in favor of giving the individual countries the possibility of specific roads of development."

Gorbachev and his generation have a different political experience from the generation before them, but their experience is primarily that of futile reform attempts, Mlynar says and mentions Khrushchev's unsuccessful reform attempts, as well as the attempts to alter the system in 1956 (Poland, Hungary), 1968 (CSSR), and 1980 (Poland). On the other hand these experiences include the realization that the policy of suppressing and postponing unresolved problems offers no chance of success. At the same time by this time reforms have become an internal need even in the Soviet Union. After noting that there is no satisfactory model for reforms in the USSR and that neither the Czechoslovak, nor the Chinese nor the Hungarian reform concepts seem applicable to the USSR, Mlynar continues:

"From my knowledge about Mikhail Gorbachev dating back to a time when his call to his present function was not foreseeable, I cherish certain hopes. The principle that 'the truth is always specific' has certainly not been forgotten by him.

"He is a person who believes more in what he himself has experienced than in what he is shown on paper. In his life not only the momentary success but also durable values are of importance. And he has enough self-assurance to renounce what he himself has recognized as being not right.

"Before he was appointed CPSU general secretary he declared in a speech that despite the great importance of Soviet-U.S. relations one cannot forget that the world does not consist only of the United States. If he were to consider at the same time that the Soviet Union, too, is only a part of today's world--though a very powerful and important one--and that all parts desire and also need autonomy, then this would be of great importance.

"Gorbachev could really contribute to the world being understood as it actually is, rather than as it appears in the distorting mirror of the super-powers' bipolarity.

"But let me return to what I said at the beginning: that I have had very bad experiences with my personal optimism before," Mlynar says in conclusion.

CSO: 2300/380

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HAVLIN ARTICLE ON CULTURE, ART

AU221011 Prague NOVA MYSL No 4 in Czech and Slovak, signed to press 4 March 1985
p 43

[Article by Josef Havlin, Secretariat member and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, in the rubric "40th Anniversary of Czechoslovakia's Liberation":
"Culture and Art After the 16th CPCZ Congress"]

[Excerpts] In its entire activity, the CPCZ has always attached fundamental importance to making all values of culture, arts, and education accessible to the broadest working people's masses, while at the same time establishing conditions for developing a new culture, one permeated by Marxist-Leninist ideas, linked with the life of the working people and enriched with the cultural values of the peoples of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all progressive streams in the world. [passage omitted]

Culture and art have an intense impact on the life of the working people and their way of thinking; they are the broadest field of the ideological class battle for the people's minds and their way of life, for their attitude to socialism. That is why the development of our culture is a systematic struggle to ensure its socialist character, its ties with life, work, and the struggle of the working man. Obviously this is also realized by their class enemies, who strove in the past, and are striving now, to misuse culture and art for subversive aims, for propagating bourgeois ideology and a bourgeois way of life. The demagogical campaign to manipulate the artists' creative freedom also serves this purpose. Without wanting to underrate the influence of hostile propaganda, particularly on young and still inexperienced artists, we can say that our artists have seen through the demogagy around the issues of artistic freedom and they are reacting to it correctly. They see their creative freedom in responsible artistic work for our society, which establishes the most favorable conditions for the blossoming of talent and for the broad implementation of it. They know that our party does not prescribe to them how they should create, that it leads them to responsibility for the work they have created and for its influence on the people's thoughts and deeds. Nobody tells them how to write; but our social development is orienting them toward the pivotal issues of the broad stream of events. For them the people's life and work are the richest source of inspiration. [passage omitted]

Perhaps it might seem unnecessary to recall the old and defeated campaigns of the bourgeois propaganda. But exactly after a lapse of time it is possible to

prove that all that we have achieved in our socialist culture is the result of a sharp ideological struggle. Respect for this reality even in our present times, and the consistent waging of an ideological struggle from class positions, are the main obstacle to the penetration of opportunism and revisionism into our culture. Only principled Leninist policy, linked with the support for those artists who, by their talent, serve society and fight with conviction for our class truth, establishes the conditions needed for creating the real and socially beneficial culture riches. [passage omitted]

The deep socioeconomic transformations which our society is undergoing cannot be grasped and actively taken in hand without new values and norms which correspond to them. Understandably, they emerge from the people's everyday experience. Like the scientist, the artist, too, throws light on this everyday experience--each artist in his own way and with his own means; he discerns what is good and what is bad, what promotes progress and what hampers it. It is self-evident that both the artist and the scientist have a most active share in the creation of the value system of the socialist society. And it must be said that in this sense, too, the abstract humanism, which is not quite alien to our artistic creators, is not sufficient guidance and orientation in the struggles of the times. That is why the party will support artistic creation which is permeated with communist partymindedness, which reacts to the main issues of the present, which fights for the socialist morale, which depicts the man of our times in his real struggles and work effort, and which rears him in the spirit of patriotism and internationalism. [passage omitted]

The absolute majority of talented artists today stand on positions of socialism, sharing and implementing the party's policy and helping by their activity to realize the conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress. However, not all artists are ideologically and politically mature to the same extent; not all are engaged in civic activity, not all are creating works of art that meet the high demands placed on ideological content and artistic skill. Side by side with the outstanding works of our prominent creators there also emerge works which are undemanding and which are merely meant to entertain. We will not reproach them for this. After good work, each and every one of us wants to have fun. But even entertainment can be good or bad. It is the lasting task of the artists themselves, but also of the entire management sphere responsible for the development of culture and art, to raise the demands here and, above all, to see to it that such work does not contradict our ideology.

The new, upcoming generations of young artists are emphatically part of our artistic front; they are talented and educated, but they do not always approach artistic practice with a proper civic and world-outlook. If the need for constant education is valid anywhere at all, it is exactly here. An artist and his work can have an enormous impact. Combining ideas and sentiment, the general and the unique, they help us grasp the sense of the times in which we are living, the life which we are living. But, of course, only on one condition: that the artist himself understands his times. And this is not so simple. Our society is qualitatively changing in every aspect: thousands of scientists are dealing with these changes and the knowledge of the social sciences is increasingly growing. We must think about, and search for, new forms which would enable and speed up the transfer of this new knowledge from science to art, from scientists to artists.

The shaping of the artistic front and the consolidation of its ranks in the current ideological struggle are among the significant successes of the party's policy. They are the result of the realization of the party's cultural policy, based on the implementation of the Leninist principle of respect for the uniqueness of talent and of creative work, combined with an unappeasable attitude in ideological issues. That is also why the coming period, too, will be characterized by a growth of artistic and ideological demands on the entire creative and political activity of artists in the struggle for socialist and peace in the world, in fulfilling their tasks within the construction efforts of our people.

In realizing the CPCZ's cultural policy, an extremely significant role is played by artists' unions. They are the main factors in our care for ideological work on the creative front, as well as in the care for developing artistic creativity in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist principles. The membership base of the unions consists of the best artistic personalities of all generations. The unions have more than 5,500 members, roughly one third of whom are communists. They assess the created works regularly and critically, they set up aktivs and clubs of young and upcoming artists, and commissions for the development of artistic theory and criticism; they organize professional seminars, symposiums, conferences, reviews of artistic works, exhibitions, and other ideocreative events. [passage omitted]

The overwhelming majority of creative artists profess allegiance to the revolutionary traditions of our art, drawing inspiration from the present life and also from significant events in the history of our peoples. This is strikingly expressed in their effort to create the picture of contemporary man--the hero of our times. The protagonists of literary works and drama are, increasingly, working people from all strata of our society, bearers of the socialist attitude to work and life. There is no sphere of artistic work where no artistically impressive works with a weighty social content would not emerge, works permeated with a communist party spirit and created in the spirit of socialist realism.

However, side by side with this healthy stream there still exist serious shortcomings that must not be overlooked. We can frequently encounter a lack of ideological crystallization, greyness, the routine, formal purposelessness, fawning. The criticism of the negative phenomena that we can encounter in life is not always ideologically and artistically skillful enough to show up at the same time the merits and prospects of our socialist system. At times the manifestations of a bourgeois spirit and of a petty bourgeois way of life are not condemned, but used for cheap and tasteless entertainment. We have particularly large short-comings as regards entertainment genres.

So far our artistic criticism--for the development of which such a great deal has been done along the lines of artists' unions and ministries of culture--is not coping with these problems efficiently. A part of the literary critics, represented by several outstanding personalities of the literary sciences, are fulfilling their mission on the whole successfully. But in the sphere of light music, artistic criticism practically does not exist. The basic problems do not lie in the publication of works in the science of the arts or in monographs on individual spheres of art; they lie in the everyday review activities

of the communications media, where we can often witness subjectivism, descriptiveness, the ignoring of true values and the elevation of marginal ones. Criticism does not confront art with life in society sufficiently, and frequently it does not even proceed from the Marxist-Leninist principles of our cultural policy. In the interests of improving the situation, we must achieve a closer cooperation of university-level schools, scientific institutes, artists unions, ministries of culture, and communications media; and at the same time we must devote far greater attention to rearing young critics. Simultaneously we must strive to forge closer ties between literary criticism and party work.

All major problems in the sphere of art stem, in essence, from ideological struggle, at the center of which stand culture and art. However, they are also due to inconsistency in management and conveyance [of art] at the level of individual cultural institutions. The activity of many supervisors and managers in artistic work is marked by over-emphasis of practice [prakticismus] and complacency; a class-oriented approach and the ability to react to those phenomena that derive from ideological struggle and the disregard for which is negatively reflected in our cultural life are disappearing from their work. That is why it is necessary to be more critical in evaluating the work of individual links of management and to improve it constantly and comprehensively.

Cementing the artistic front on the positions of socialism is one of the cardinal tasks of the CPCZ's cultural policy. We can be successful in fulfilling it only by further developing ideological and political-educational work in the ranks of artists, especially among the young generation of artists. [passage omitted] Our party will give full support to works of art that are imbued with adherence to communist principles and which--using a rich variety of forms, genres, and original approaches--proceed from the creative method of socialist realism. [passage omitted] At the same time, we emphasize the implementation of the idea that was formulated at the 16th CPCZ Congress and the 15th session of the CPCZ Central Committee that we will not tolerate anything that harms socialist art and our society. While placing great demands on artistic skill, we will permanently regard the ideological orientation of a work of art and all creative work as the yardstick of its social meaning and mission. [passage omitted]

The enhancement of the standard of aesthetic education of the youth and working people, which was strongly emphasized by the 16th CPCZ Congress, is a key and long-term task in the comprehensive development of culture. We must admit that, in spite of many partial results, the general standard of aesthetic education still does not come up to the present requirements on the education of a socialist personality and the development of its creative talents and moral qualities. We must prepare, and implement, a comprehensive social system for the aesthetic education of the population, a system that will become binding for all agencies, organizations, and institutions of our society that have an impact on the education of people. Our concept of aesthetic education is one of a lifelong process that promotes the development of a socialist aesthetic taste and the creative talents of a man who is a highly motivated builder of the developed socialist society.

The consistent implementation of the conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress and of the further exacting tasks to be set for the cultural sphere by the 17th

CPCZ Congress requires a systematic deepening of the party's leading role in this area. It is necessary to enhance the influence and responsibility of communists and party organizations in asserting class-oriented ideological viewpoints in the activity of artists' unions, cultural institutions, and creative collectives. In all sectors of culture and the arts, communists bear great personal responsibility for the practical implementation on the principles and tasks of our cultural policy--in artistic work as well as in cultural-educational activities. [passage omitted]

CSO: 2400/364

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATIVES MARK COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE

LD242347 Prague Television Service in Czech and Slovak 1730 GMT 24 Apr 85

[No video available]

[Text] A festive gathering of delegates and highest representatives of all 18 Czechoslovak churches and religious societies took place in Brno today. Comrade Vaclav David, speaking at the gathering, said that the liberation of our country by the Soviet army ensured the independence of Czechoslovakia. He added that our state makes available considerable means to ensure that the religious needs of believers are properly met. He also praised the important contribution of churches and believers to peace activity. This tradition is alive in the Pacem in Terris Catholic Clergy Association and in the Christian Peace Conference.

The main paper was delivered by (Amadeo Molnar), dean of the Comenius faculty of evangelical theology in Prague. Thanks to the culmination of the Slovak and Czech struggle for freedom and the final victory of the Red Army our nations were spared the physical extinction that threatened them, he said. He also praised the opportunity of the members of churches and religious societies to take part in creating socialist social relations.

The participants in the gathering adopted a statement expressing respect for the Soviet people who bore the brunt of the war. From the depth of our faith we reject plans for the militarization of space and for its transformation into a tool for destroying life on our planet. The experiences of the generations who survived World War II set us on the only possible course of the fundamental transformation of our society--toward socialism--which means social justice and peace, the statement says.

Finally, the delegates approved the text of a letter to Gustav Husak, president of the CSSR. They assure him that they will contribute to creating conditions for a happy and peaceful life both at home and in the international situation. For believers this means active participation in the life of our socialist society.

CSO: 2400/364

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BENO SPEAKS AT REOPENING OF LENIN HALL IN PRAGUE

LD222342 Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 1100 GMT 22 Apr 85

[Text] Today, the 115th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the Lenin hall, with rearranged exhibits in its foyer, has been reopened in the Vladimir Ilyich Lenin Museum in Prague, dedicated to the memory of this revolutionary thinker, politician and statesman. The ceremony was attended by a CPCZ Central Committee delegation headed by Mikulas Beno, its secretary. Present also were Karel Hoffmann, member of the CPCZ Central Committee presidium and chairman of the Central Trade Union council; Vratislav Vajnar, federal minister of the interior; Tomas Travnicek, vice chairman of the National Front's Central Committee; a delegation of the Soviet embassy in Prague; and other figures.

Comrade Mikulas Beno pointed in his speech to the significance of the sixth all-Russian conference of the social Democratic Workers' Party of Russia, which took place in 1912 in this very Lenin Hall in the present museum and which was presided over personally by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The conference at that time set out both strategic and tactical tasks of the class struggle and elected a new Bolshevik Central Committee headed by Lenin.

As Comrade Mikulas Beno went on to say the history of class struggles of the working class and the triumph of the Czechoslovak people in building their socialist homeland under the leadership of the Communist Party, confirm that only in the consistent application of the Leninist principles lies the guarantee for successfully constructing a new society. In this connection he pointed out that any departure in the past from Lenin's teaching led to serious mistakes, to decelerated development and it weakened the positions of socialism and the party. This was fully confirmed by the experiences in the crisis period of 1968-69, Comrade Mikulas Beno declared, and recalled the historic significance of the election of Comrade Gustav Husak 16 years ago to head our communist party and the formation of the new leadership, which had a decisive influence on the process of renewing Leninist principles in CPCZ activity.

Lenin's work inspires us also today to seek out ways and means of perfecting the process of building advanced socialism in every way. Comrade Beno also stressed in his speech delivered at the reopening of the Lenin Hall in his museum in Prague, the importance of the forthcoming culmination of the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of our homeland by the Soviet Army.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CHNOUPEK'S ACTIVITIES, TALKS IN KUWAIT

AU181125 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 16 Apr 85 pp 1, 7

[Text] CTK--Bohuslav Chnoupek, CSSR minister of foreign affairs, who is currently on an official visit to Kuwait, was received on Monday [15 Apr] by Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait. Minister B. Chnoupek presented the top Kuwaiti representative a friendly greeting from CSSR President Gustav Husak, which was returned; and a written message containing an invitation to the head of the state of Kuwait to visit Czechoslovakia, which was accepted with gratitude.

During their friendly talk they assessed mutual relations between the two countries; it was stated that favorable prerequisites exist for deepening them further. In this connection the Czechoslovak-Kuwaiti contacts were described as a specific example of the useful nature of a mutually advantageous cooperation of states with different social systems; as a contribution toward strengthening trust and understanding among nations; and as part of the broad struggle waged by the nations of all continents against the danger of war and for consolidating peace in the world.

In the exchange of views on certain topical problems of the current international situation it was emphasized that all controversial issues can be resolved by political means. This also fully applies to such a weighty problem as the protracted conflict in the Middle East. The Czechoslovak representatives again underscored the stand maintained by our country, which supports the just cause of the Palestine people and their inalienable right to create an independent state. Likewise, the dangerous tendencies, as represented by the escalation of war operations between Iraq and Iran, for peace and security in the area of the Persian Gulf and other areas were also appraised.

Negotiations also took place in Kuwait between Minister B. Chnoupek and Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, acting head of the Kuwaiti government and minister of foreign affairs. In a friendly talk the two representatives assessed the current state and prospects of relations between the two countries and also discussed topical international issues. They stated that the Czechoslovak-Kuwaiti contacts are developing successfully, in the spirit of the already traditional friendship of the peoples of the two countries and for the benefit of peace and of strengthening the atmosphere of trust in international relations. The two representatives spoke in favor of further

developing the political dialogue, including regular contacts on the level of ministers of foreign affairs and also the two countries' cooperation in the United Nations. They concurrently declared that great possibilities for enhancing the dynamics of mutual contacts also exist in the spheres of the economy, medical care, education, sports, and the communications media.

Bohuslav Chnoupek and Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah condemned the Israeli policy of aggression and expansion. They stressed that only an international conference, held with the participation of all interested parties on the basis of equal rights, including the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine, can completely resolve the entire complex of Mideast problems. They underscored that the inevitable prerequisite of such a solution is Israel's total withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestine people to self-determination and the creation of their own state. They expressed concern over the escalation of the Iraqi-Iran conflict and they concurrently spoke in favor of its speedy conclusion and of the final solution of all disputes in the area by means of political negotiations.

Minister Chnoupek also met Rashid al-Rashid, state minister for cabinet affairs, with whom he exchanged opinions on certain issues of Czechoslovak-Kuwaiti contacts, as well as on topical international problems. Minister Chnoupek also met 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Awadi, minister of health and planning. The two ministers assessed CSSR-Kuwait cooperation in the spheres of planning and medical care, which is a significant component of relations between the two countries, and they pointed out specific possibilities for expanding it further.

CSO: 2400/364

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CHNOUPEK MEETS WITH PDYR MINISTERS

LD180959 Prague CTK in English 1943 GMT 18 Apr 85

[Text] Aden April 17 (CTK)--Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek, who started his official friendly visit to the Yemen people's Democratic Republic today, was received by Premier Ha-yder Abu Bakr al-Attas.

During the meeting, which took place in a cordial atmosphere expressing traditional friendship of the two countries, they discussed several aspects of bilateral relations with regard to their economic sphere, and international topics.

The prime minister of Democratic Yemen welcomed the new disarmament initiatives of the USSR aiming at the liquidation of nuclear weapons and the Soviet proposals for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle-East crisis by way of an international conference. Minister Chnoupek highly appreciated successes achieved by the Yemeni people, led by the Yemen Socialist Party, in the strengthening and development of the results of the national democratic revolution.

Foreign Ministers Bohuslav Chnoupek of Czechoslovakia and 'Abd al-'aziz al-Dali of Democratic Yemen today discussed the possibilities of further deepening of bilateral relations. They agreed that fraternal cooperation between the Czechoslovak communist party and the Yemen socialist party is the mainstay of bilateral contacts, based on the principles of proletarian internationalism.

They further agreed that all-round cooperation, political contacts in particular, considerably developed in the period which has elapsed since the meetings of the two countries' supreme party and state representatives Gustav Husak and 'ali Nasir Muhammad in Aden 1981 and Prague 1982. They confirmed the two countries' interest in the expansion of economic cooperation and came out for the use of all existing reserves, mainly in supplies of Czechoslovak complete plant [words indistinct].

At a dinner to honour the Czechoslovak guest, minister 'Abd al-'aziz al-Dali highly appreciated the principled peace foreign policy of the socialist countries including Czechoslovakia.

Minister Chnoupek appreciated the policy pursued by Democratic Yemen--that of the defence of peace, struggle for disarmament, against imperialism, colonialism,

racism and Zionism. We maintain the view that peace in the Middle East can be achieved only by a comprehensive settlement, he stressed. That is why we fully support last July's Soviet proposals to convene an international conference of all parties involved, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), defending the right of the Arab people of Palestine to their own state.

CSO: 2020/107

10 May 1985

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BRIEFS

'DEMAGOGIC, PROVOCATIVE' PROGRAM AIRED--Last night, the French state television service transmitted a demagogic, provocative program that falsified both history and the present, grossly insulted the Soviet Union, and openly called for militarism. The program was narrated by the well-known actor and anticommunist Yves Montand, who claimed that the European Continent has been able to live in peace for the past 40 years thanks to the strengths of the NATO, United States protection, and both the French and British nuclear weapons. He preached the need for a greater arms buildup and not to believe relaxation of tension and peace. The program sponsored by the French bourgeois and progovernment media has caused indignation among the progressive public. Peace and antiwar organizations today indignantly condemned the television program, which was titled "Face to Face With War," and declared as a reply to the warmongering television program, the holding of a broad peace discussion platform on Saint German des Pres in Paris on 4 May. The director of the daily of the French Communist Party L'HUMANITE appealed to all three French television channels to give equal time under the same conditions as given to the demagogic program on war to a program entitled "Face to Face in Peace" with the participation of progressive personalities of French cultural life. [Text] [LD191937 Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 1600 GMT 19 Apr 85]

JAKES HOLDS TALKS WITH CUBAN OFFICIAL--Milos Jakes, member of the Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, received Alberto Hernandez, deputy chief of the Economics Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC] today. Their conversation covered current tasks and the experience of the two fraternal parties in the implementation of the economic programs of the 16th CPCZ Congress and the 2d [PCC] Congress, a number of questions pertaining to the further expansion of mutual economic, scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries, and the implementation of the conclusions of the CEMA economic summit conference. [Text] [LD191720 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1330 GMT 19 Apr 85]

CSSR-LIBYA, CSSR-PDRY TRADE SESSIONS BEGIN--The ninth session of the joint Czechoslovak-Libyan committee for trade, economic and scientific-technical cooperation started in Brno today. The Czechoslovak delegation is led by Minister of Foreign Trade Bohumil Urban and the Libyan delegation is led by Mubarak al-shamikh, secretary of the General People's Committee for Communications and Maritime Transport. The further development of trade and economic relations, possibilities of construction of important industrial complexes in

Libya and the broadening of trade cooperation are on the agenda. The fourth session of the joint commission for trade exchanges, economic and scientific-technical cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the people's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) also started in Brno today. Bohumil Urban also discussed possibilities of broadening mutual cooperation with Mozambique Minister of Foreign Trade Joaquim de Carvalho. [Text] [LD211426 Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 1300 GMT 21 Apr 85]

SPANISH CP DELEGATION CONTINUES VISIT--Frantisek Brabenec, secretary of the Central Trade Union Council (URO), yesterday [16 Apr] received the study delegation of the Communist Party (Spain), led by Angelo Campos, member of the Party's Central Committee, which is in the CSSR at the CPCZ Central Committee's invitation. In a friendly talk they briefed each other on the activity and main tasks of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH) and of the Spanish workers commissions (CCOO). The representatives of the two organizations expressed in the talk their concurrent views on the inevitability of continuing to create the action unity of the international workers and trade union movement in defending the justified economic and social demands of the working people, in the fight for peace and disarmament and for continuing the policy of detente. [Text] [AU181113 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Apr 85 p 2]

TALKS WITH YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC--Yemen Arab Republic--Talks started yesterday in Sanaa between foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia and Yemen Arab Republic, Bohuslav Chnoupek and 'Abd al-Karim al-'Iryani. Bohuslav Chnoupek arrived in Sanaa on an official visit. Both representatives pointed to the importance of political contacts between governments of the two friendly countries and spoke in favor of further deepening of cooperation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic missions attached to the United Nations Organization and at other international forums. When exchanging views on the present international situation, they agreed that the most important task of the present is to avert the danger of nuclear war and to preserve world peace. In this connection they said that both Czechoslovakia and Yemen Arab Republic share a concern over the arms race, above all the attempts to militarize outer space. [Text] [LD210847 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0730 GMT 21 Apr 85]

HUNGARY, CSSR DISCUSS LANGUAGE TRAINING--Concepts aimed at promoting the mother tongue education of Slovaks living in Hungary and Hungarians living in Slovakia were mentioned at talks conducted by Minister of Culture and Education, Bela Kopeczi in Bratislava. At the 2-day meeting Hungarian-Slovak education and scientific ties were discussed, as were further possibilities for developing cooperation. [Text] [LD241058 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 24 Apr 85]

CSO: 2500/349

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

STOPH INTERPRETS VICTORY CELEBRATION SIGNIFICANCE

East Berlin NEUER WEG in German Vol 40 No 6, Mar 85 (signed to press 14 Mar 85) pp 211-216

[Article by Willi Stoph, member of the SED Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers: "At the USSR's Side, the GDR is Among History's Victors"]

[Text] The people of the GDR celebrate as a national holiday the 40th anniversary of the USSR victory over Hitler-fascism and the liberation of the German people from Nazi rule. In this, they feel as one with the Soviet Union and all forces who stand for peace, international understanding, social progress and humanitarianism.

A Milestone on the Road to the Eleventh Party Congress

Communists in the party collectives, utilizing the Ninth Session of the SED Central Committee and the speech by comrade Erich Honecker before the first secretaries of the kreis leaderships, are undertaking to make this anniversary a climax of political-ideological work. Standing at the head of their work collectives, with new achievements in the socialist competition, they will make 8 May 1985 a milestone on the road to the Eleventh Party Congress.

Looking at the course of the 20th century up to the present, there were two events which left their special imprint. In 1917, the Great Socialist October Revolution broke the chains of the exploiter society, stopped imperialist annexation, and opened to the peoples the gateway to the bright future of socialism.

In 1945, the Soviet Union, as the major force of the anti-Hitler coalition, liberated mankind from fascism, that most monstrous product of imperialism, and initiated a far-reaching change of the international situation in favor of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism, which led to the development of the socialist world system.

The attitude toward those events characterizes the position in the class struggles of our time. For this reason, the evaluation of 8 May 1945 has led to fundamental expositions which, in the last analysis, all end up in the all-decisive task of the present, securing world peace.

Triumphant Advance of Socialism on German Soil

The position of communists in this exposition is clear and unequivocal. It was confirmed by the Secretary General of the SED Central Committee, comrade Erich Honecker, in his speech before the first secretaries of the kreis leaderships, with this statement: the "act of liberation gave our people the chance for a new start, which also initiated the triumphant advance of socialism on German soil."

The 40th anniversary of the day of liberation is the occasion to recall the historic events which link most closely our entire life, our work, and our struggle to 8 May 1945. It remains unforgotten that the victors over genocidal Hitler-fascism, striving for world domination, came to us from the first socialist state of the world, as friends of the working people.

The ruins of the criminal war were still smoking, and the wounds inflicted by rapacious fascism were still fresh. But the Soviet soldiers shared their bread with the needy population and lent a helping hand where it was a matter of resuming again a peaceful life. Thus they proved themselves to be true proletarian internationalists who contributed by their attitude to the removal of the moral ravages brought about by monstrous anticommunist propaganda of hatred and horror.

With the support of Soviet class comrades and utilizing their experience, the activists of the first hour laid the foundation stone for the building of our workers-and-peasants power. In accordance with the terms established in the Potsdam Agreement by the states of the anti-Hitler coalition, imperialism and militarism were eradicated by their roots, and fundamental democratic reforms were carried out. It is thanks to the united workers' class and its Marxist-Leninist party that it assumed the leadership in this revolutionary process and assembled for joint action all antifascist democratic forces in the Democratic Bloc and in the National Front.

New Quality of Fraternal Relations

With the founding of the GDR, which constituted a turning point in the history of the German people and of Europe, fraternal relations with the country of our liberators gained a new quality. In inseparable alliance with the USSR, the first workers-and-peasants state on German soil grew strong. Friendship with the Soviet Union became solidly anchored in the hearts and minds of millions of people and thus became a matter close to the heart of the people. Whether it was a matter of fending off the numerous imperialist attacks on our young state, or breaking through the diplomatic blockade, the Soviet Union was always at our side as a true friend.

The proclamation on the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitler fascism and the liberation of the German people states: "The indestructible fraternal bond between the SED and CPSU counts among the greatest achievements of our development." Ongoing universal cooperation, coordination of foreign policy activities, and the deepening of socialist

economic integration provide strong impulses for the growth and prosperity of our country.

A Large Bridge of Beneficial Cooperation

A large bridge of cooperation, constantly widening and becoming ever more beneficial, stretches from the historic proclamation of the Communist Party of Germany in June 1945, the program of our Party, the resolutions of the Tenth Party Congress and the Ninth Session of the Central Committee; from the Constitution of the GDR, membership in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance and the Warsaw Pact, to multilateral treaties and agreements. An outstanding place is occupied by the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded 10 years ago and constantly proves its worth.

The Warsaw Pact has existed for almost 3 decades as a collective political and military alliance in which the GDR cooperates with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal European countries. The unity and unanimity of the socialist community of states, and above all the decisive share of the Soviet Union in the protection of socialism and its tireless efforts for peaceful coexistence of states independent of their societal order, have ensured for the European continent the longest period of peace in this century. In the battle against the dangers stemming from the policy of confrontation and armament of the most aggressive imperialist circles, especially the United States, our republic--at the line of separation between Warsaw Pact and NATO--makes its contribution to successful implementation of the joint peace strategy of socialism.

Resolutions for the Present and Future

For the tasks to be solved in the present and future, outstanding significance must be attributed to the resolutions of CEMA economic consultation at the highest level, and to the long-term program of cooperation in science, technology and production which was also agreed upon last year between the GDR and the Soviet Union. On these solid foundations, cooperation between the two states is developing, and ever more numerous are the close contacts between party, trade union, and youth organizations, between factories and institutions, between working people from the most varied sectors of society. Constantly growing is the number of citizens who, on their vacations, enjoy the beauties of the vast Soviet land and experience the warmth and hospitality of its inhabitants.

All of these facts are well-known in our country, and the older comrades helped prepare the way for many events. But we must also take into consideration that at present, already more than half of our population did not personally experience the day of liberation and owe their knowledge to the descriptions of older people and history lessons. For this reason, the responsibility of the party organizations and of each comrade is growing each year to make younger generations aware of the magnitude of the victory, for which 20 million Soviet citizens and many other fighters on the

antifascist front, among them German resistance fighters, gave what is most valuable—their lives. As the joint proclamation of the SED Central Committee, the State Council, and the National Council of the National Front stated, the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great National War of the Soviet People demonstrated "the historic superiority of the promising socialist society and showed: Nothing can succeed in defeating socialism and reestablishing the capitalist order of exploitation. Socialism embodies historic progress, the welfare and the future of peoples." From this fact stems our certainty to be among the victors of history, today and forever."

Ultrareactionaries in the FRG Call for Crusade

But there are ultrareactionaries in the FRG who are taking the floor and are interpreting 8 May in their own way. It is those revanchists who question the results of World War II, and in particular want to keep open the so-called "German question." They call for a "crusade against socialism," which they want to "behead with the nuclear sword." It is not surprising, therefore, that voices can be heard in the chorus of these people who reject honoring the 8th of May, because they consider it "the greatest catastrophe of German and European history."

Whoever considers the destruction of Hitler-fascism as "capitulation and defeat," only proves that he has not come to grips with the past, and even today places himself at the side of those who set the whole world on fire. That is a mockery of almost 50 million people for whose blood the German fascists are accountable. This cynical disregard is directed not only at the Soviet Union, which made the greatest sacrifices for the liberation of mankind, but also at its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the peoples of the United States, France, England and other countries, as well as the millions of freedom fighters in all of Europe. These attempts to falsify history are part of the plans of aggression based on the nuclear potential of the United States and NATO. But they have been, and are, condemned to failure. In Europe, after the fall of the German Reich in the flames of World War II, two sovereign states, independent of each other, were created on German soil, the socialist German Democratic Republic and the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany.

Full Compliance With the Basic Treaty Is Required

A post-war order has grown up in Europe as the political result of four decades of peace which found international confirmation in the Final Act of Helsinki. This also demands that the FRG make every effort so that never again shall another war be started from German soil. This means, above all, full compliance with the Basic Treaty concluded with our republic. Under international law, relations between the GDR and the FRG demand full recognition of our nationality, regulation by mutual consent of the border along the Elbe dissolution of the office in Salzgitter, and converting the two representations into embassies.

It is surely not a coincidence that the observance of the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitler-fascism has found such a wide echo in many European states. History teaches lessons which, when taken to heart, give all peace-loving people new hope that it will succeed in protecting our planet from a nuclear inferno.

At that time, broad people's movements were formed which stood up against fascism and war, and for freedom, democracy, national independence and socialism. They included various social and political forces who were united in the common goal--despite differing views on some questions--to destroy criminal fascism and to reestablish peace.

Broad Movement for the Defense of Peace

Today, when the most aggressive circles of imperialism risk the existence of all of mankind in their striving for world domination, a broad peace movement has developed among the peoples of all five continents, in which antifascists actively participate. Determined actions by the forces for peace contribute to stopping the demented course of imperialist confrontation and armament.

Particularly hopeful is the fact that, in accordance with the humanist character of the socialist order of society, the Soviet Union stands in the front line of the fight for peace. Together with the other socialist states, it uses its power and influence to stop the arms race, to lower the level of military confrontation, and to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. Within the framework of the coordinated socialist peace policy, the GDR tries everything within its power so that reason prevails, and so that one can finally achieve to solve even the most complicated international problems through peaceful means.

At present, the nations are looking to the Geneva negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the entire complex range of nuclear and space weapons. Increasingly, the realization is gaining ground that preventing a militarization of space would create favorable conditions for disarmament on earth. The success of the talks depends essentially on the condition that the U.S. side also recognizes fully the principle of equality and equal security.

The GDR Fulfills the Legacy of the Anti-fascists

The successful development of the GDR, based on the unswerving fraternal bond with the Soviet Union, the internationally respected peace policy of our state, and the achievements of the workers, prove that our country has heeded the lessons of the past and has fulfilled the legacy of the anti-fascists. Also because of this, our people, who have opted irrevocably for socialism, are among history's victors.

The close cooperation between the SED and CPSU, the GDR and the USSR, continues the tradition of German communists who have always taken clear positions in the great conflicts between progress and reaction. During the

time of imperialist intervention in the years 1918 to 1920, the KPD stood in solidarity at the side of the young Soviet power the spirit of proletarian internationalism has always and at all times determined the attitude toward the first worker and peasant state in the world, and our unforgotten comrade, Ernst Thaelmann, did so immeasurably much for German-Soviet friendship. German communists fearlessly confronted the rising brown danger [Nazis], and together with patriots from different strata of the people continued their fight even during the hard times of Hitler-fascism. In illegality, in prisons, concentration camps, and in exile, their actions were testimony to the continued existence of another Germany, whose humanistic achievements are respected all over the world.

In our country, antifascist traditions are cultivated, and resistance fighters occupy a highly regarded place everywhere in society. At present, many meetings are taking place where German antifascists with comrades from various European countries reach conclusions for the present from the joint battle. The party organizations are well-advised when they use for political-ideological work the rich treasure of experience which our male and female comrades, tested in hard class struggles, have garnered in their battle-filled lives. We must always demonstrate to the younger people in our ranks that true patriots are, at the same time, also socialist internationalists.

Experience Must be Used in Party Work

Patriotism and internationalist are demonstrated in our days through concrete deeds which serve to strengthen socialism, and thus also make peace more secure. They include model work performances as well as the readiness to protect what has been created from the attack of imperialist adversaries.

Starting from this realization, the working class and all worker of the republic are implementing the 1985 economic plan as the work program of the entire people in preparation for our Eleventh Party Congress. This has found concrete expression in the battle programs of the basic organizations. In coming weeks, many collectives will account for the first stage of their competitive programs on the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitler-fascism and the liberation of the German people. Also a part of this are the obligations deriving from the agreements and treaties concluded with the Soviet Union in the economic and scientific-technological fields.

Onward, Looking Ahead to the Eleventh Party Congress

Advanced experience, but also the development of existing reserves, are increasingly gaining importance for the continuation of socialist competition. The resolutions of the Ninth Session of the Central Committee and the trend-setting speech by Comrade Erich Honecker before the first secretaries of the kreis leaderships have given a clear direction to all party organizations for the work in days to come, so that the Eleventh Party Congress will become a new climax in the life of our fighting union of like-minded people.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

CHURCH PAPER CRITICIZES EMIGRANTS

Jena GLAUBE UND HEIMAT in German Vol 40, No 11, 17 Mar 85 pp 1-2

[Editorial by Dr Gottfried Mueller: "Value of the Homeland"]

[Text] Last week, the daily papers focused attention with large headlines on the emigrant problem. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reported on 6 March that "over 20,000 former citizens wish to return." Just two days later, the same newspaper printed reactions from the GDR population.

The expressions used in this discussion, whether by the newspaper or by private citizens, are quite candid. "Heaven help them if those people receive a modern apartment upon their return!" said a master from the Klement Gottwald Works in Schwerin. The issue was summarized thus by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND: "According to the first opinions, the general feeling is just about totally opposed to the acceptance of requests for permission to return to the homeland.

This mood of rejection directed against those desiring to return arises from the feelings of bitterness and sorrow that the decision to leave the GDR causes among the relatives, friends and colleagues who remain behind. With very few exceptions, the reasons underlying the decision to emigrate are rarely approved by others.

This is also true of the Christian community. The Church has always been opposed to emigration. If, in accordance with Christian belief, the chief purpose of life is to be found in the attempt to care for one's neighbor, then whoever abandons his neighbor is guilty. "Abandoning one's neighbor" is understood here in the widest context. It is clear that the actions of a doctor who hands his patients over to his already overworked colleague in order to seek a supposed self-fulfillment in the west are inexcusable. But people also feel abandoned when "just" a conversation partner, a person with similar attitudes, or a "helper to joy" disappears.

The Church has always been opposed as well to the pretense that the desire to emigrate is justified by the difficulties inherent in the situation of being a Christian in an atheistic country. No one believes that the relationship between Christians and Marxists could possibly be portrayed as idyllic. But the constitutional principle of freedom of belief and conscience is available to every citizen, with the help of the Church in complicated cases. The more often this principle is invoked in an

unprovocative but determined manner, the more impact it will have in actual social practice. The last top-level talks held between the State and the Church, which took place on 11 February, re-confirmed this good perspective.

Because the Church constantly and urgently advises against abandoning the homeland, it is aware of its obligation to take a position with regard to solving, or at least alleviating, the genuine human problems linked to the existence of the systemic borders in Europe. Thus the Church actively supported the Madrid KSZE follow-up conference with its determinations regarding the reuniting of families and comprehensive, transborder communications. And it was more than twenty years ago that Bishop Moritz Mitzenheim of Thuringen pointed out to then head of state Walter Ulbricht the importance of the opportunity to travel (not to emigrate). This resulted in the regulations, which are still valid today, though in a more extensive version, governing travel by retired persons. In this regard too, the usefulness of State-Church encounters at the highest level, should therefore, as history teaches, not be underestimated.

Despite the importance of institutions, the citizens themselves have a crucial role to play in the matter of emigration. It is only rarely that the desire to go or to stay originates in a careful comparison of the socialist and the capitalist systems. The arguments of the would-be returnees, which have appeared in the newspapers, further support this view. Usually more decisive than the question of principles (which certainly should not be underestimated) is the question of the concrete way in which human beings relate to each other. In this relationship, each one of us is a microcosm of society as a whole.

It is therefore important to ask oneself the following questions. How does the work collective react to the self-formed opinion of one of its member? Are discussions frequent and based on factual argumentation, or is there only room for standardized views that evince a sterile correctness? What kind of contact does an employee of the housing allocation office or a school principal have with the citizens? In our society, what are the highest goals of life? If only material things are sought after, it should not come as a surprise that some will want to experience vulgar materialism in its western version for a change. Do our churches really transmit to their parishioners the feeling that they are needed? Do we know how to think globally, and not to degenerate in provincialism? And - and this is a special question for those of us who are Christians - how happy and free are we made by the Good News of Salvation, which we must pass on to others?

The answers to these questions, which could easily be multiplied, indicate the extent to which a homeland is experienced as a home. It is human nature that there will always be a percentage of human beings who break away from any kind of orientation to a home. For such contemporaries, what Master Goetz, of the VEB "Rationalisierungsmittelbau" in Berlin, wrote NEUES DEUTSCHLAND may be valid: "In the words of an old German saying: one should not get in the way of travelers."

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

LATEST CRIME STATISTICS SHOW MINIMAL CHANGE

Bonn INFORMATIONEN in German No 4/1985, 22 Feb 85 pp 16-17

[Article: "GDR Crime Statistics for 1983"]

[Text] Compared to the preceding years, the crime rate in the GDR was allegedly for the most part unchanged in 1983. As is evident from the recently released Statistical Yearbook of the GDR 1984, the number of crimes in 1983, namely 122,656, was 1.65 percent higher than in 1982. For years, however, only part of the crimes have been broken out in the GDR statistics. Only 25 types of offenses are listed each time, which in essence are those covered by classical criminal law. Taken together, these crimes totaled circa 78.6 percent in 1983 (1982: 77.7 percent). Not broken out in 1983, therefore, were 21.3 percent of the crimes, which in large measure were offenses against the state and public order; this includes, among others, convictions for so-called flight from the republic [attempted escape to the West], illegal contacts, and public degradation.

Included among the 25 crimes that are broken out is theft, an offense which for years has occupied a top spot in the crime statistics of the GDR. The incidence of thefts in the total number of crimes was 41.7 percent in 1983 and underwent almost no change compared to 1982 (42 percent). A comparison with the years farther in the past yields essentially the same picture. In dealing with thefts, the GDR differentiates between thefts of "socialist" and "private" property. Theft of "socialist property" in 1983 constituted 18 percent of the crime total and thus showed no change compared with the previous year. Theft of private property in 1983 made up 23.6 percent of the crime total and thus slightly lower than in 1982 (24 percent).

Also included among the property crimes listed are fraud and embezzlement, both to the detriment of "socialist property" and to the detriment of "private property". This offense constituted 6 percent of the crime total and was thus 1.57 percent higher than in 1982. In this category, the number of crimes to the detriment of "socialist property" was 5.1 percent and thus several times higher than the share of such crimes committed at the expense of private property (0.9 percent). Compared to the year before, one is struck particularly by the disproportionate increase in the incidence of fraud and embezzlement to the detriment of "socialist property," which in 1982 had constituted only 4.7 percent of the crime total.

Bodily injury crimes likewise show a slightly increasing trend. In 1983 their share of the total was 9.14 percent (1982: 9 percent; 1980: 8.67 percent). The same trend can also be noted in robberies and extortion, which in 1983 accounted for 0.7 percent of the total (1982: 0.69 percent; 1980: 0.58 percent).

With respect to traffic offenses, the number of convictions for causing a serious traffic accident was 3.1 percent in 1983, a minimal increase over preceding years; the 1982 figure was 3.0 percent, the 1980 figure 2.8 percent. The figure for unauthorized use of a vehicle is 4.7 percent for 1983, compared to 4.4 percent for 1982. Differing from this is the trend in the number of convictions for endangering traffic while intoxicated; those crimes constituted 2.5 percent of the total, or slightly less than in the year before (2.63 percent). Considering the increasing number of passenger cars registered, this can be viewed as a success, for in 1983 the number of passenger cars registered in the GDR passed the 3 million mark.

Resistance to state measures and rowdiness, the only offense among those listed which could have a certain political impact, are dealt with more precisely; whereas convictions for rowdiness show no major changes (1983: 1.67 percent, 1982: 1.68 percent, 1980: 1.7 percent), those for resistance to state measures show a slightly rising trend (1983: 1.12 percent, 1982: 1.08 percent, 1980: 0.95 percent).

The development of the crime rate in the various districts of the GDR and in East Berlin was quite diverse, as in previous years. Berlin (East), as in the past, again registered the highest number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants (1,027 for 1983). Following successful lowering of this figure to less than 1,000 in 1982, this mark was again exceeded in the next year. Trailing far back are the districts of Frankfurt/Oder and Neubrandenburg with 897 crimes each, Potsdam (885), Schwerin (879), Rostock (826), Magdeburg (792), Leipzig (772), and Halle (763); the other districts are markedly lower, with Gera bringing up the rear with 528 crimes [per 100,000 inhabitants].

The number of convictions decreased in 1983--as it did in previous years; it was 68,733, compared to 70,365 in 1982. At the same time, the number of cases turned over to social courts rose from 18,292 (1982) to 21,904.

12689

CSO: 2300/336

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

ALCOHOLISM, CRIME, DESPAIR NOTED IN BERLIN DISTRICT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 18 Mar 85 pp 9-10

[Article by Roland Mischke, datelined Berlin in March: "'Lichtenberg Always Has Been a Rough Neighborhood'--Report on a Family Doctor's Work in an Old East Berlin Workers' District"]

[Text] Dr Heintz is a man in his late sixties, small of stature and tending toward corpulence, his white hair extending wildly from his head, with a twirled mustache and wearing ancient suits. An old gentleman who, without drawing much surprise, might pull a monocle from his coat pocket and press it to his eye. With a small suitcase containing a stethoscope, a pulsimeter, and several small bottles with pills and salves, he walks almost every evening through the East Berlin district of Lichtenberg, along Normannenstrasse, Ruedigerstrasse, Scharnweberstrasse, and the streets intersecting with these, and visits the elderly or helps women in labor.

He believes that he is the only doctor in Lichtenberg who still does this. The young doctors nowadays, he says--not without a touch of rancor--, do not think much of house calls, especially calls which have to be made without a staff car. Heintz, who was born and grew up in Lichtenberg--"that has always been a workers' district"--and who took over his father's practice, knows why too. Whoever enters the houses here, he says, experiences asociality, vandalism and alcoholism, learns of property crimes, prostitution on an opportunity basis and pimping, of incest, child abuse and loss of parental rights, dereliction, juvenile sentences and recidivism. "And for this our young academicians are not prepared at all."

In the dirty side streets of the main arteries that cut through Lichtenberg, in the run-down rear buildings that one would not suspect existed behind the facades of Frankfurter Allee and the Strasse der Befreiung, they suddenly encounter a reality which they have not been told about, which allegedly does not even exist any more in a country such as the GDR.

Five years ago the doctor wanted to close his practice and retire. But that was impossible. "There is currently no replacement for you," he was told at the city hall on Jacques-Duclos-Strasse, and he was urgently requested "to continue on in his profession." And this he did in fact do, after having received confirmation that a replacement for him could really not be found

in the center of the Berlin health system--the largest blood donor center of the GDR is located on Atzpodienstrasse in Lichtenberg, and every fourth hospital bed in East Berlin is in a Lichtenberg clinic. To be sure, Dr Heintz, who belongs to the "Liberal Democratic Party of Germany," did not continue his practice because functionaries asked him to do so, but because of people who in some cases have been his patients for decades, because of the families whom he knows like no one else in the district, and because of the children and the old people who would not have had a family doctor if he had left. "What was I to do? I could not let them down."

In the "Zum Goldbroiler" restaurant at the Frankfurter Alle S-Bahn [city rail system] station--fried chicken with french fries and salad are served here--, the doctor addresses the topic of alcohol. "Actually, the Berliners are whiskey drinkers," he says. One of his patients ("a problem case for as long as I can remember"), whom he has often given a tongue-lashing because of his excessive drinking, the other day gave him a new version of the old barroom adage: "When I've had a whiskey, I'm a different man, and that different man wants a whiskey too!" Heintz, who has been ranting against the alcoholism of the Lichtenberg residents, nevertheless understands the drinkers. In drastic terms he describes the day-to-day life of the people whom he knows: housing worries, neediness, dreariness, and problems with the authorities. That is too much, no one can cope with these things forever. "So what do they do? They drink!" And he adds: "Things were the same in this district in the old days too." He speaks of the resignation which is evident everywhere, of the fatalism of even the very young.

"Lichtenberg has always been a problem area: too much industry, too much polluted air, too many security police, too many plebeians." He can only react with laughter to what is read to him from the city guide of a GDR publishing house: "Lichtenberg is a city district throbbing with life and having strong and high-capacity enterprises, with a working class that is proud of its revolutionary traditions."

Frankfurter Allee, once Reichsstrasse 1 [national highway 1], which linked Aschen with Koenigsberg, is the street which is familiar to all GDR higher-ups. On this street they are driven in their Volvos and Tschaikas whenever there is something to be dedicated again in the neighboring city district of Marzahn. Frankfurter Allee is Lichtenberg's "boulevard," the facades of the old buildings that are still standing have pronounced, almost crude color accentuation, the ruins have been blasted away, and in their place there are now high-rises with shops, boutiques, restaurants and cafes. The obligatory flags flutter in front of the windows. Also structures built in the overly elaborate style of the Stalin era can be seen, with portals that are patterned after Greek temple gables.

On Jacques-Duclos-Strasse, which used to be called Moellendorffstrasse, the old village green can still be made out; the prefab houses here are so high that they rise above the old village church which has been declared a historical monument. The "treasurer village" Lichtenberg is mentioned for the first time in official documents in the year 1288, and later it was turned over with all tillable areas and dues to the city of Berlin, which

leased it out temporarily, e.g., to the court of the elector. Lichtenberg had a small peasant uprising at that time. The village residents, who were supposed to run most of what they earned over to the elector's household, resisted. Berlin immediately took vigorous action: horses, wagons and grain of the rebels were confiscated, several were jailed. The consequences of the Thirty-Year-War were much worse: when it was over, only the families of nine peasants and nine day laborers were left in Lichtenberg. Today the "ice-gray comrades" have infiltrated the district. From here they operate, the numerous employees of the Ministry of State Security, and govern the city from their massive headquarters, a structure with a brown raw concrete facade and windows of ribbed glass, impossible to see through.

Dr Heintz, who while making house calls often passes this tightly guarded building, has his "working places" right behind the city hall, on Normannenstrasse. Here the houses and streets still look as they did at the turn of the century, nobody makes a move to restore the crumbling facades. Children jump around between piles of dog excrement, and the yards belong to pigeons and rats. The waiting Trabis ["Trabant" automobiles] roar their engines in front of the traffic light. The shops with their more or less attractive displays are the only cosmetic touch for the dreary streets between the pediatric hospital Lindenhof, the adjacent central cemetery, the Noeldnerplatz [square] and the most important East Berlin transfer station for S-Bahn passengers, Ostkreuz.

Next door, in one of the "A & V" (An- und Verkauf) [thrift] shops that are becoming more and more popular, connoisseurs who can afford it look through all the wrapped and preserved, dried out and rusted, dust-covered and yellowed goods for a bit of nostalgia for their apartment or dacha. From a porcelain flour jar to a landscape in oil, from a pocket calculator to a hot air heater, something that one will find in no department store (they use too much electricity), nearly everything can be found. The people rummage in lace borders and cartons full of children's toys, sniff at home remedies or leaf through the "Treasury of the German Housewife" in front of the bookshelves. Near the store is one of the many out-of-order telephone booths, in which children are climbing around, noisily talking in their flippant Berlin dialect. Figures which Zille would have sketched.

A few meters further on, a refreshment stand. An elderly woman is trying to remove the tough skin from a bockwurst. On all the small plates there are remnants of the sausage skins, which many consider unpalatable. For this reason this sausage is also called "strip tease sausage" in Lichtenberg. Most of the houses have neither a doorbell nor an intercom; if they are locked, one cannot enter without a key. Yet most of the front doors are wide open. In one hallway, Dr Heintz points to a notice put up by the authorities: "To all tenants. Since burglaries and sleeping in the attics are becoming more frequent, it is necessary, in the interest of order and security in our houses, to keep the front doors locked from 8 pm on, effective immediately. Take care also that the attics and hatches remain closed. With socialist greetings!" Many houses, says Heintz, are in fact locked from 8 pm to 10 pm, thereafter in most cases no one has the time or

inclination to lock them. "Most of the doors are open all night long. And if they are locked, unruly residents or visitors break off the handles and enter forcibly." "It all belongs to the people, after all!": this is allegedly the excuse offered by one person when caught red-handed while kicking in a door.

Many, so says the doctor, wanted to leave this area, especially the young families. And their chances of getting out of this run-down district are better than in other East Berlin districts. Furious construction activity is under way in Lichtenberg; a number of new housing areas are cropping up. The largest at this time is the Ho-Chi-Minh housing area, where the ground was broken in 1960 and 50,000 people are now already residing. In addition, there are the Hans-Loch housing area with 15,000 residents, the Frankfurter Allee-South housing area with 16,000, and the 5,000 apartments built in the past years at S-Bahn station Rummelsburg--on a site which after World War II was for a long time a devastated area covered by rubble mounds of hundreds of bombed out houses.

The Ho-Chi-Minh housing area appears to be the most successful of all the new construction areas. Two ponds, known as Fennpfuhl and Langpfuhl, were integrated into the municipal construction plans; there are 15 combined nurseries and kindergartens, four discount department stores, and other "social facilities." Lichtenberg-Northeast, by comparison, the housing area currently still being built, and planned for 170,000 persons, is a nightmare. Quickly put up buildings, parking lots bordered by garages, the houses high and all of the same form. Heintz admits that the people there have more "living quality", bathrooms and toilets inside the apartment, but he also knows that they must live together with greater anonymity there than in the old city districts. He tells of the building superintendent of a school in the Hans-Loch housing area, who used to live on Fanningerstrasse and who returns there to his favorite saloon almost every evening. There he knows the people, here in his apartment on the eighth floor "the ceiling is falling on his head." The walls are too thin for him, the elevator is often out of order, he knows almost no one in the building. Today 16 percent of the population of East Berlin lives in the Lichtenberg district. And their number is growing.

12689

CSO: 2300/338

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

GDR DEFENSE MINISTER CITES NATO FIRST STRIKE PREPARATIONS

East Berlin VOLKSARMEE in German No 51, 1984 (signed to press 17 Dec 84) p 3

[Unattributed article from the speech of Army General Heinz Hoffman, minister for national defense, at the party aktiv session of 14 Dec 84 in preparation for the 11th SED Congress: "Maintain the Military Balance--Reduce Tensions in the International Situation"]

[Text] On 14 December 1984, the party working group members of the Ministry for National Defense conferred with each other about the tasks for the further work of their party organizations in evaluating the 9th Session of the SED Central Committee in preparation for the 11th Party Congress and the realization of the objectives of the minister for the training year 1984/85. The following took part in this significant party working group session: the member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee and minister for national defense, Army General Heinz Hoffmann, the members of the SED Central Committee and deputy ministers Colonel General Heinz Kessler and Colonel General Fritz Streletz, as well as the representative of the Department for Security Affairs of the SED Central Committee, Major General Fritz Clement.

In the fundamental statements by Army General Heinz Hoffmann, as well as the speeches of Colonel General Heinz Kessler and Colonel General Fritz Streletz, the decisive directives were specified for the uniform and united action of the communists in preparation for the 11th Party Congress. The discussion made clear that in all party collectives the members and candidate members of the party of the working class are pushing with a great sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of the party decisions, commands and instructions. Valuable experience and well-founded conclusions were conveyed, which must now be quickly generalized and purposefully applied in the further work of the party.

The participants of the party working group session assured the general secretary of the SED Central Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker, that especially during this current period of strife and conflict the party leadership can fully rely at any time on the communists and all staff members of the Ministry for National Defense in the military safeguarding of socialism and the defense of peace. The Watchword "Military Exercise 11th Party Congress. Always Combat-Ready for Peace and Socialism!" is the determinant for thought and action. In so doing, they want, above all, to continue to improve the efficiency and quality of the work and to conduct political and ideological work purposefully as the core element of party work. They gave expression to the fact that during the training year 1984/85 they will struggle to attain a high degree of combat effectiveness and combat readiness, so as to make a worthy contribution toward the 11th Party Congress.

At the beginning of his statement, Army general Heinz Hoffmann noted that the 9th Session of the Central Committee provided an impressive and convincing balance sheet of what the working people of the GDR, under the guidance of the party, have accomplished since the 10th Party Congress. "Above all, it proved possible to maintain peace under extraordinarily complicated military and political conditions in firm fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union and the other allied socialist states, and also in close cooperation with the friendly countries and young national states, with the international communist and working class movement and all other columns of the peace forces operating throughout the world."

"Now More Than Ever!" for Mobilizing Force

A mobilizing force, he indicated, has emanated from the words of Erich Honecker "Now more than ever all energy for the struggle for peace!" since the 7th Session of the Central Committee. The purposeful strategy and tactic of the SED in the struggle for the strengthening of socialism and the safeguarding of peace, even under the aggravated political and strategic conditions due to the NATO stationing of missiles, he said, has found the full agreement and active participation of the working people of the GDR and in particular, of course, of his soldiers. "This agreement relates not only to the course of the main task in its unity of economic and social policy, but also fully to the foreign and security policy of our party, to the unity of steps aimed at detente and measures to increase our defense readiness.!"

A Feasible Program for Future Negotiations

The minister then referred to the fact that Comrade Erich Honecker, in the report of the Politburo to the 9th Session of the SED Central Committee, characterized the accelerated arms build-up of the United States in all its danger. Addressing himself to the American preparations for the conduct

of war in space, he said: "In particular in the FRG and its mass media, there is a great deal of speculation at the present time concerning the fact that, at the end of the 'greatest technological battle', as they formulate it there, between the two most powerful nations on earth, America will be victorious." But all serious experts on the subject and on the Soviet Union in the West are warning the United States government against the illusion that Soviet scientists, technicians, military men and politicians would at any time permit a decisive military-technological or military-strategic inferiority of the socialist military power vis-a-vis the United States or NATO.

Nevertheless, [the minister stated] the American preparations for "star wars" signify a great danger for peace and the stability of international relations. For this reason, he indicated, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries, in the communique on their most recent meeting, emphasized the importance of the future American-Soviet negotiations, which do not represent a resumption of previous negotiations, and made the demand "that from the very beginning aims and tasks of these negotiations are established that are designed to strengthen strategic stability, not to allow the militarization of space, and to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe and in the world through the reduction of nuclear weapons--of both strategic and intermediate range--up to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

NATO Is Training For Sudden Aggression

As much attention must be paid to the other measures of U.S. and NATO war preparations against the socialist states as is given to their nuclear arms build-up, he said. According to the long-term armament program and the most recent NATO Council decisions, the possibilities for the sudden launching of an attack and for the conduct of initial strikes with and without nuclear arms should continue to increase. The NATO fall maneuvers carried out this year confirmed that the preparations of the pact for the short-term reinforcement of their armed forces, for the creation of strike forces, as well as for the surprise launching of a war limited to Europe, have reached a high state. They showed the increased striving in NATO for surprise, for a heavy shock and fire power in the units, especially during attack operations and battles, as well as close cooperation of the military services and the NATO contingents.

Material War Preparations and Intensified Revanchism

Army General Heinz Hoffmann referred to a further point of view, which must be given increasingly more attention in the future, viz., the increasing supply of new, highly-effective munitions and weapons systems to the armed forces of the United States and NATO in Central Europe. This, he indicated, includes not only the Pershing II and the cruise missiles. Already by the end of the 1980's, he said, at least 72 operational-tactical Pershing 1 B missiles, with a range of more than 800 kilometers, will be stationed to replace the Pershing 1 A. Also, there is already talk of an additional 200 Pershing missiles, which are to be used with conventional warheads within

the framework of the strategy of "the deep strike" against targets in the depth of the Warsaw Pact states and against the second echelons of our armed forces. The American arms-producing companies are also already working on an improved version of the operational-tactical Lance Missile. NATO, he said, is expecting substantial increases in combat effectiveness from the introduction of the so-called reconnaissance-strike groups.

At the most recent meeting of the defense ministers of the European NATO states, he reported, a whole chain of additional weapons systems were cited, which are to be procured already during the next year. Many of the new and future systems of the main combat equipment of the NATO armed forces, according to Hoffman, possess significantly better battle qualities and, together with new types of munitions and the future mechanization and automation of the troop command, will increase their striking and firing power. In particular, he indicated, there will be an increase in their ability to effectively take under fire a large number of point and area targets. In addition, he reported, NATO has decided on a six-year program for the improvement of the military infrastructure and for the higher stockpiling of munitions, in order to increase the possibilities for the conventional conduct of war and for long-lasting engagements.

Parallel to these extensive preparations for war in the realm of materiel by the FRG, and the other NATO states, he indicated, there is also an increase in the attempts of openly revanchist forces to call into question the results of the Second World War and the postwar development. "Forty years after the total defeat of German imperialism, after the unconditional capitulation of the fascist army, thirty years after the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, these are and remain phantoms, but precisely dangerous phantoms because behind them stand dangerous means of power and influential political forces!"

Warsaw Pact Indispensable for the Maintenance of Peace

"The past 30 years have clearly proved," Army General Heinz Hoffmann noted, "that the Warsaw Pact serves the consistent consolidation of the unity and determination of the socialist countries, that it is indispensable for jointly counteracting the aggressive policy of the United States and its allies, and the war preparations of NATO, in order to make a decisive contribution to the safeguarding of peace in Europe and the entire world! Today it is evident--even to the most obstinate politicians and strategists of NATO--that any attempt of direct military aggression against the state of the Warsaw Pact would end with an unavoidable fiasco for the attacker."

The member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee amplified further: "In order for this to remain as it is, in order for the policy of the United States, the FRG and NATO, which is aimed at military superiority and the overthrow of the socialist state and social order in our countries, not to have any chances of success in the future as well, the GDR, as well as the other states of our alliance, must take all the measures that are necessary with foresight in order to maintain the approximate military balance, to ease the international situation and to safeguard the peaceful future of our nations."

The worthy preparation and execution of the 30th anniversary of our socialist defense alliance and the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism and the liberation of our nations, he said, will contribute to the further strengthening of the friendship between the nations of the socialist community and their armies.

Mastery of Science and Technology Decisive

The minister then turned to conclusions that must be drawn from the evaluations and directives of the 9th Central Committee Meeting. Among other things, he said: "The mastery of science and technology will also decide the future of the GDR as a reliable partner of the Warsaw Pact, as a firm bastion of peace and socialism in the center of Europe, as a socialist state with a firmly established state and social order and a modern national "defense." In the struggle for high combat effectiveness and combat readiness in the National People's Army and the border troops of the GDR, for high reliability of the entire national defense, [he said], the main path is called intensification and higher efficiency. Where the ratio of expenditure and utility is concerned--and this is the issue, according to Hoffmann, not only with the processing of material and financial security--genuine advances are possible only through new scientific findings, through their constant acquisition and conscious, creative application.

The 9th Plenum, he said, leads us to understand still better that quality and efficiency are the decisive criteria of our work and that this constantly requires the hard work of all cadres with respect to themselves, their political and military leadership qualities, abilities and skills, their knowledge and their know-how. "For to lead collectives as a military superior, to be in charge of leadership organs or staff sections, after all, means first of all to work with people, to direct them politically and militarily in a competent, convincing, circumspect and purposeful manner toward a goal, to organize, to motivate and to qualify them for the fulfillment of a task."

In the command of troops, too, according to Hoffmann, no fewer scientific-technological upheavals are taking place than with the weapons and technical means of combat. Thus, he said, it is today indispensable that the latest achievements of several sciences be placed simultaneously in the service of troop command--from psychology and sociology through cybernetics and critical path analysis to higher mathematics and microelectronics. This, he indicated, is a prerequisite in order to prepare the troops for armed combat, to lead them and to use the weapons systems in such a way that they do not let themselves be surprised by the enemy. "In the end we will carry out the scientific-technical revolution in the sphere of troop command in the socialist armed forces more effectively than the enemy because we are doing it quite consciously for our people, for the members of the army and the working people, as well as quite consciously with them."

8970

CSO: 2300/334

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

RESEARCH LIBRARY HOLDINGS, CIRCULATION DESCRIBED

East Berlin PRESSE-INFORMATIONEN in German No 28, 7 Mar 85 p 6

[Unattributed article under rubric "Numbers and Facts": "Academic Libraries--an Inexhaustible Resource for Research, Teaching and Practice"]

[Text] The general and technical academic libraries are part of the academic library network. The most significant are the Deutsche Staatsbibliothek [German national library] in Berlin, the Deutsche Buecherei [German library] in Leipzig, the Saxon state library in Dresden, and the Gotha research library. In addition, there are the university and technical school libraries, the academies-of-science libraries, the general academic libraries at bezirk level, the special libraries for various firms and combines and the libraries for governmental agencies.

In conjunction with the scientific information and documentation organizations, these libraries are responsible, in particular, for the timely dissemination of the latest scientific and technical findings and developments throughout the world to scientists and researchers, engineers and innovators for their analysis. With their specific means, they promote science, education and culture in our country.

The Deutsche Staatsbibliothek in Berlin and the Deutsche Buecheri in Leipzig share the function of a national library. The Deutsche Staatsbibliothek gathers, stores, accesses and disseminates East German and foreign literature in a manner appropriate to research and education needs. It is also responsible for preserving and maintaining national and international literary heritage and for receiving and increasing the pre-1913 German national library holdings. In orchestration with the academic libraries, it acts as the central coordination point for circulation and the central catalogue for foreign periodicals and monographs and for questions about manuscripts and incunabula.

The Deutsche Buecheri in Leipzig represents the central archives for German literature since 1913 and serves as the bibliographic information center for German literature. This institution is responsible for the direction and coordination of bibliographic services and bibliographic institutions in the GDR. It preserves the national literary heritage including the holdings of a German national library from 1913 on.

A number of large academic libraries, university and technical school libraries, academies-of-science libraries act as a central technical library. Working together with the technical information and documentation institutions, they constantly make an increasing contribution to meeting the information needs of users in the technical school system, the combines, plants and other areas. With their specific resources, they help increase the effectiveness of research and education, as well as communist training.

The academic libraries' services and capacities are being systematically developed. In the Ministry for Technical and Vocational Schools alone, to which the Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, the Deutsche Buecheri, the Saxon state library, seven university libraries, 19 technical school libraries, and three medical academy libraries, and the Gotha research library belong, the resources for accessions increased by 50 percent between 1970 and 1980. Compared to 1970, the services in local lending increased by 61 percent and by 76 percent for inter-library loans in 1983.

The three central public libraries, the Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, Deutsche Buecheri, the Saxon state library, have about 11.7 million items in their collection, primarily monographs, periodicals, newspapers, dissertations. The university libraries have about 19 million items in their collection; the ten technical and economic vocational schools, about 2.7 million; the medical school libraries, about 415,000; the nine engineering technical schools, about 720,000; and the Gotha research library, about 525,000. In total, the almost 300,000 annual users have over 35 million items in the collections available to them in the Ministry for Technical and Vocational Schools alone.

The libraries of the Academy of Sciences, including the main library and over 70 affiliated libraries of the science institute have more than two million items in their collection. They receive a total of more than 20,350 periodicals and have counted almost 259,000 users within and without the academic area. The agricultural central library at the GDR Academy for Agricultural Sciences reported a collection of about 368,000 items and almost 13,000 users.

The central conference of academic libraries which met in January 1985 placed greater demands on the range of services, on administration and planning, and on the capacities and working methods and organization of the libraries. It was oriented especially towards quicker access and targeted dissemination of the increasing wealth of international knowledge and break-throughs. This requires the consistent implementation of a new quality of cooperation in coordinating and sharing work on the basis of modern information and communication technologies.

In the near future, with the further expansion and solidifying of the technical and territorial cooperation and the step-by-step modernization material-technical bases, the academic libraries will be forming not only the prerequisites for an intensively expanded reproduction of these social niches that are closely connected to research, but especially greater

effectiveness of the economic potential. Cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the area of literature and information services, especially, will contribute to increasing the standard of the library's work and the complex information retrieval for research, teaching, and practice in the GDR.

12348

CSO: 2300/339

10 May 1985

HUNGARY

WRITER DEFENDS HARSH CRITICISM OF STALINISM

Budapest MAI MAGAZIN in Hungarian Mar-85 pp 18-20

[Interview with Erzsebet Galgoczi, by Zoltan Eros: "Vidravas [Otter Trap] in the Well." MAI MAGAZIN is the pictorial monthly of the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT].]

[Text] [Question] I have here in my hand the 5 March 1952 issue of SZABAD IFJUSAG. On its front page there is a glowing, panegyric lead article greeting Matyas Rakosi, "our beloved leader" and "a great and wise son of our nation," on the occasion of his 60th birthday. And I also have here "Vidravas" [The Otter Trap], the greatest Hungarian bestseller in late fall and winter of 1984, a work of fiction that passes ruthlessly frank and harsh judgment on the body- and soul-crippling political mechanism and state power structure of what is known as the Rakosi era, the 1950's. Don't you find this a bit strange and embarrassing? Does it not discredit you as a writer, to say nothing else?

[Answer] Not at all. The glowing birthday article was written by a 22-year-old peasant girl, a student of the College of Dramatic Art who was planning to become a screenwriter, and who sincerely believed what the Rakosi gang was saying and preaching. And why should she have not believed, hoped and applauded with a beaming face when, thinking of her own bright future, she was aware that she had only the new system to thank for this opportunity to study and advance socially.

But "Vidravas" has been written by the Erzsebet Galgoczi who became a believer in reality the moment her eyes opened and she saw the wide and ever-deepening gulf between the high-sounding principles on the one hand, and everyday life and practice on the other.

[Question] When did this moment of truth occur that has shaped your entire career and attitude as a writer?

[Answer] Six months after my greetings to Rakosi were published. At Christmas in 1952. When I went home for the holidays to my place of birth, Mefocsanak, I was confronted with reality amidst bitter feelings. I was able to see and experience directly the pauperization of my parents and the entire village, their shocking defenselessness at the mercy of the jaras and local potentates.

Because they knew I was a Budapest reporter, relatives, neighbors, friends, and even villagers whom I knew less well, came to me practically in tears to complain how wickedly and dishonestly the chairman of the village council had treated them. As the end of the year approached, it turned out that for some reason or other the village had fallen short of fulfilling its plan for compulsory deliveries. The chairman of the village council summoned the peasants for an accounting. Naturally, everyone took with him the carefully saved receipts for the compulsory deliveries. When everyone was able to prove that he had fulfilled his compulsory deliveries without failure, the chairman of the village council took away the receipts, tore them up one by one, threw them into the paper basket, and again demanded deliveries of everyone. There was nothing else to do than to scrape together again somehow the farm products for compulsory delivery. As a result, the village nearly starved. I remember that also in our house the Christmas menu consisted of potatoes fried in sunflower oil. That was what we ate for days, because we did not have at home even a deciliter of milk, a single egg, or a kilogram of flour.

Well, I wrote up in a report everything I had heard and seen. But IRODALMI UJSAG was able to publish my article only six months later, in July 1953, after the government's new program had been announced. My article caused a big storm even so. After its publication there followed an eight-months-long investigation and harassment involving ten organs, including the Ministry of the Interior and the Council of Ministers as well. During this time the village was so intimidated that, when I was confronted with them, the people even denied ever having spoken to me. "We don't know her, she is not a local girl," the neighbors said. Even my poor mother was so afraid that she testified: "My Bozsike has not been home recently, she could not have talked with anyone in the village."

Since this article that caused such a storm, I have written not a single stereotyped enthusiastic article, but the more "jolting" investigative reports and short stories. Although I had to reckon with the possibility that not every one of them would see print, I was unwilling to describe as white something that actually was black. In 1954, for example, KORTARS rejected one of my short stories about two university students who get married, but the poverty and hopelessness destroyed their pure love. The editor in chief accused me of distorting reality, because there were no such things under socialism. Well, just to show how "redolent of life" this short story was, it is included also in my collection of short stories "Ott is csak ho van" [There Is Snow Even There] that was published in 1961.

Thus I have nothing to be ashamed of, and do not have to examine my conscience as a writer, because of the 1950's. My conscience is clear. What I wrote then, I acknowledge even today, without shame. I feel that I have the right and moral credibility to write about the period.

[Question] I do not question this right. However, your latest effort and your choice of subject have caused some surprise, among fellow writers and readers alike. After all, Erzsebet Galgoczi's range of interest is the world of today. We have become accustomed to your probing and uncovering the contradictions of the present in practically all of your books and works of fiction. Now that

you, too, have chosen this fashionable subject, one cannot help but ask a question or two that may seem rude. Again the 1950's? Has the flood of books, films and TV plays about them not been enough?

[Answer] Perhaps it has become fashionable to dwell on the period, to write and make films about it. In this avid interest, of course, there have surfaced also opportunists, in addition to the honest and commendable creative intentions and efforts. But I see nothing at all wrong with this fashion. A fashion necessarily develops when, after lengthy bashful silence, it finally becomes permissible to write about the period.

I was not bothered or influenced the least bit in my undertaking by the fact that now practically everyone is dwelling on this period. To the contrary, I finally began to write "Vidravas" specifically because, despite the numerous publications and works, there has not been up to now a single comprehensive work about the 1950's that offers an authentic and nuanced presentation of the horrible damage and destruction that this period wrought in the soul of practically entire Hungarian society of that time, and the effects of which are being felt even today. For there is not a single class or stratum that has survived the 1950's without loss of blood. Besides the honest pro-Hungarian Communists and politicians, hundreds of workers, peasants, intellectuals and ordinary people were imprisoned innocently. A shocking statistic, but very typical nonetheless of the period: in the 1950's, police or court proceedings were instituted against one out of every five adult Hungarians!

Well, it is not up to me to determine how successful I have finally been in presenting a comprehensive and nuanced picture of the period. In any event, the readers received my novel gratefully and thought highly of it. In the weeks following the book's publication, hundreds of strangers wrote or telephoned to thank me for my effort. For having erected with my work a monument to the hundreds and thousands of ordinary people, as an elderly caller put it whose daughter was taken away by the AVH [State Security Authority] in 1951 from the Academy of Fine Arts, and the family received official notice of her death only in 1955. To this day they do not know when and under what circumstances she died.

But when I was invited to give a lecture at the School of Journalism, even young people who do not remember those years told me that from my book they now finally understood what the Rakosi period had really been like.

[Question] Often specifically this understanding and interpretation are the problem. Those who learn about the 1950's from such literary works and films get a rather one-sided and practically stereotyped picture of the period. Yet there were not only abuses of power, distortions and destruction, but also new plants and factories were established, the country was developing, and socialism was being built.

[Answer] These days I, too, often hear this opinion, and from people who know very well that it is impossible to write horrible things about the period that are not true even in their one-sidedness. In my opinion, the 1950's--in other words, the period from Rajk's trial in 1949 to 1956--has only harmed the Hungarian people and the cause of socialism. Actually the conditions for

socialist transformation were in place, and the foundations of the new social system had already been laid in 1945-1949. A land reform and stabilization had already taken place, nationalization had been completed, and the constitution had been adopted. A large part of the investment in industry between 1949 and 1956 has not benefited the country much, because the projects were built so haphazardly and operated so uneconomically that the incidental costs far exceeded the initial outlays.

Politically the six or seven years from 1949 to 1956 were unambiguously harmful. The Rakosi gang, and the party and state leadership serving him, committed the unpardonable and still barely reparable crime of depriving the Hungarian workers and peasants even of their national self-esteem and national awareness, by branding the entire Hungarian nation guilty of World War II. They destroyed every kind of human fellowship, in town and country alike. The positive thing about the Rakosi system was that the children of workers and poor peasants were able to study. They were given an opportunity unimaginable earlier, to advance from their backward and poor environment. But this virtue is so overshadowed by the mistakes and distortions that one is able to write mainly about the negative features of the 1950's. Thus the writer or artist must assume this one-sidedness because, paradoxically, only in this way is he able to depict the period realistically. But the 1950's themselves were a paradox, a Kafkaesque absurdity.

[Question] As was the story or tragedy of one of the novel's protagonists, Dr Pal Simon, the renowned geologist and oil-exploration specialist. On the basis of trumped up charges, he was sentenced initially to death by hanging, and then his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, because Pal Simon's professional skill and knowledge were indispensable to the success of the prospecting for petroleum that began just then in the Alföld. Thus it happened that in the morning he was secreted from prison as a civilian, to direct and organize the exploration of the oil field. And in the evening he was returned as a prisoner to his cell. This is almost unbelievable.

[Answer] But that is exactly what happened. Every letter of what I wrote in my book about the fate and tribulations of Dr Pal Simon (Simon Papp in real life), chief geologist, university professor and retired director general of the Hungarian-American Oil Company (MAORT), is an authentic documentary. When I first heard his story seven years ago, at the Washington congress of American university instructors of Hungarian extraction, I myself did not believe it. But I decided to look into the story and write about it. At that time, of course, I did not foresee what unexpected difficulties and resistance I would encounter already in gathering my material. First of all, I gained access to the 500-page court record of the MAORT trial--it had taken place in December 1948--in one of the archives only with special permission, after months of delay. From the record I copied the names of the defendants, their interrogators, lay assessors, defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge. At home I looked up in the telephone book and called, one after the other, everyone who had been involved with the case at that time. Everyone still living was willing to be interviewed. The ones who had sent to prison, and who had sat in prison, and some who had done both. Specifically with their help, I came across many data, facts and interrelations that previously had been unknown.

During the three years of painstakingly gathering my material, in the restricted section of the Szechenyi Library and in various domestic archives, I scanned and read all the pertinent press reports, documents, records and memos that I deemed important. To my great amazement, I even found in the National Archives an 800-page doctoral dissertation on the background of the MAORT case, written with the obvious intent of rehabilitating Simon Papp and his codefendants.

[Question] It is indeed rare to find an author who devotes so much time and effort to writing a book as you did in the case of "Vidravas." But why have you chosen such an odd form for your novel? On the basis of the vast amount of data and facts that you researched and gathered, enough for several works, you could have written even a documentary on Simon Papp and the 1950's.

[Answer] After I organized my several kilograms of notes and succeeded in making them manageable, I attempted to write an outline. That took 10 months. But the story just refused to gel. As I mentioned at the start of our interview, my intention was to write a novel that would comprehensively present and highlight the fate and everyday lives of every social class and stratum--from the technical and classical intellectuals who had "served" the Horthy regime, down to ordinary workers and peasants--in this oppressive and anxiety-ridden period. To this end I had to blend the documentary with fiction. In other words, I had to invent subplots and walk-on characters, with the help of which the stories of the fictitious Orsolya Rev and real-life Dr Pal Simon came together as a novel.

[Question] You claim that the talented peasant girl Orsolya Rev, an art student expelled because of kulak parents, did not exist. Yet many readers believe they recognize the young Erzsebet Galgoczi in this protagonist.

[Answer] Somehow there is always a bit of the author in his work. Although in "Vidravas" I have not written about the start of my own career, Orsolya Rev does have something in common with my past, with my former self. In 1949, after graduating from secondary school, I was admitted to the Faculty of Philosophy in Budapest, although I wanted at all cost to study screenwriting at the College of Dramatic Art. But my mother would not hear of it. She forbade me outright to take the entrance examination at the College of Dramatic Art. Her unshakeable opinion was that every "actress" was a whore. I did not think so. Anyhow, I wanted to be a screenwriter, not an actress.

At the Faculty of Philosophy, however, I did not get a scholarship, because my parents with their 18 cadastral yokes counted as middle peasants. I was unable to get any assistance from home because compulsory deliveries were so strict, and taxes so high, that sometimes even my parents did not have enough to eat. After six weeks, therefore, I went back from Budapest to the village of my birth, to escape starvation.

I looked for work in Gyor, but every morning there was a kilometer-long queue in front of the employment office. Fortunately, a former classmate sat at the office's window. Although he was unable to find me office work commensurate with my educational qualifications, he promised to smuggle me in among the nuns of a just disbanded order in Gyor, and the prostitutes of the brothel, because

the Gyor Railroad Car Factory had been ordered to hire them. In this way I became a lathe operator trainee in the factory. But to this day I do not know whether I was hired as a nun or as a prostitute. The next year, in 1950, I was admitted to the College of Dramatic Art, after winning first prize with a short story in a national talent contest sponsored by DISZ [Federation of Working Youth]. My mother finally was forced to reconcile herself to the idea, because here I already received a scholarship. So much for the parallel between the two careers.

[Question] The final scene in "Vidravas" gives readers the impression that Erzsébet Galgóczi will probably continue the story of Orsolya Rev in the years after 1956.

[Answer] I certainly have gathered enough material through my research, investigations and, last but not least, my life experience to allow me to start working on the sequel, even tomorrow if I wanted to. For the time being, however, I am letting the story mature for a few years. The 1960's are so recent that it would not be possible to write about them without tearing up old wounds. Not even the wounds inflicted on our society's body in the 1950's have healed completely as yet. Some things in that period cannot be told or brought to light even today. The vicissitudes of my manuscript are a good example. To put it delicately and diplomatically: the submitted typescript of my novel is not identical, letter for letter, with the published work. But the essential thing is that in the end it was allowed to appear. This tells one more than anything else about our present political climate.

1014

CSO: 2500/333

HUNGARY

SCOPE OF 40TH ANNIVERSARY AMNESTY DESCRIBED

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Apr 85 p 8

[Interview with Justice Ministry Assistant Chief of Section, Dr Gyorgy Moldovanyi: "Who Is Affected by the Amnesty?"; date and place not specified]

[Text] On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Hungarian People's Republic the Presidential Council has proclaimed a general amnesty. The law decree concerning this will be effective on 5 April, and therefore because of the nature of the matter we asked Dr Gyorgy Moldovanyi questions about the concepts in the short announcement which has already been published rather than about the specifics of the statutory provision.

[Question] How shall we interpret the statement in the announcement that the general amnesty originated in accordance with our principles of penal policy?

[Answer] The sentences meted out by our penal courts are fair and just, and therefore there is no need for any kind of subsequent correction. The goal of the general amnesty is that it should extend primarily to those who have committed lesser crimes which generally were not premeditated.

[Question] The law decree differentiates between premeditated crimes and crimes of negligence.

[Answer] Those who committed crimes of negligence are to be granted amnesty in every case, that is, without regard to personal circumstances. On the other hand, those who committed premeditated crimes will receive amnesty only if justified for humanitarian reasons.

[Question] What is included in the expression "humanitarian"?

[Answer] It means that primarily those will share in the general amnesty whose life circumstances are unusually difficult, e.g., mothers who are living with children under 10 years of age (without regard to whether they are living in marriage or not), pregnant women--I believe I do not have to give reasons for this--and women who have passed their 55th year and men who have passed their 60th year. Also those who are incurably ill or suffer from a life-threatening illness. The latter is a medical judgment and must be medically verified, if necessary a medical expert in judicial affairs must be used.

[Question] This is partly an enforcement amnesty and partly a procedural amnesty.

[Answer] The enforcement amnesty means that a sentence already in effect cannot be carried out, or the enforcement of a punishment already being carried out must be terminated. As a consequence of the enforcement amnesty, imprisonment under 3 years or correctional rehabilitation work will be waved. And a prison term over 3 years will be reduced by one half, that is, a 5-year term will be reduced to 2 years and 6 months.

[Question] How is the granting of probation adjusted?

[Answer] Probation will be granted on the basis of the reduced extent of the punishment.

[Question] Does the general amnesty extend to fines?

[Answer] No, nor does it apply to secondary sentences.

[Question] What does procedural amnesty mean?

[Answer] This means that the process cannot be started because the crime comes under the terms of the amnesty. Or if already started, it must be discontinued whether the case is in an investigative or trial phase.

[Question] For example, if the crime is not discovered until August but was committed before 5 April does it come under the terms of the amnesty depending on the conditions?

[Answer] Yes, in such cases the authorities renounce an investigation or if it has already been ordered and the exact date of the crime committed, or some other circumstance listed in the decree with the force of law, becomes known only later, the investigation is terminated. The general amnesty is a cause for terminating culpability like the statute of limitations.

[Question] Does all this extend also to violations of administrative regulations?

[Answer] General amnesty does not extend to such violations.

[Question] Does the application of general amnesty have to be requested?

[Answer] It need not be requested. It is investigated by the office of the procedural authority. But there are conditions which must be verified by the person concerned in his own interest. Such, for example, are pregnancy or incurable illness. In given cases the person concerned may also call attention of the procedural authorities to conditions which may have escaped their attention.

[Question] What conditions exclude the application of general amnesty?

[Answer] It is excluded in the case of those who have been penally classified as habitual criminals; also in the case of crimes listed in the law decree, as for example, intentional bodily injury, manslaughter, resisting an officer, and in the case of those who commit felony or robbery.

6691

CSO: 2500/331

POLAND

DEBATE ON AMENDED HIGHER EDUCATION LAW CONTINUES

View From Lodz University

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 21 Feb 85 p 3

[Interview with Prof Leszek Wojtczak, rector of Lodz University, by Janina Paradowska; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Question] A discussion is going on about the future amendment of the law on higher education. In it, many critical comments are being addressed to the collegial organs of schools that have decisive authority -- senates, and department councils. It is said that they are too numerous, sluggish, and dominated by groups of younger scientific workers. It is also said that the authority of the rector is very limited, and that in many cases he is simply helpless.

[Answer] I propose to hold onto the soil, the ground where we are located, i.e., Lodz University.

[Question] Why are you bringing up the school's status?

[Answer] Well, since the statute, which grows out of the law, is the school's internal constitution, and in many very fundamental matters it is this statute, and not the legal regulations, which are as a rule fairly general, that determines the composition of the collegial bodies, their jurisdictions, and the mutual relations between the collegial organs and the single-person ones--the executive ones--the rector or dean.

[Question] Let us start with the composition of the Senate.

[Answer] It consists of 39 people with decisive votes and several with advisory votes. The composition of the Senate includes all of the prorectors, the deans, 2 representatives from each of the school's 6 departments (autonomous scientific workers), one representative of the younger scientific workers from each of the departments, 4 student senators, 2 individuals who are not scientific workers, and in addition the head of military studies and representatives of the PZPR and the other parties. Sixty percent of the members of the Senate are autonomous scientific workers--professors and lecturers. The administrative director,

the library director, the bursar, and the representatives of student self-government, youth organizations, and trade unions have advisory votes.

[Question] This body is not too large for a university with 3,500 workers and nearly 14,000 students.

[Answer] The composition of the Senate has not changed much in comparison with its composition before the law. As a matter of fact, the only major change is the increase in the number of assistant scientific workers. But this actually small quantitative change is on the other hand very important qualitatively, since this numerically largest group of teaching personnel has better representation for itself. Obviously I am aware that at other schools the senates are larger, but we, acting within the framework outlined by the law, have tried to arrange the composition of the collegial organs in such a way as to guarantee good and efficient work, and at the same time to ensure representation in them for all groups of workers. The composition of the department councils was formed similarly under the statute--so that the collegial organs could work efficiently, competently, and in a comprehensive manner. I repeat--the law outlines the general framework, but how the school implements its content depends upon itself, on its experience and maturity, on the judgment of the people creating the statute and ratifying it.

[Question] The Senate and the department councils are not all, however. There are also numerous commissions that group together lots of workers.

[Answer] Those are the ones that differ most from those which operated earlier. In school practice a long time ago, there were a great many senate or rectorial commissions. Now we have limited their number to a few. For example, we combined the commissions on science, scientific research, apparatus, and foreign visits into one, since we had come to the conclusion that they examined matters that were mutually complementary. After all, it is difficult to decide on foreign visits without an evaluation of scientific work, or to plan research without being familiar with the state of the apparatus. The new commissions examine problems in a comprehensive manner, and likewise also submit their comprehensive conclusions to the rector or the Senate.

[Question] In drafting the statute for Lodz University, an effort was made to have it ensure that the school's administration was organized as well as possible. Did an equally good practice arise from this theory?

[Answer] The few months that have passed since the time when the newly elected authorities began to perform their duties are a bit too little for a more complete assessment. Nevertheless, I think that one can already speak of certain good experiences. The Senate, or I as rector, make decisions on the basis of well-prepared substantive materials. And after all, we, and especially the Senate, decide on matters that are fundamental for the school, on the directions for the activity and development of the school, the plans and programs for studies, financial management, and conclusions on awarding degrees and titles. These are only a few examples.

[Question] What you have said means that in practice the Senate has all the authority.

[Answer] I would say instead that it has a very large part of the authority, and on the fundamental matters. But it also follows from the very characteristics of higher schools and from their traditions that this authority cannot be less. This also follows from the laws in effect, at least regarding scientific degrees and titles. These are decisions that must be made in a collegial manner.

[Question] Aren't they made collegially to an excessive degree?

[Answer] Perhaps we can start with the following comparison--if we were to use industrial terminology, Lodz University is the largest production plant in the city, with 18,000 people constituting its work force. The rector cannot be completely familiar with all of the organizational units and their problems. Even the prorectors cannot know them thoroughly. Consequently it is necessary to have all groups of workers represented, since without the participation of some group we could make incorrect decisions on its affairs.

[Question] A very high position for the rector also follows from the traditions of a higher school, however. The law limited this authority. Are you conscious of these limitations?

[Answer] I am aware primarily of the abundance of obligations. Besides, if we read the law accurately, we see that there are considerable authorizations and possibilities for exercising authority. These are provisions of the law itself. Many matters are again regulated by the school statute, but the Senate can also give the rector the authority to undertake various activities.

[Question] Has the Senate of Lodz University made use of these possibilities?

[Answer] Yes. In a great many administrative matters, on matters related to contracts or agreements with other higher schools, cooperation with other countries, and social matters, which in practice are decided only in agreement with the trade unions. I also have a great deal of freedom in conducting personnel policy. It seems to me that the question of the rector's authority is to a great extent also a matter of a good understanding between the Senate and the rector.

[Question] Am I to understand that the Senate leaves you complete freedom of action on these different matters?

[Answer] The Senate is legally responsible for supervising and assessing the work of the rector. But it leaves me time, and does not supervise me step by step; it does not try to steer me, but rather to inspire me.

[Question] Then there are no areas of school life in which you are conscious of insufficient authority?

[Answer] I can only speak on my own behalf. I am not conscious of it, but the subject of the rector's cooperation with the Senate is very sensitive and I would not like to generalize this issue. During the last term we really worked very earnestly to make sure through a well-designed statute that the school would operate properly. Furthermore, one should not forget the human factor, the interpersonal relationships prevailing in the schools. After the upheavals that our country has gone through, as a result of the polarization of attitudes and positions they cannot be arranged very well everywhere. It does not seem possible to me, however, for the controversies to go beyond substantive discussions and turn into a sort of battle between the rector and the Senate.

[Question] And you have not had disputed problems?

[Answer] I have, but we were able to reach an agreement on almost all of the issues, and perhaps to the advantage of both sides, both myself and the Senate, since during the discussion we were able to clarify our own positions better to each other and even to get to know each other better.

[Question] You are an elected rector, but as a matter of fact you hold two offices--a state official and a representative of the academic community. Isn't there a contradiction in this duality?

[Answer] The description "a representative of the academic community" sounds much more pleasant to me, but I am not, however, denying that I am also a state official, officially dependent upon the authorities, elected to lead the academic community in carrying out the policy of the state, but also in order to make the authorities aware of the specific characteristics of the academic milieu, and to articulate its aspirations and needs.

[Question] Is the fact that you are performing your duties by election and not by appointment, however, hindering the implementation of what you yourself described as the policy of the state? Doesn't it incline you naturally toward articulating more loudly the aspirations and needs of the academic milieu, which after all may be beyond the capabilities of the state?

[Answer] I wonder if we do not generally attach too much importance to this issue--election or appointment--since in my opinion the essence of the matter lies in the authority of the rector, in his personal and scientific authority. No appointment, or more broadly, legal authorizations, will help if the rector does not have authority. If he has it, in time the scope of the authorizations given can even appear less important; although I would like to stipulate that I support electing the rector. From that position it is easier to convince people of various reasons of state, which are not always popular.

[Question] And how would you assess the atmosphere prevailing in the school today?

[Answer] As an atmosphere of increasingly better instructional, research, and educational work. I will not conceal, however, that there is also some concern in connection with the proposed amendment of the law on higher education. So far, however, it is not hindering the conducting of an objective, substantive discussion. We are treating this consultation very seriously, and after it is finished we want to present to the minister a position that takes into account the complete range of views on this subject--views that are very different on many issues, not just those presented in the assessment of the functioning of the law that was done by the Sociopolitical Committee of the Council of Ministers.

The law has many shortcomings and defects. We see them and consequently we do not want the consultation to be limited to a few selected problems, but rather to cover the entire law, so that it can really help to improve it.

Sejm Education Committee Meeting

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Feb 83 p 3

[Article by Andrzej Skrzypczak: "Regarding the Law on Higher Education"]

[Text] Although the issue of the functioning of the law on higher education is currently a subject of lively discussion in academic circles, its being dealt with, as one of the topics at the January meeting of the Sejm Commission on Education, Upbringing, Science and Technical Progress, resulted from the plan for the commission's work, which was established several months earlier.

Circumstances led to the materials constituting the basis for the discussion being more extensive than initially planned. In addition to the studies prepared as early as last year by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the position of the Sociopolitical Committee of the Council of Ministers was taken into account, as well as the conclusions and evaluations of NIK [Supreme Control Chamber] following the inspection conducted at Warsaw University and the Warsaw Polytechnical School and at the Higher Agricultural-Pedagogical School in Siedlcy.

Disturbing Phenomena

Even though both the above-mentioned documents and the extensive introduction to the discussion by the chairman of the commission, Deputy Jarema Maciszewski, did not pass over the positive elements, grey and often even dark colors dominated this picture of the situation in higher schools. It should be stated at once--as was expressed by the deputies--that not all of the negative phenomena and tendencies occurring in higher schools are directly related to the law. One cannot assess its functioning, however, apart from the situation in the schools. The law and its practical application create a basis for the emergence of appropriate mechanisms modifying the course of processes occurring in school circles, and the decisions contained in it encourage developmental directions and trends. But the negative trend presently occurring in higher education, as

Prof J. Maciszewski acknowledged, is really highly disturbing. The deterioration of the situation in the schools is demonstrated by the declining scientific and research activity of academic teachers. This is not only in fields requiring technical means, but also in the theoretical sciences, including the humanities. Science loses by this, and this also has an effect on the quality of teaching.

The separation of higher schools from the broader social environment and its problems is disturbing, Prof J. Maciszewski continued. The tendency for schools to become isolated from the country's life is harmful for the educational climate and also for the fulfillment of social tasks and requirements. Although this does not apply to all schools and academic circles, nevertheless, as Prof J. Maciszewski emphasized, this gives rise to justifiable concern about the further fate of higher education.

Self-Management in Practice

The law is frequently treated selectively, which is strikingly contrary to the intentions of the legislature. Above all, people are not observing some of the basic decisions contained in its first three articles, which define above all the state nature and fundamental duties of higher schools. On the other hand, respect for differences in world views, which was mentioned on a conference of the social sciences, is leading to a situation in which Marxist directions are discriminated against.

In some schools and departments, politics and debates, often directed against the initiatives and activities of the authorities, are replacing substantive issues. Manipulations in personal matters do not have anything in common with democracy, which for youth will be associated with anarchy. The emphasis is primarily on the rights of workers and students, forgetting about their obligations. The decline of individual responsibility is furthered by the excessive expansion of the jurisdictions of the collegial organs.

The portrayal of the negative elements was confirmed and supplemented by the director of NIK, Czeslaw Dabrowski, who presented the results of the inspection conducted at the three schools.

Nonuniformity of the Picture

Positive examples, particularly from the small schools (Deputy Maciszewski spoke about the Higher Pedagogical School in Opole, and Deputy Bozena Hager-Malecka pointed out the good situation in the medical academies) do not change the disturbing picture of the situation in higher education. In the opinion of Deputy Lidia Jackiewicz-Kozaniecka, the implementation of the law should be considered from the point of view of the goals that it was supposed to serve, and thus from the point of view of increasing the efficiency of the schools' work, improving the performance of their basic educational and scientific research functions, and establishing the state or socialist nature of the higher schools.

In the meantime, analysis of the situation at several schools leads to the conclusion that the awareness of the personnel is not keeping pace with such far advanced self-government. This is demonstrated by negligence in performing the basic tasks and by the use of self-government authorizations for a political battle with the socialist state.

Nevertheless, this nonuniformity of the situation in the schools caused doubts (expressed by Prof Ryszard Bohr, among others) about whether the negative examples had been generalized too much. It was proposed that there be a separate evaluation and treatment of the schools at which the situation was bad, and acknowledgement for those that were functioning well and whose activities were above reproach. It was also pointed out (by R. Bohr and E. Zglobicki, among others) that the negative phenomena and the examples cited were the result of failure to observe the law, or conduct contrary to it. It was asked (by Deputy Genowefa Rejman) whether the existing possibilities for curbing abuses with respect to the law had been utilized.

Also discussed was the difficult situation in which the introduction of the law had been undertaken and the suspension of some of its provisions that had been caused by this situation. Among others, this circumstance was pointed out by Prof Roman Cieselski, the chairman of the Main Council of Science and Higher Education, who was invited to the commission's discussion.

On the other hand, the poor situation in the schools was confirmed by another of the representatives of academic teachers who was invited, Dr Stanislaw Koperski, the president of the "Science" Union of Polish Teachers. In his opinion, the neglect of the basic duties and the replacement--especially in the large schools--of substantive assessments by the criteria of membership in the political opposition were having an effect on the entire academic milieu.

How To Create Positive Tendencies

In spite of the occasionally pronounced differences in opinions about the scope, the sources, and the strength of the influence of the negative phenomena, all of the statements were dominated by concern about the fate of higher education. The question posed by Deputy Maciszewski, about how to create positive tendencies within the framework of the existing legal regulations, returned in many statements. The awareness that this depends above all on academic circles was expressed most fully by Deputy Walenty Kolodziejczyk, speaking about the role that could be played by the Main Council of Science and Higher Education in forming a proper climate in the schools.

If the negative trends are not curbed and reversed, the issue of amending the law will remain open. Even though this last issue was not formally a topic of discussion (the Sejm has not received a draft of any changes to the law), this eventually was nevertheless considered in some of the statements.

Need and Scope of the Amendment

The controversies associated with the possibility of an amendment increased the occasionally formulated apprehensions that it would mean renouncing academic self-government. This possibility, in the opinion of the minister of science, Prof Benon Miskiewicz, was out of the question. The ministry's dilemma is how to ensure supervision and the possibility of the state's influencing the development of the situation in higher schools, while at the same time preserving the positive elements associated with the functioning of academic self-government. In the opinion of Minister Miskiewicz, the question is still open as to whether the law on higher education, which cannot be compared to any other type of act in the world, can, in the present situation in Poland, fulfill the hopes placed in it.

Nevertheless, the ineffectiveness of the past characteristic patience and leniency of the activities undertaken by the authorities to normalize the sociopolitical situation at the schools is prompting more decisive steps. The amendment should not mean changing the legal situation of the whole of higher education. The intention of the ministry is a change in the legal status relative to the situation in the schools. The intensification of the struggle for power in the schools in recent months can be demonstrated by the attempts to limit or eliminate the state's influence on decisions about the employment of academic teachers.

Meanwhile, the scale and scope of the negative phenomena, even if they are occurring in a few of the large higher schools, are vividly illustrated by the fact that more students study at two schools like the Warsaw University and Polytechnical School than in all of the medical academies in the country.

"There is not and cannot be," Deputy Jarema Maciszewski stated in summing up the discussion, "any contradiction between the interests of the state and higher education. If the Sejm receives a draft amendment to the law on higher education, let us take it seriously and consider it, while utilizing broad forms of social consultation.

9909

CSO: 2600/736

ROMANIA

REPORT ON JOINT HISTORY SYMPOSIUM WITH ISRAELIS IN BUCHAREST

Horthyst Occupation

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 1, Jan-Feb 85 pp 71-87

[Article by Aurica Simion: "Proceedings of the Romanian-Israeli Scientific Symposium held in Bucharest on 11-13 June 1984]

[Text] In accordance with the cooperation agreement between the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies of the RCP Central Committee and the Yad Vashem Institute, the second Romanian-Israeli history symposium was held last year. In its issue of June 1984, ANALE DE ISTORIE carried a report on the proceedings of that scientific meeting. This issue presents the papers of the Romanian researchers.

The Horthyst Occupation Regime in the North-West Area of Romania. Policies Toward the Non-Magyar Population

As of the establishment of Nazi rule, Horthyst Hungary faithfully followed Hitlerite Germany and Fascist Italy in their aggressive policy, and participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the territorial maiming of Romania, for which it was rewarded with large areas of those states. Under the Vienna diktat of 30 August 1940, imposed on the Romanian people by the fascist big powers, Germany and Italy, ancient Romanian territories in the north-west of the country, with an area of about 43,000 square km and a population of over 2.6 millions, mostly Romanians, were handed over to Horthyst Hungary.

The Horthyst occupation, which began on 5-16 September 1940 as the Romanian army and administration were withdrawing according to schedule, lasted until 25 October 1944, when the entire Romanian territory was liberated thanks to the joint struggle of the Romanian and Soviet troops.

With the occupation of the north-west part of Romania, it became clear that the Horthyst government was determined to ensure the prevalence of the Hungarians over the other nationalities at both the social and the political levels. In the very first days of the occupation, the Horthyst government established a military administration in the respective area and filled it with massive numbers of army troops, police, and gendarmes, as well as members of the "patriotic" and paramilitary organizations ("The Ragged Guard"--"Rongyos Garda;" "The National Guard"--"Nemzetorszeg;" "The Fireline Fighters"--"Tuzharcosok;" "The Paramilitaries"--"Levente"), who had all been taught to hate the other nationalities, especially the Romanians and the Jews. It was the mission of this administration to carry out the preliminary destruction and intimidation of the majority Romanian population in the area.

What is significant is that, although they met with no opposition upon entering Transylvania, "the troops permeated to the marrow of their bones by

fascist theories,"¹ still proceeded to kill and massacre, rape, torture and mistreat, expulse, seize and confiscate property, fire people from jobs, and to an unending series of other abuses. Before history was to mark the massacres of Lidice and Oradour-sur-Glane that still make the world shudder, the Horthysts perpetrated similar crimes in Romania in the Ip and Traznea communes. In Ip, 159 people, among them 34 children under the age of 16, were butchered in the middle of the night, while in Traznea 81 people were killed. One of the survivors of the Traznea massacre related that the Horthysts aimed their cannons at the village setting it on fire, after which "they came down to the village to burn the few remaining houses. When the children came with the cattle from pasture, crying for their parents, the Hungarians grabbed all the Romanian children and tossed them alive in the flames, burning them alive and in terrible torment, and the entire village resounded with their pain and cries."² The massacres of Ip and Traznea were no "accidents," but part of a campaign of crimes organized by the Horthysts against the helpless Romanian villagers.

In the very first days of the occupation, many Romanians were arrested and interned in concentration camps established after the German model, there to be kept in inhuman conditions and humiliated. On September 1940, less than a month after the Horthyst occupation, alone the Puspokladany camp held 1,315 Romanians, 315 more than the normal capacity of the camp. On 23 September 1940 new concentration camps were opened at Someseni and Floresti (294 Romanians were interned at Someseni on 24 September and 365 on 28 September 1940.)³ The reasons given for the arrests and sentences were as diverse as they were unfounded: "harm caused to the nation;" "incitement against the Magyar national idea;" "incitement against the war;" "spreading alarmist rumors;" "contacts with relatives in Romania," etc.

At the same time, the Hungarian military administration expelled over the temporary line of demarcation many Romanians and Jews, in mass or individually, always, however, with the most inhuman and brutal methods: either the Hungarian army forced them to leave their homes within a few hours, allowing them to take along only hand luggage--unless those were confiscated, too, together with money and other valuables--or armed gangs of the above mentioned fascist organizations were unleashed against the Romanian and Jewish inhabitants, chasing them from their homes, mistreating them, and forcing them to seek refuge in Romania. During the months of September and October 1940, all the Romanian inhabitants were expelled from Rosiori, Salard, Lucaceni, Ianculesti, Horia, Marna Noua, Scarisoara, Poiana Sarata, Valea Mare, and many from Diosig, Salonta, Salacea Mare, Ghenci, Tirean, Piscolt, Lazuri, Pelesul Mare, Gelusi, and Baba Novac--in total over 10,000 people. On 4-6 October, 750 Romanian intellectuals were picked up, with only 3 hours warning, from the counties Bihor, Salaj, and Someș, crammed into sealed freight cars, and expelled to Romania. By the end of 1940, over 86,000 Romanians had been forced to cross the demarcation line into Romania.⁴ Similar actions were taken by the Horthysts against the Jews in the Ciuc County, where the military commander ordered the expulsion of all the Jews, with the exception of those from Gheorghieni; those who returned to the county were arrested and later sent to Nazi-occupied Galicia, where they were exterminated.⁵

The pretext claimed by the Horthysts for the massive expulsions of Romanians from the occupied territories was that the Romanian authorities had been

guilty of expulsing about 60,000 Hungarians from the area south of the demarcation line. A German-Italian investigation commission (the Altenburg-Rogeri commission), which had been in the area in the 17-19 October 1940 period at the insistence of the Romanian government, ended its inquiries with the following observations: "The Hungarian claim that this figure was attained solely as a result of measures taken by the Romanian government does not accord with the observations of the commission. The reality seems to be rather that, upon learning of the arbitrary decree of Vienna, the flame of patriotism was rekindled among the Hungarians left in Romania, and they--especially workers, waiters, servants, etc.--decided to depart in haste, often against the wishes of their employers. This was perhaps compounded by the idea that living conditions were better on the Hungarian side and, since finding jobs had been made more difficult by the crowding in Hungary, people often sought to overcome the difficulty by claiming to have been mistreated by the Romanians." ⁶

Toward the end of November 1940, in the confidence that the military administration had mostly ended the "house cleaning" operation in the occupied Romanian territories, a civilian Horthyst administration was set in place; this administration continued to pursue the same policy, designed to change the demographic character of the respective areas. This objective was promoted through three methods: 1. Reducing the number of Romanians, so that the Magyar population could become majoritary and thus the respective territory could be represented as naturally belonging to the most numerous ethnic group; 2. Empoverishing the Romanians, so that, economically weakened they could be more easily assimilated; 3. Curtailing the intellectual development of the Romanians in order to facilitate the campaign of forced Hungarianization or to turn the Romanian population into mere labor force for the "Hungarian masters."

The policy pursued by the Horthysts toward the Jews was initially aimed at limiting their participation in or excluding them from their social and economic positions, and replacing them by native Hungarians or Hungarians brought over from Trianonic Hungary; however, by 1944 they were already deporting and exterminating Jews in Nazi camps.

The Horthyst civilian authorities systematically proceeded to destroy the Romanian biological element through killings, violence and maltreatment, arrests and internment, forced labor and deportation to Germany, expulsions, and so forth. Within 2 years, from September 1940 to September 1942, 991 people were killed by the Horthysts for no other reason than being Romanians, and without trial. Similarly, 6,813 cases of maltreatment and torture were reported, and this figure records only the serious cases that could be registered. ⁷ According to a decision of the Hungarian National Defense Ministry, soldiers with large families were entitled to leave or even discharged. However, an order of the same ministry stated that "those of Romanian ethnic origin may not receive family situation certificates, whatever the size of their families, and may not benefit from the above conditions. From the viewpoint of the priority interests of national defense, it is important to wield any means to prevent increase in the number of their children." ⁸

On the date of the occupation of the north-west part of Romania, the law on curbing the participation of Jews in public and economic life of 4 May 1939 was in force. The law limited the number of commercial licenses permitted to

be held by Jews to 6 percent, and completely withdrew, within 5 years, licenses to sell state monopoly products in their possession. Public contracts secured by Jewish entrepreneurs could not exceed 20 percent of the total number of contracts, while after 1943 those were automatically reduced to 6 percent. The law also envisaged the expropriation of Jewish land and real estate property, a 6 percent Jewish quota for free professions and students, a 12 percent quota for clerks in commercial and industrial enterprises, and total exclusion of the Jews from public service, press, and amusement establishments. Jews naturalized after 1 July 1914 lost their citizenship.⁹

In August of 1941, after Hungary joined the war against the Soviet Union, a law was adopted on the protection of the race, which forbade marriage and extramarital relations between "Jews" and "non-Jews." With that the Horthysts in fact went from the stage of "official restrictions" to that of "complete racial separation" in their policy toward the Jews. Under that law, the definition of "Jewish" was very extensive, even more so than under the Nuerenberg laws. For example, a half Jewish citizen, who did not belong to the Mosaic religion, married to a quarter Jew, was not considered Jewish in Germany, but was viewed as Jewish in Hungary. The effects of this law may be more easily perceived with the aid of statistics: in 1941, there were approximately 725,000 people belonging to the Mosaic religion in Hungary, while the law considered as Jewish 787,000 citizens (43,000 Catholics, 12,000 Calvinists, 3,000 Lutherans, and 3,000 belonging to other Christian denominations.)¹⁰

A first confrontation of the Jews in the annexed part of Romania with the Horthyst antisemitic policy took place as early as the fall of 1940, when the Horthyst military administration began implementing the provisions of the 1939 law all at once, rather than gradually, as had been initially envisaged. In some places the law was even exceeded, and property was seized without any formality, stores and workshops were closed down, Jews were expelled, personal rights cancelled, and so forth. "The occupation troops, gendarmes, police, and administration brought from Hungary, who were reinforced by local cadres only later and slowly, brought with them a violent antisemitism, which was obvious at any contact with a Jewish citizen in both form and contents," stated the Federation of Former Jewish Antifascist Prisoners. "This spirit, declared as native to the Hungarians, was soon embraced by the overwhelming majority of local Hungarians in northern Transylvania, so that the Jews in this area, who between 1918 and 1940 had lived in better relations with the Hungarians, saw themselves morally and emotionally compelled to withdraw almost completely into their homes, with the exception of cases in which their professions forced them to appear in the streets or in public. This new and violent intolerance hit even those Jews who between 1918 and 1940 had advertized themselves as Magyarophiles to a lesser or even a very great degree."¹¹

This form of Horthyst antisemitism was the least painful. Others, far more serious, followed. The Magyar state had established a service to investigate foreigners (Kulfoldieket Orszagos Kozponti Hatóság--KEOKH), directly subordinated to Interior Minister Francisc Keresztes-Fischer, whose mission was to clear Hungary of "undesirable aliens." Jews who could not justify their "Hungarian citizenship"—and they were rather numerous, since the 1939 law denied the right of naturalization to those who could not prove that their ancestors had lived there prior to 1867—were first rounded up and interned in camps (the best known were Kistarcsa and Garany), and after the outbreak of the war

against the Soviet Union were "pushed" to Galicia, in the way of the famous German death squads, with the clear intention of having them killed by the Germans. On 25 August 1941, 11,000 Jews "pushed" by the Horthysts across the border were signaled near Kamenetsk-Podolski. Higher SS and German police officers hoped to "finish the liquidation of those Jews around 1 September 1941." ¹²

After the outbreak of the antisoviet war, labor squads, made up especially of Jews and Romanians, were organized and put at the disposal of the military and civilian authorities for work in mines, tree felling, railways, military engineering, and mine removal. Each detachment was made up of 4 platoons of 50 men each, and was led and supervised by 1-2 officers and 15 soldiers.

The labor squads were in fact a means of sentencing the Romanians and Jews to hard labor without a trial. Referring to the conditions in labor squads, documents of the time note that their members were "kept into service without a set term, dressed in their own rags. They were housed in huts, hovels, unheated stables, without sheets or even beds but on straw, in undescrivable filth, full of lice, insufficiently fed, worked to exhaustion, and given token medical care, although they were threatened by the worst diseases because of the cold, the dirt, and the parasites, and finally, they were sworn at, beaten, and debased for being Romanians; in other words, they were exploited as workers and humiliated as men." ¹³

According to those sources, the number of Jews used in those detachments for forced labor rose to 130,000; about 30,000-40,000 of them died, either killed by the Germans during the withdrawal from the Don in the winter of 1942-43, or by the treatment to which they were subjected by their guards. ¹⁴ The number of Romanians taken into such labor detachments rose to over 70,000, ¹⁵ and many of them perished. Many Romanians, especially men, were conscripted for various manual labor or for working with animals in the wooded parts of Transylvania, or for agricultural work in Trianonian Hungary, while in the spring of 1944 the last able-bodied men between 17 and 65 years of age (over 20,000) were rounded up from villages and sent to labor in Germany. ¹⁶

Other means of persecuting the Romanians, Jews, and other nonmagyar and nongermanic nationalities were to fire workers, ¹⁷ clerks, and teachers, to limit the activities of lawyers and other free professionals, and to withdraw the permits of artisan workshops and commercial permits. ¹⁸

Ministerial decisions No 1 440/1941 M.E. and 1 470/1941 M.E., published in BUDAPESTI KOZLONY No 45 of 23 February 1941 totally rescinded all the expropriations and grants carried out by the Romanian state, within the framework of the agrarian reform, from the lands that before 24 October 1918 had belonged to the Hungarian state, communes, churches, foundations, etc. These decisions hit not only the first grant recipients or buyers, but also all those who later bought such property in whatever form. The same decisions also decreed that the Hungarian state will take over all the assets belonging to the Romanian state and to private companies (industrial, commercial, banking, cooperative enterprises, etc.) in which the Romanian state participated or had shares or concessions. At the same time, decision No 1 890/1941 reinstated the ownership of the large Hungarian landowners over the land expropriated by the Romanian state for communal pasture. ¹⁹ The purpose of this action was clearly

stated by Count Bethlen Istvan, who said: "We must reestablish the social classes that had formed the backbone of this nation...We must restore and make viable the class of Hungarian landlords."²⁰

In 1942, under ordinance 9 100, the Ministry of Agriculture decreed that all owners of building lots received under the agrarian reform must complete the construction work, otherwise the respective lots will be viewed as abandoned and will be expropriated by the state. This measure was primarily aimed against the ownership rights of refugees and expelled people, but it also hurt other inhabitants who could not complete building work because of lack of funds. In order to illustrate the scope of this action, we will note that alone in Cluj ex officio actions were begun against 1,325 Romanians who owned building lots.²¹ In February 1943 Decree No 970 M.F. was issued, under which the expropriation of 316,438 iugar [1 iugar = 5,775 square m) of wooded land and forest property was to be cancelled and the land returned to the Hungarian landlords. Since simultaneously with the above measures the Horthyst government was carrying out an intensive colonization propaganda, the impression was gained that these lands and buildings were to be utilized for that purpose. In reality, with the exception of a few cases in which military training grounds were erected on expropriated land, the ownership right was transferred to the former landlords—counts and barons—among them the wife of Horthy Miklos' son.²²

Within the framework of the policy of "Aryanization" of economic life in Hungary and on the basis of the law of 1939, by 1942 the Horthyst authorities had seized from Jews 213,000 acres of forests and 299,000 acres of arable land (of a total of 373,000 acres of woods and 914,000 acres of arable land owned by Jews); in October 1942 it was planned to seize another 276,000 acres of arable land,²³ out of which 90,000 acres were to be given to the big Hungarian landowners.

The harmful economic measures adopted by the Horthysts did not spare the upper Romanian and Jewish bourgeoisie either. After banning the branches of the Romanian National Bank from the occupied territory of Transylvania, the Horthysts in 1943 transferred all the assets of the bank to the Hungarian National Bank. Similarly, the occupation authorities sought to seize the shares held by Romanians in the Iris porcelain factory in Cluj, in the Baia Mare chemical plant, and in other enterprises. As for the Jews, by May 1942 they had been completely barred from trading in cattle, importing potatoes and fruit, and from selling in bulk sugar, gasoline, fodder, coal, bread, and milk, and by January 1943 also from trading in fats and pigs, cement, exporting hay and straw, and from public catering.²⁴

The Horthyst occupation regime resumed the Austro-Hungarian policy of national suppression of the Romanians and of the other nationalities, expanding and compounding it by fascist methods. Secular higher education in Romanian was banned; the number of elementary and medium schools in Romanian and the number of their students were severely cut. The publishing of Romanian books and of certain press issues were faced with insurmountable difficulties. It is thus significant to note that the Horthysts permitted only one Romanian daily, TRIBUNA ARDEALULUI, for a population of over 1,300,000 Romanians. Great pressure was brought to bear on Romanian churches to prevent them from carrying out their activities. Seizing church property, destroying churches, torturing

and assassinating priests and their families were the methods through which the Horthysts were trying to break the Romanians' resistance to the policy of Magyarization.²⁵

The "spiritual purification" practiced by the Horthysts heavily hit the Jewish population. The Jewish newspapers, including UJ KELET, published in Cluj were banned, as were Jewish clubs and associations. Jewish students were forced to leave the Hungarian schools, a fact which determined the Jewish community to establish highschoools in Cluj and Oradea. The acceptance of Jewish students to universities became merely symbolic.²⁶

The Romanian population and other nonmagyar and nongermanic nationalities were excluded from political life. They were denied representation in the Budapest Parliament. Disregarding the population ratio, most of the councilors of administrative units were appointed from among Hungarians and Germans.²⁷ The activities of the Romanian and Jewish bourgeois political parties were banned in the Horthyst occupied territories.* On the other hand, the activities of Hungarian fascist parties ("The Crossed Arrows," the Hungarian Revival Party, etc.) were intensified. At the same time, on 14 December 1940, at the proposal of the Hungarian Prime Minister Teleki Pal, the Magyar Transylvanian Party was established by the reorganization of the Magyar Party that had been acting in Romania in the period between the wars. As the political organization of the Magyar aristocracy and upper bourgeoisie, and having a conservative, reactionary leadership (its president was Count Teleki Bela), the Magyar Transylvanian Party considered it its supreme duty to support the Horthyst regime and to fight the resistance movement organized by the communists and the other leftist parties and organizations. Significantly, in a letter addressed to the Hungarian minister of the interior on 10 June 1943, Teleki Bela requested both the arrest of the leaders of the leftist parties or conscripting them in labor detachments, and the "dismantling of leftist organization and occupying their headquarters."²⁸

Officially, the Horthyst laws allowed the activities of the Social-Democratic Party, which rallied workers of all nationalities. In reality, however, the occupation authorities adopted various intimidation strategies to prevent the social-democrats from organizing. In view of this situation, the Cluj branch of the Social-Democratic Party was in a position to establish a provisional leadership only in January 1941 and to hold its first general meeting on 17 June 1941. Branches of the Social-Democratic Party came into being in other centers only in 1943: in April in Baia Mare; in August in Oradea, and in December in Satu Mare. After the occupation of Hungary by the Nazis in March 1944, the activities of the Social-Democratic Party were banned.

The occupation authorities vented their terror with particular violence against the organizations of the communist party. After the Hungarian government declared war on the Soviet Union on 27 June 1941, the Horthysts began arresting and interning in camps all the known communists in the occupied territory of Transylvania, many of them Jewish. In the fall of 1943, the Horthysts managed to arrest the communist leader of northern Transylvania, Jozsa Bela; after torturing him, they killed him at the Someseni jail.²⁹

During the 4 years of Horthyst occupation 217,842 Romanians were forced to abandon their homes and property and to cross over into Romania. Due to this exodus, to assassinations and deportations, the Romanian population in the Horthyst occupied territories dropped by 16.6 percent.

In the 1942-43 period, the Nazis repeatedly requested--either directly, at talks with Horthy Miklos, or through Ambassador Sztojay in Berlin--that Hungary "collaborate" in the radical solution of the Jewish problem. On 17 April 1943, during the talks that Hitler and Ribbentrop had in Klessheim with Horthy, the German foreign minister said that the Jews must be either exterminated, or interned in concentration camps, there being no other alternative. A few days later, at a lengthy meeting with Sztojay, von Ribbentrop again brought up the "Jewish problem," in terms that made the Hungarian minister insist, in his report to Budapest, that this "problem" must be swiftly solved in order to preclude any further German interventions.³¹ Horthy promised to meet the requests of the Nazis. In a letter addressed to Hitler on 7 May 1943, after recalling that he had been "the first to cry out against the destructive attitude of the Jews," Horthy said that in the wake of the measures adopted in Hungary, the Jews had been "divested of any possibility of further exercising their harmful influence on public life," and finally promised that "as soon as conditions are at hand for deportation, they will be deported."³² In his turn, Prime Minister Kallay Miklos stated: "There are more Jews in Hungary than in all of western Europe... It is obvious that we must solve this problem; hence the need for provisional measures and for an appropriate regulation. However, the final solution can only be the complete resettlement of the Jews. Still, I cannot make up my mind to put this issue on the agenda until the fundamental premise for the solution, namely the answer to the question where to resettle the Jews, is given."³³

The Nazis were carefully monitoring the attitude of the ruling circles in Budapest; they realized that Regent Horthy's and Prime Minister Kallay's hesitations to implement the "final solution" to the Hungarian Jews were determined not so much by humanitarian considerations, as by a reluctance to cut the bridges of negotiations with the western powers for pulling the country out of the war. On the other hand, the Jews, viewed as the most assimilated among all other minorities, contributed a considerable numerical addition to statistics on the Hungarian population.³⁴ In March 1944, Berlin decided to intervene in Hungary in order to end any attempts of the Horthyst government to get out of the war through diplomatic negotiations with the Allies, and to liquidate the important Jewish concentration in that country. Summoned by Hitler to the Klessheim castle, Horthy was put in a situation where he had to choose between the military occupation of Hungary and the establishment of a government approved by the Germans. Horthy opted for the second choice. However, back in Budapest he had a surprise: the country had been occupied, and a special car had been attached to his train, carrying the Reich's "plenipotentiary representative" to Hungary, Edmund Veessenmayer.

The Dome Sztojay government, which began its activities on 22 March, was formed with the approval of Veessenmayer and had to account to him for each measure taken. An army of counselors spread out throughout Hungary, and among them there was a special detachment, led by Adolf Eichmann. His presence alone was sufficient to make Berlin's intention clear: the Jews of Hungary were to meet with the same fate as in the other occupied countries: deportation and death.

At the 19 March 1944 Crown Council meeting, Horthy reported that one of the accusations leveled by Hitler was that "Hungary is doing nothing about the Jewish problem, and is not prepared to liquidate its many Jews."³⁵

Personally, Horthy did not agree with the Nazi "final solution." But he believed that it was not worth coming into conflict with Berlin over it.³⁶ He empowered the Sztojay government to resolve the "Jewish problem" through orders and decrees, thus avoiding direct involvement in this problem. The minutes of the 29 March 1944 meeting of the Hungarian Council of Ministers show that Prime Minister Sztojay informed those present that, "in connection with the decisions concerning the Jews, His Serene Highness the Regent had given the government a free hand and, in this respect, he does not wish to exercise his influence."³⁷ Interior Minister Jaross Andor presented a draft decree (based on the 1939 law on national defense), under which all Jews over the age of 6, regardless of sex, were obligated to wear on the left arm and very visibly, a yellow star with six points, as of 5 April 1944. The Council of Ministers agreed with this decision to mark the Jews, which constituted a decisive step toward the implementation of the "final solution," and appointed Jaross Andor and the two under secretaries of state at the Ministry of the Interior, Baky Laszlo and Endre Laszlo to carry out the measures requested by the Germans on the Jewish problem. At the same marathon meeting, which went on from 11 in the morning till 10 at night without a break, additional orders were passed, which excluded the last Jews from the social-political and economic life.³⁸

With the publication of these measures at the end of March, Under Secretary of State Endre Laszlo issued a statement, in which he stressed that the Sztojay government was determined to carry out to its completion the solution of the Jewish problem, on the basis of a coherent plan.³⁹ These anti-Jewish measures were certainly appreciated by Veessenmayer, who, on 30 March 1944 wrote to von Ribbentrop: "Through the decisions adopted in connection with the Jewish problem, the new government shows that it is serious about solving this problem in keeping with our concept."⁴⁰

By the middle of April 1944, the Sztojay government decided that Jewish property was to be declared and frozen. According to the respective order, all Jews were obligated to declare non-fixed assets in excess of 10,000 pengo and all valuables. The Jews were to immediately deposit all shares, fixed interest bearing titles, mining interests, and all relevant papers in certain banking institutions. Similarly, they had to deposit all jewelry, gems, platinum and gold, and any cash in excess of 3,000 pengo. Bank safe deposit boxes and current accounts were immediately blocked, and the banks were entitled to pay out from them to the Jews at most 1,000 pengo monthly. Under the same order, the Jewish commercial and industrial enterprises had to be declared, and the trade and industry ministers were empowered to appoint to the respective enterprises a Gentile director at the expense of the Jewish owner.⁴¹ On 21 April, additional decrees ordered the closing down of all Jewish stores. On the same date, another decree ordered that all radio sets belonging to Jews, and which had been previously blocked, had to be turned in to the authorities; under an order of the Ministry of Supply, the food quotas for Jews were reduced as of 1 May.⁴²

At the beginning of April 1944, a meeting was held at the Ministry of the Interior with the participation of representatives of the gendarmery, police, and Hungarian army, and of Eichmann's group, at which the manner in which the Jews were to be rounded up in ghettos was decided. On the same day, Interior Ministry order No 6 163/1944 was published on Jewish residence, which stated: "The Hungarian royal government will soon clear the country of Jews. The clean-up will proceed according to areas. Throughout this action, Jews of all sexes and ages will be rounded up in concentration camps. Subsequently, some of them will be shipped out to the Jewish houses established by the police authorities, or to ghettos, in larger towns and communes. Exempted are those working in war factories, mines, major enterprises, and agriculture, so as not to disrupt the production... The round-up of the Jews will be carried out to completion by the regional police and royal Hungarian gendarmery. The German security forces will act as a consultative body and will be present on various locations; special emphasis is to be placed on free collaboration with those bodies. The local authorities will immediately proceed to prepare sufficient concentration camps, according to the number of Jews, and the respective sites will be reported to the secretary of state for public security... The Jews who are to be deported may only have with them the clothes they stand in, possibly two changes of underwear, and food for 2 weeks, in a parcel that may not weigh more than 50 kg."⁴³

Long before 7 April 1944, when Under Secretary of State Baky Laszlo signed the above orders, having first obtained Eichmann's approval, the Ministry of the Interior had ordered the gendarmery to prepare written records of all the Jews and, at the beginning of April, had appointed a "Hungarian commander for de-Judeification."⁴⁴ On 7 April, the Hungarian government forbade all Jews to travel without official permits issued by the town police or communal gendarmery. One locality after the other established curfews for Jews. Simultaneously, the post office began confiscating all the telephones belonging to Jews. These initiatives of the Hungarian fascists were designed to "technically" prepare the ghetto internment operation, followed by immediate deportation, which proceeded very swiftly between April and July 1944, in the following order:

Zone	Area	Round-up begins	Deportation completed
Zone I	Carpathic*	16 April	7 June
Zone II	Transylvania	4 May	7 June
Zone III	North of Budapest, from Kosice to the German border	7 June	17 June
Zone IV	East of the Danube, without Budapest	17 June	30 June
Zone V	West of the Danube, without Budapest	29 June	9 July
	Budapest	Beginning July	end July

*Zone I, the Carpathic, also included considerable Romanian territories, such as Maramures.

According to Raul Hilberg, the order of priority was established in keeping with several considerations: a) the proximity of the Soviet armies to the sub-

Carpathic area and to Transylvania; b) the conviction of the Nazis that it will be easier to secure the Hungarians' cooperation in the deportation of the Jews from the territories occupied in 1938-44; c) the German tactics were to "divide" the Jews. While the Jews from sub-Carpathic Ukraine and Transylvania were being deported, those in old Hungary were given assurances that the radical measures were directed only at the "non-Magyar" Jewish elements, and that nothing will happen to them. The purpose of this tactic was to make the Jewish leaders refrain from organizing resistance against the deportation, and particularly, from stirring up international public opinion.⁴⁵

An examination of the documents of the time reveals not only a great desire on the part of the Budapest rulers to "collaborate" in the elimination, first of all, of the Jews from the annexed territories (as Hilberg demonstrated), but even original Hungarian initiatives, such as: pushing 11,000 Jews from sub-Carpathic Ukraine in 1941 to the area of action of the German death squads on Soviet territory, with the obvious intention of having them killed by the Germans; the killing of thousands of Jews by Horthyst troops at Novi Sad; the proposal made in October 1943 by the secretary of Prime Minister Kallay to the SS counselor of the German Legation in Bratislava (Hauptsturmfuehrer Wisliceny) that Hungary should deport, for a start, all the Jews from the Carpathic area and from Transylvania, followed by the Jews of the rest of Hungary, and finally by those of Budapest. Which was precisely the plan implemented in 1944.

The details of the internment of the Jews from the Romanian occupied territories in ghettos were discussed at two secret conferences chaired by Under Secretary of State Endre and attended by the heads and representatives of public services, gendarmery, and police. The first was held on 26 April 1944 in Satu Mare and dealt with the elimination of the Jews from the counties Bihor, Satu Mare, Salaj, Cluj, Solnoc-Dabica, and Bistrita-Nasaud (which belonged to the ninth gendarmery district), and the second was held on 28 April in Tirgu Mures and dealt with the Jews in the counties Mures-Turda, Ciuc, Odorhei, and Trei Scaune (the 10th gendarmery district). The final plans, worked out with Endre's direct guidance, envisaged the organization of 11 ghettos: in Cluj, Gherla, Dej, Simleul Silvaniei, Satu Mare, Baia Mare, Bistrita, Reghin, Tirgu Mures, Sf. Gheorghe, and Oradea. For Maramures, which from the viewpoint of the gendarmery belonged to sub-Carpathic Ukraine, the plans on the rounding up of the Jews were finalized at the Munkacevo conference of 12 April, and envisaged the establishment of four ghettos: in Sighetul Marmatiei, Ocna Slatina, Viseu, and Okormezo.⁴⁶

The Jews from the north-west part of Romania were rounded up in ghettos in the second half of April and the first half of May. Forbidden by previous orders from leaving their houses outside certain hours (usually 2 hours a day, at noon), the Jews were waiting for the arrival of commissions to take them to the ghetto. In Oradea, for example, the commissions were made up of two members: a police agent and a townhall clerk; their function was to check each house. "At Jewish houses, they will instruct those obligated to wear the yellow star to gather up as quickly as possible the following: aside from the clothes on their backs, two changes of underwear per person; 50-kg parcels containing one bed sheet, pillow, blanket, comforter, and mattress; food for at least 14 days... The Jews found in the houses must be requested to immediately hand over valuables such as: cash found in the house, gold, silver, gems, valuables, watches and jewelry made of precious metals, even wedding

bands... After that, the commissions will request the Jews to bring their other valuables: rugs, valuable paintings, cameras, typewriters, etc.... The commissions will hand the Jews over to the police agents in the street, to be shipped to the ghettos. The Jews will carry their things personally, without any help."⁴⁷

Upon arriving in the ghetto, the Jews were again searched and even tortured to find any money or jewelry they may have managed to hide. The document "The Jewry of Northern Transylvania Under the Magyar Occupation 1940-44" notes: "Attached to each ghetto there was a gendarmery investigation service with torture chambers, etc. used to obtain from the Jews information on valuables assumed to have been hidden or given to non-Jews for safekeeping, and on the hiding places of missing Jews. The beatings, maimings, and torture were conceived and executed with the greatest refinement, often with electrical current."⁴⁸

On 4 May 1944, Edmund Veessenmayer reported to the Reich Foreign Ministry: "The internment in ghettos in the Carpathic area (Zone I) is being completed these days; 200,000 Jews have been put in 10 camps and ghettos. In Transylvania (Zone II) the rounding up of the 110,000 Jews living here began today. The shipping of the 310,000 Jews from Zones I and II to Germany is scheduled to begin at the middle of May; four daily shipments of 3,000 Jews each are envisaged."⁴⁹ Less than a month after the above communication, Veessenmayer on 13 June sent another cable, stating: "The shipping of the Jews from the Carpathic area and Transylvania (Zones I and II) to destination was completed on 7 June by the deportation of 289,357 Jews, in 92 trains, each with 45 cars. The failure to attain the initial figure of 310,000 is explained by the fact that the Hungarian side has in the meantime conscripted many Jews for forced labor."⁵⁰

The work "Eichmann in Ungarn" notes that the total number of Jews deported to be killed during the Hitlerite occupation of Hungary in 1944-45 was 618,007.⁵¹ Some 109,000 of them came from the Romanian occupied territory.⁵²

A document of the Romanian section of the Study Commission of the World Jewish Congress, signed by Kiva Orenstein, shows that out of the 151,125 Jews recorded by the Horthyst authorities in 1941 in the Romanian occupied territory, 13,636 remained in place, most of them in the auxiliary services of the Horthyst army, and 137,485 were deported. By 1 September 1945 15,769 people had come back from concentration camps, which means that the number of victims was 121,717.⁵³ Another document, issued by the Romanian authorities in May 1946, shows 127,377 deportees, of which 19,764 had returned by that date, while the other 107,613 were considered dead (the Romanian authorities did not exclude the possibility that other north Transylvanian Jews were still alive, which would lower the number of killed).⁵⁴ Randolph L. Braham in his work indicates the figure of 131,641 people on the basis of data culled from the Hungarian military command at Kosice—the last stop on Hungarian territory for the deported Jews.

The success of Eichmann's activities in Hungary are due, in the first place, to the fact that he had the full cooperation of the Sztojay government and of the Horthyst state apparatus. It is true that not the Horthysts were the executioners, but the Nazis. However, the Horthysts carried out the technical operations and delivered the defenseless victims to the butchers. To that is

added the fact that public opinion, instead of acting as a break against the measures taken by the state apparatus, collaborated with it against the Jews. In the document we cited earlier, the Union of Former Jewish Deportees states: "The 'purification' operation, as it was described by the Magyar authorities of the time, could be so completely successful only because an amazing percentage of the Hungarian public opinion, especially the middle classes, supported those actions; even people who had no direct interest and were not inspired by any personal animosity, vied with each other to inform on Jews who tried or had managed to hide, for the sake of the idea of getting rid of the Jews. A characteristic example along this line is Cluj, where, after the liberation of the city by the Red Army and the Romanian army, some 40,000 written denunciations were found at the police station concerning the hiding of Jews or concealment of Jewish property."⁵⁵

The Romanian population, itself oppressed, had a completely different attitude, and helped the Jews with the few means they had. The same document cited above notes: "There were isolated cases when certain people, especially peasants, workers, etc., put up symbolic or actual resistance against the terror, some taking upon themselves the risk of hiding a Jew. Such behavior was noted particularly among the Romanian population in northern Transylvania, led by the Bishop of Cluj and by other notables."⁵⁶ Similarly, some Hungarian public figures also expressed disapproval of the measures taken against the Jews. Thus, Baron Josika, the prefect of the Salaj County, resigned when he learned that the Jews were to be deported; other members of the administration were abruptly "taken ill" and had to be replaced. Along the same line, Randolph L. Braham mentions that the catholic bishop of Alba Iulia, Marton Aron, went to Cluj on 18 May and delivered a sermon at the St. Michael cathedral condemning the internment of the Jews in ghettos and appealing to the Hungarians "not to leave them prey to destruction." Such attitudes, however, were rather scarce and did not form a current of opinion that may have influenced the attitude of the Horthyst government and authorities.

The Romanian people never reconciled themselves with the idea of losing the north-west part of the country. The masses were aware of the need for struggle to restore the mutilated borders of the country and to free their brothers from the Horthyst terror. Perceiving this mood, the German Legation in Bucharest wrote to Berlin: "No Romanian wants to believe that the problem of Transylvania was solved once and for all by the Vienna arbitration." It is for the Romanians a dogma that the Vienna arbitration is not the end."⁵⁷

In their turn, the Horthyst authorities were compelled to admit that, despite all the pressures to which they subjected the Romanians in the occupied territories, the latter maintained permanent contacts with their conationals south of the demarcation line ("the Romanian traffic across the line is so lively, that the border is almost an illusion"), listened to Bucharest radio, and kept up their hope that their liberation will come, sooner or later. Here are some edifying passages from the numerous documents existing on this topic:

The year 1941: "The Romanians are seized by a genuine fever. They are becoming more confident... This would all be unimportant from the Magyar national viewpoint, were it not for the fact that the Hungarians living amid this sea of Romanians are losing their self-confidence, or worse, are not watching over local Magyar interests."

The year 1942: "The Romanians... preserve their religion, do not want to forget their language, and intensely hope that Romania will be restored."

The year 1943: "From the Magyar national viewpoint, the Romanians' attitude leaves much to be desired and cannot be described as loyal... They still do not fit into Magyar life, do not attend Magyar national events, and do not support any Magyar action."

The year 1944: "In its great majority, the Romanian population lives in the hidden hope of unification with the Romanians in southern Transylvania... The covert aspirations of the Romanians are obvious." "The absolute majority of the Romanians live on the hope that the end of the war will bring a radical change in their favor." On 18 August, a few days only before the outbreak of the Romanian people's revolution for social and national liberation--one of the fundamental objectives of which was to free the territories invaded by the Horthysts and to reintegrate them in the body of the homeland: "They (the Romanians) are secretly saying that the north of Transylvania will again be Romanian... they are body and soul with their brothers across the border and are only waiting for the moment when the Romanian dream is fulfilled."⁵⁸

With the time, the antihorthyst feelings that had prevailed among the Romanians from the very beginning spread to the Hungarians and to the other coinhabiting nationalities, as the illusions created by the Horthyst propaganda were dissipating and as people were confronted with the realities of a regime of cruel police oppression. Trials for "national offenses" or for "offending the Regent Horthy" became more frequent, and Hungarians, too, were tried along with Romanians. Actions of solidarity of Hungarian workers, peasants, and intellectuals with the Romanians became more frequent. At the meeting of the United Socialist-Democratic Party held in Budapest in December 1940, the representatives of the Cluj organization of the Socialist-Democratic Party protested the persecution of Romanian workers, and presented a list of hundreds of Romanian workers and employees who had been fired.⁵⁹

The outbreak of the Romanian revolution for social and national liberation caused real panic among the occupation authorities, who began arresting and jailing all suspect Romanian elements. Hundreds of people were interned in camps; at the same time, in September-October 1944 hundreds of people--Romanians, Jews, and of other nationalities--were killed in the Romanian occupied territories. Despite these reprisals, many citizens provided the liberating Romanian and Soviet troops with information on the enemy, volunteered as guides in raids, carried ammunition under the bombs of enemy airplanes, gave shelter, care, and food to the wounded, and sometimes even participated directly in the fighting, determined to make their contribution to chasing the invaders and liberating the Romanian occupied territories one hour earlier. As the invaders withdrew, Romanian refugees began returning to their native places, where in the most cases they found their homes destroyed, damaged, or occupied by Hungarian families brought over from Trianonic Hungary. Similarly, Jewish survivors of labor detachments were returning home, where they lived through the tragedy of not finding their families, deported by the Horthysts to Auschwitz. Those, and others, were serious and very complex problems, to which the new Romanian democratic authorities had to find solutions, while the country was intensifying its efforts to fight the war at the side of the Allied troops until the final victory.

FOOTNOTES

1. Szenczei Laszlo, "Magyar-Roman Keredes," Budapest, 1946, p 161.
2. Lt. Gen. Dr Ilie Ceausescu, "Transylvania, Ancient Romanian Land," Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1984, p 95.
3. "The Antifascist Resistance in Norther Transylvania (September 1940-October 1944)," Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1974, pp 76-77.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (then Archives of the Foreign Ministry) section Peace Conference, vol 108, pp 180-82; section 71 Transylvania, vol 123, pp 31-32.
5. Ibid., Peace Conference, vol 85, p 294.
6. Ibid., Transylvania, vol 123, p 120.
7. Ibid., Peace Conference, vol 103, pp 187-88.
8. Ibid., p 193.
9. Bernard Weynryb, "Jewish Emancipation Under Attack," The American-Jewish Committee, New york, 1942, pp 70-80.
10. Raul Hilberg, "The Destruction of the European Jews," Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1961, pp 513-14.
11. Foreign Ministry archives, Peace Conference, vol 85, p 295.
12. Raul Hilberg, op. cit., p 520.
13. Cluj-Napoca state archives, Cluj County section, 1943 Presidential-Confidential Documents, package no 1,239, file no 24, p 131.
14. Raul Hilberg, op. cit., p 517.
15. Foreign Ministry archives, Peace Conference, vol 108, p 194.
16. Op. cit., pp 197-98.
17. Thus, at the Cluj railway workshops, where 1,680 Romanian workers were employed in 1940, only 100 remained after 1 year of occupation; at the Cluj tobacco plant, the number of Romanian employees dropped from 500 to 25 in the same period, while at the Dermata shoe factory it dropped from 700 to 72. In the Baia Mare industrial zone, 1,326 Romanian workers were fired by 1942, while 365 Hungarians were hired. All Romanian technicians were fired without exception (Cluj-Napoca archives, op. cit., pp 114-15)
18. "Antifascist Resistance in Northern Transylvania," pp 67-68; Tilkovszky Lorant, "Revizio es Nemzetisegpolitika Magyarorszagon (1939-41), Budapest, 1967, p 289.
19. Foreign Ministry archives, Peace Conference, vol 108, p 154.

20. Tilkovszky, op. cit., p 298. By the middle of 1941 the Horthysts managed to review in court the expropriation of 77,160 cadastral iugars (1 cadastral iugar=0.56 hectares), out of which 42,246 cadastral iugars were returned to Hungarian big landowners.
21. "Antifascist Resistance..." op. cit., pp 61-62.
22. Csatari Daniel, "Forgoszelben (Magyar-Roman Viszony 1940-45), Akademiai Klado, Budapest, 1983, pp 244-45.
23. Raul Hilberg, op. cit., p 517.
24. Csatari, op. cit., p 140,244; Hilberg, op.cit., p 516.
25. Cluj-Napoca archives, op. cit., file no 4; also, "Antifascist..." op. cit., pp 73-75; Tilkovszky, op. cit., pp 301-302.
26. Randolph L. Braham, "The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary," vol I, Columbia University Press, 1981, p 172, 189.
27. Thus, in the Bistrita-Nasaud County, where the population was made up of 113,326 romanians, 20,827 Germans, and 7,816 Hungarians, the county council established on 26 April 1941 was made up of 90 Hungarians, 35 Romanians, and 23 Germans; the Cluj county council, which also had a majority Romanian population, only 27 councillors out of 120 were Romanians. (TRIBUNA ARDEALULUI, 1 April 1941; SAPTAMINA, 11 May 1941; also see Silviu Dragomir, "Transylvania Before and After the Vienna Arbitration," Sibiu, 1943, p 42).
- * The Horthysts tolerated--but harassed--the National Romanian Community (led by Emil Hatieganu), because a similar body existed in southern Transylvania for the Hungarians in that part of Romania.
28. "Antifascist..." op. cit., pp 69-70.
29. I. Micu, A. Simion, "Jozsa Bela," Bucharest, 1971, pp 76-85.
30. Foreign Ministry archives, Peace Conference, vol 108, p 182.
31. Kossuth Konyvkiado, "Horthy Miklos Titkos Tratai," Budapest, 1962, document 75; Hilberg, op. cit., pp 520-21.
32. "Horthy..." op. cit.
33. Hilberg, op. cit., pp 525-26.
34. "Eichmann in Ungarn," documents. Published by Jeno Levai, Pannonia Verlag, Budapest 1961, p 161. Significantly, at the 1941 census, the central bureau of the Jewish community urged the community members to declare themselves as Hungarian (memo no 700 of 27 January 1941). ("One Year of Magyar Rule in Northern Transylvania," the Official Monitor and the state printing houses, Bucharest, 1942, p 118). According to the census

data, out of 151,125 Jews, 45,593 gave Yidish as their mother tongue (Randolph L. Braham, op. cit., p 166).

35. "Horthy..." op. cit., document no 81.
36. Ranky Gyorgy, "1944, Marcius 19 (Magyarország Nemet Megszállasa)," Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1968, pp 158-59.
37. "Horthy..." op. cit., document no 85.
38. "Eichmann..." op. cit., p 75.
39. Foreign Ministry archives, section 71 Hungary, vol 65, p 43.
40. Ranky Gyorgy, op. cit., p 161.
41. Foreign Ministry archives, section 71 Hungary, vol 65, pp 98-99.
42. Ibid., pp 100-101.
43. "Eichmann in Ungarn," pp 82-83.
44. Ibid., pp 84-85.
45. Raul Hilberg, op. cit., p 535.
46. Braham, op. cit., pp 538-39, 566-68.
47. Foreign Ministry archives, section 71 Hungary, vol 65, p 104 ("Instructions for the Commission in Charge of the Internment of the Jews in Ghettos," signed by the deputy mayor of Oradea, Gyapay László).
48. Ibid., Peace Conference section, vol 85, p 300.
49. "Eichmann in Ungarn," p 102.
50. Ibid., p 124.
51. Ibid., p 303.
52. Ibid., p 131.
53. Foreign Ministry archives, Peace Conference section, vol 128, p 212.
54. Ibid., vol 129, p 276.
55. Ibid., p 301.
56. Ibid.
57. Archives of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies, section XIII, file no 1,736 (The document: "Romania and the Vienna Arbitration").
58. "The Antifascist..." op. cit., pp 128, 156, 160, 166.
59. Ibid., p 110.

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 1, Jan-Feb 85 pp 87-102

[Article by Livia Dandara: "Jewish Population Within Transylvania's Integration in Romania's Economic Social, Political and Cultural Life (1919-40)"]

As an objectively necessary and profoundly progressive act, the Great Union of 1918 created a national, socioeconomic, and cultural framework for raising to a higher level the ancient community of the Romanian provinces, pooled the creative energies and capabilities of all the people, and united all the progressive forces of the Romanian society at national level. "The following period," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stressed, "saw the consolidation and development of the united national state and the production forces; at the same time, it was a period of great revolutionary upsurge for the democratic development of the country, for defending the interests of the workers class and of the masses, and for democratic freedoms."¹

Representing a nation that had fulfilled its ideal of state unity, the Great National Assembly held in Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918 gave voice to the ancient aspirations of the Romanians for peace, freedom, friendship, and brotherhood among nations. Significantly, in article III of the Resolution adopted, the National Assembly proclaimed complete freedom for all the cohabiting nationalities in state affairs, through representation in the legislative bodies and in the country's government, proportionally to the number of their members; equal rights and complete religious freedom; a democratic regime in all the areas of public life, through universal ballots; complete freedom of press, association, gathering, and faith.²

Speaking at the 30 November 1929 meeting of the Deputies Assembly on this document of a major importance, on behalf of the Jewish Parliamentary Club, Deputy Teodor Fischer of Transylvania disassociated himself from the statements made by certain Hungarian deputies, who had described the Alba Iulia Resolution as a pledge made by the Romanians for the sake of foreign listeners, in order to move the Paris peace conference to recognize the Union.² He said: "This Union is based on the right to self-determination of the national communities of Transylvania, Banat, Crisana, and Maramures, who had the absolute majority in those territories, and is valid by virtue of the fact that it accords with the principles of international law and self-determination." He clearly stressed at the forum of the Romanian Parliament that "There was no reason for the Alba Iulia National Assembly to see itself constrained to add the principles concerning the ethnic minorities to the Union Resolution. That was not a tactic or an act of opportunism; the Alba Iulia Resolution came, with the elemental force of a pure spring flowing from a rock, from the heart of the Romanian people represented there, from their profound love for the great Romanian nation to which they belong, their yearning for national unity, but also their lofty feelings of unity and brotherhood with all the cohabiting peoples [nationalities]"³

Comparing the minority clauses of the Saint Germain Treaty with the Alba Iulia resolution of the Romanian nation, one notes that the decisions of the Romanian people were far superior to the treaty. In the words of National-Peasant Deputy N. Polizu-Micsunesti, the Alba Iulia Resolution was not a "pact," a sort of "magna charta" of the minorities, a "supplex libellus magyarorum," as Horthyst Magyar revisionists tendentiously claimed, for the simple reason that

it was written, proclaimed, and voted on by the assembly of the Romanian representatives of Transylvania, without pressure or interference from foreign factors.⁴

The situation of the Jewish population in Romania in the period between the wars was based on the Jews' contribution to the great acts that brought about the restored political-statal unity of the Romanians: the Independence War of 1877-78, and participation in the 1916-18 war. Viewing the participation of some 22,000 Jews in the war in the Romanian army as a great honor for them, Chief Rabbi I. Niemirower, senator in the Romanian Parliament throughout the period between the wars, praised the spirit of the fighters that paved the way for the union of all the Romanian provinces and the memory of the 800,000 "unknown heroes" who fell for the birth of the Romanian nation.⁵ In his turn, King Ferdinand I, receiving a delegation of Romanian Jews in 1918, said: "I have long since come to the conclusion, which I am pleased to see was correct, that all the inhabitants of the Romanian land, regardless of origin, race, and religion, are inspired by the same feelings of brotherhood."⁶

Some 681 of the 22,000 Jews mobilized in the reunification war were decorated for bravery, self-sacrifice, and heroism.⁷ The Jews put at the disposal of the authorities hospitals, schools, and even synagogues, and collected over 4 million francs for widows and orphans. Impressed by their patriotic enthusiasm, many Romanian public figures (Emil Lahovary, Ovid Densusianu, Take Ionescu, and others) expressed the desire to hasten the naturalization of the Jewish population at the end of the war.

As it had announced already in 1914, the government led by Ion I.C. Bratianu on 29 December 1918 passed the decree-law No 3,902 concerning the naturalization of foreigners, including the Jews, who could prove that they were born in Romania and that they were not subjects of a foreign country. Those who had been mobilized in the campaigns of 1913 and 1916-18 and their families were directly naturalized, while those who had been previously naturalized preserved their rights. A new decree-law, No 2,085 of 22 May 1919, gave the right to Romanian citizenship to the Jews who applied by making the respective statement.⁸ The political emancipation of the Jews in the Old Kingdom coincided with the liberation of the Romanian provinces that were still under foreign domination, provinces which contained in their ethno-demographic composition a large Jewish population. After the ratification of the Union, the Jews in the respective provinces became Romanian citizens de jure simply by putting their names down on the nationality lists.

Under the Constitution of 1923 (article 133), both the decree-laws concerning the naturalization of the Jews in the Old Kingdom, and the citizenship rights of those in the newly united provinces were ratified.⁹ As in the case of the consolidation of the national (economic, social, political, military, moral, and intellectual) Romanian unity, for the Jewish population in Romania, too, there followed a period of consolidation of their emancipation, which had become a reality once they obtained the Romanian citizenship. Speaking of the Transylvanian Jews, Senator Samuel Rappaport said, 10 years after the emancipation: "We [from the Old Kingdom] have shed blood in this country, and it is thanks to us that the minority Jews are not today groaning under Horthy's heel... The Union, which brought them to their adopted country, spared them

much suffering. Let them come into our midst and benefit from this regime of great tolerance... let them come and embrace the soul of this country.¹⁰

As for the attitude of the Romanian workers movement and of its political parties toward the "Jewish problem," we must stress the consistency with which from the beginning they asserted and struggled for genuine and complete equality of rights for all the citizens, regardless of nationality and religion. Throughout the period between the wars, within the framework of the struggle waged by the RCP and by the Social-Democratic Party, respect for the rights of the nationalities was one of the consistently defended points, while in their internal life and on the barricades of social and political struggles, ethnic origin never was a criterion. This explains the impressive number of members that came from among the nationalities, including the Jews.

All the legal regulations and their implementation attest to the desire of the Romanian nation to live in brotherhood with the coinhabiting nationalities. Nevertheless, at the peace negotiations with Austria and Hungary, the big powers made recognition of the union of Transylvania and Bukovina with Romania dependent on the inclusion of the minorities treaty, although Romania had settled those issues through internal political acts. Far from being moved by humanitarian concern for the "minority" groups in the united national states, in reality, the big powers wanted to secure their "right" to intervene in the domestic affairs of those states under the pretext of "protection," with a view to legalizing, through interference, genuine spheres of influence in central-east Europe and in the Balkans.

The integration of Transylvania in Romania's economic, social, political, military, and cultural life also brought about the integration of the coinhabiting nationalities, including the Jewish population. In 1930 Romania had a population of 18,057,028, out of which 12,981,324 (71.89 percent) were Romanians, 1,425,507 (7.89 percent) Hungarians, 745,421 (4.12 percent) Germans, 409,150 (2.26 percent) Russians, 582,115 (3.22 percent) Ruthenian-Ukrainians, 51,0652 (0.28 percent) Serbians, Croats, and Slovenes, 366,384 (2.02 percent) Bulgarians, 51,842 (0.28 percent) Czechoslovaks, 48,310 (0.26 percent) Poles, 12,456 (0.06 percent) Huzans, 728,115 (4.08 percent) Jews, 26,459 (0.14 percent) Greeks, 4,670 (0.02 percent) Albanians, 15,544 (0.08 percent) Armenians, 154,772 (0.85 percent) Turks, 22,141 (0.12 percent) Tatars, 105,750 (0.58 percent) Gagauzians [Christian Turks of Dobruja], 262,501 (1.45 percent) Gypsies, 56,355 (0.31 percent) other nationalities, and 7,114 (0.03 percent) undeclared.¹

From a statistical viewpoint, the census taken as reference is that of 1910 (taken by the Hungarian authorities) and that of 1930. The Statistic Annuals of Romania and other related studies and articles may be consulted to examine demographic developments in other years and periods, with the reservations due to the objectivity of the source of information.¹² According to the 1910 census, Transylvania had a population of 5,248,522, out of which 2,702,599 were Romanians, 1,498,849 Hungarians, 536,311 Germans, 182,897 Jews (according to the Mosaic religion), and 208,745 other nationalities. In 1923, within the reunited Romania, the same territory was inhabited by over 5,507,966 people, out of which 3,232,806 were Romanians, 1,357,442 Hungarians, 577,633 Germans, 203,191 Jews, and 136,844 of other nationalities.¹³ When, on 24 February 1924 the law on obtaining and forfeiting Romanian nationality was published, the

background material of the law featured a statistic (established on the basis of the data of the General Directorate of Police and State Security) which indicated a population of 5,200,000 inhabitants, out of which 3,000,000 (57 percent) were Romanians, 1,300,000 (25 percent) Hungarians and Szeklers, 540,000 (10.3 percent) Germans, 200,000 (3.8 percent) Jews, and (3.9 percent) of other nationalities.¹⁴ After the 1930 census, the Jewish population of Transylvania was of 178,699 people (3.2 percent) according to nationality, and of 192,833 (3.5 percent) according to religion. Out of Transylvania's total population, 89.5 percent of the Romanians lived in rural areas, and 10.5 percent in urban localities; 56.2 percent of the Jewish population lived in urban areas (100,413 people), and 43.8 percent in rural areas (78,286 people).¹⁵

As for the economic life, both at nationwide level and in Transylvania, existing official statistics provide data based on the criteria of "groups of professions," featuring the number of persons whose living was connected to one of the listed professions, so that the "group" may be equated with the family. From this viewpoint, out of the 18,057,026 people that Romania had in 1930, 13,063,213 were connected to agriculture, and only 4,993,815 to industry, banking, commerce, and public services. These general figures show that 77.86 percent of the Romanians worked in agriculture, and 22.14 percent in other sectors. Some 0.34 percent of the Jewish population worked in agriculture, and 99.66 percent in other sectors. In Transylvania, the proportion was of 67.21 percent Romanians and 0.42 percent Jews; in the other sectors, 32.79 percent were Romanians, while the Jewish population was distributed among the various groups of professions.

In view of the paucity of statistical data on the economic aspect of social life according to the nationality criterion--and in the case of the Jews the statistics are even thinner--the same general census of 1930 facilitates, to a great extent, an understanding of the economic conditions of the Jewish families of integrated Transylvania. This is due to the fact that, as opposed to the Hungarians, the Jews did not organize their economic establishments on "national" bases.¹⁶ According to 1930 statistics, out of all the Jews in Transylvania, Banat, and Crisana, grouped according to classes of professions, 9.2 percent were employed in agriculture, 0.3 percent in mining, 3 percent in the metallurgical industry, 3 percent in the timber industry, 0.9 percent in construction, 11.8 percent in textiles, 5.4 percent in the food industry, 1.7 percent in the chemical, paper, and printing industry, 2.3 percent in credit institutions and commercial agencies, 35.3 percent in trade, 2.8 percent in transportation, 7.6 percent in public institutions, 13.2 percent in various other areas, and 2.9 percent had no declared occupation.¹⁷

Economist D. Komorofsky was of the opinion that, in order to perceive the real economic stratification of the Jewish population, one should proceed from the fact that there were about 200,000 Jewish families in all of Romania (one family having 3-4 members). Also grouping them according to "profession branches," he states that about 74,000 families (37 percent) had no wealth whatsoever; 10,000 families (5 percent) incorporated the "free" professionals (physicians, lawyers, engineers, religious servants, etc.); 40,000 families (20 percent) were made up of artisans and commercial clerks; 56,000 families (28 percent) were in small-scale trade; 8,000 families (4 percent) were involved in large-scale trade; 10,000 families (5 percent) made a living in cottage industries; and 2,000 families (1 percent) made up the group of industrial and

banking magnates. The latter, he said, were mentioned in the press on a daily basis. They were connected to liberal and peasant politics, and even to rightist organizations. Their administration boards had Romanian politicians of all categories. Their capital, Komorofsky adds, profited the Jewish population only very little, and only few of those "big" names appeared in Jewish charity institutions or in the Jewish community.

In reality, scaled down and reflecting the specific traits of the evolution of the Jewish population from the viewpoint of occupation (an evolution that was marked by the historical and political conditions of the time), the Jews of Romania, including those of Transylvania, were divided into the same strata as the national Romanian society, which had reached a stage of agrarian-industrial development: the ruling class, made up of the industrial, financial, and agrarian bourgeoisie, and the ruled class, made up of workers and peasants. There was also a large class of small and average bourgeoisie, and intellectuals, linked to one of the big classes by origin or interests.

After 1918, the political life of the Jewish population was shaped by the realities prevailing in Romania. The specific trait of the Jewish population (in comparison with the other nationalities) was that it did not declare or organize itself as a separate nationality. The Union of Native Jews (U.E.P.) changed its name into the Union of Romanian Jews (U.E.R.) in order to safeguard the principles of civil equality sanctioned by the Romanian state and law, and threatened by the propaganda and pressures of antisemitic and extremist organizations. The U.E.R. endeavored to draw into its ranks the Jews from the reunited provinces, and succeeded in establishing sections in the more important centers of Transylvania. At the first U.E.R. congress (June 1926), in the presence of provincial delegations, the aims of the organization were defined: to defend the individual and collective rights of the Jewish population according to the law and to the treaties; to promote religious, cultural, social, economic, and political interests, and to implement civil equality de facto.

For the first time in Romania, the Jews participated in the elections of 1919 (under the decree of universal vote), and even established a "Jewish Block." Later, the U.E.R. concluded electoral agreements with the Romanian political parties, rejecting both the idea of agreements with the parties of other cohabiting nationalities, and that of running as a separate party. Prior to 1927, it concluded agreements with the Conservative-Democratic Party group and with the Peasant Party; after 1927, with the National-Liberal Party.¹⁹ In Transylvania, "The National Union of Transylvanian Jews," formed in 1918, militated to combat the influence of Magyarophile assimilationism, and gradually awoke the Jews' awareness as a distinct ethnic nationality.

Immediately after 1918, the problem of forming a Jewish party was raised, and separate lists were entered in the 1919-22 elections. That stirred heated discussions among the Jewish community because, for decades, the Jews of the Old Kingdom had struggled for political rights on the principle of naturalization and political assimilation. Once those rights were secured (1918-19), the issue of establishing a "national" Jewish organization was abandoned both in the Old Kingdom and in Transylvania.²⁰ Toward the end of the 1930's, its promoters relaunched it and, in 1928, the National Jewish Club was formed, which then became (in 1929) the National Jewish Party of the Old Kingdom. In the same period, in electoral coalition with the National-Peasant Party, the

Jewish organizations from the reunited territories succeeded in sending deputies and senators to the Parliament. That was the origin of the Jewish Parliamentary Club, which included: Theodor Fischer, Iosif Fischer, and M. Landau, deputies; Mayer Ebner, senator; and M. Benvenisti, who was the secretary general of the club. For a short while there was also the General Assembly of Romanian Jews, which gathered the most representative figures of Jewish organizations in the country. Later, on 4 May 1931, the Jewish Party of Romania (P.E.R.) was established, whose honorary chairman was Adolf Stern, and chairman Theodor Fischer.²¹

During 1919-29, when the country was alternately governed by the National-Liberal Party and the People's Party, the Jews in the reunited provinces seemed uninterested in the national politics and the general electoral campaigns. In 1926, the Congress of Unions of Romanian Jews for the first time discussed the need to adopt a policy of cooperation with the government. "The Jews," Cl. Blumenfeld said then, "are faced with the question whether the time has not come to try a policy designed to prevent antisemitism from above... in a country in which, in fact, the great masses are free of religious hatred or generalized and atavistic antisemitism; in such a country, if antisemitic impulses from the center are preempted, a quiet life is already 3/4 ensured for the Jewish population... The adoption of this policy is not only a very good thing, but also a great political step."²²

After 1926, the leadership of the Union of Romanian Jews was asked whether it is prepared to reach an accord with the National-Liberal Party. Together with W. Filderman, Cl. Blumenfeld wrote a memorandum, discussed at contacts with about 40 Romanian and Jewish personalities, on the basis of which an electoral pact was concluded with the Liberals in 1927, when the latter came to power. The coalition was very positive for the Jewish population, and constituted a moral and political gain, too.

According to Blumenfeld, several mistakes were committed in Jewish policies in 1927-28, when the National-Peasant Party came to power: Filderman clearly sided with the National-Liberal Party, a fact which made the National-Peasant Party hostile to the U.E.R.; at the elections, the National-Peasant Party did not ally itself with the U.E.R., but with the Transylvanian Jews;* dissensions appeared between the U.E.R. and the Jewish national "group," and all that contributed to shaking the solidarity of the Jewish population in the country.²³

During the 1928-29 legislature, Deputy Theodor Fischer expressed respect, love, and loyalty toward the Romanian homeland, state, and nation, and asserted the determination to "conscientiously and exactly fulfill his civic duties," by learning, understanding, and valuing the "moral and spiritual treasures of the Romanian nation." Proceeding from the observation that the majority of the Jewish population earned a living in trades and commerce, he announced the decision of the Jewish Parliamentary Club to defend and attach a greater attention to those factors of the Romanian national economy. For the Jewish population in general, he requested fully guaranteed civic rights, particularly freedom of religion, thinking, press, and education in the "language chosen by the parents" (in Transylvania, that was mostly Hungarian or German), and repression and elimination of antisemitic propaganda from public life.²⁴

The existence of dissensions in the Jewish community also manifested itself in the Parliament. When for example, Senator Mayer Ebner pleaded for recognition of the Jews as a distinct and separate ethnic group, Senator Samuel Rappaport viewed this as embarrassing after the Jews had struggled for and obtained the right to be considered legitimate Romanian citizens.²⁵ While Theodor Fischer stated that the Jewish Parliamentary Club was a coalition of provincial organizations on its way to become a genuine "united political party," "opposed" to the U.E.R., Cl. Blumenfeld from the U.E.R. did not view such a party as necessary, and believed that it would only bring harm, and no benefit to the Jews. While the first believed that "all the members of the Mosaic religion in this country were 'an integral part of the Jewish people everywhere,'" and viewed the Jewish nationality and the Mosaic religion as the two sides of the same coin, the second, without contesting the Jews' obligations toward the "ancestral land," stated: "We have not, however, forgotten, like the Jews in all Western countries do not forget, the country to which we belong. Not only have we not forgotten it, but we put it in the first place, as is only right."²⁶

Established as such on 4 May 1931, with the purpose of "bringing order and unity in the movement, and linking all the Jewish chapters from all the Romanian provinces," the Romanian Jewish Party (P.E.R.) crystallized its principles at the general congress of 7 November 1933: "The existence of the Jewish population of Romania is asserted, regarding both the political rights of its members as citizens, and its being as an ethnic community and as an integral part of the Jewish people, through the P.E.R."²⁷

At the general elections of June 1931, the P.E.R. won 64,193 votes and 5 deputy seats; in June 1932, it won 67,583 votes and 6 deputy mandates; in December 1933 it won 40,000 votes and no seat in the Deputies Assembly (partly because of the polemics between the U.E.R. and the P.E.R., which continued throughout this period)²⁸ The relatively low number of votes won in relation to the size of the Jewish population of Romania is also explained by the fact that, throughout the period between the wars, considerable Jewish social strata voted for the Romanian bourgeois or workers political parties, and for the parties of the coinhabiting nationalities. In Parliament, the P.E.R. representatives participated in the debates on laws, and brought up abuses of administrative bodies and antisemitic incidents provoked by extremist groups. In the great confrontation between democracy and fascism, which particularly in the 1940's polarized all of Romania's social-political forces, the Romanian Jews, enlisted in the existing parties—workers, bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic—editors of democratic newspapers and magazines, teachers and scientists at institutes of education, culture, and art, workers and clerks, made a noteworthy contribution, recognized at the time and noted in the post-war historiography.

In addition to its integration in the structures and flow of development of the Romanian society, in the period between the wars the Jewish population also experienced problems specific to its historical, ethnic, cultural, and spiritual nature.

After 1918, the educational system in Transylvania was faced with particular difficulties, caused by abnormal situations inherited from the policy of disnationalization promoted by the Austro-Hungarian regime. None of the official statistics, including the 1930 census, give any indication as to the ethnic

composition of the educational system. It is, however, certain that in Transylvania, for a population of 4,596,905 (entitled to schooling), only 3,079,722 (67 percent) could read, while 1,498,874 (32.6 percent) were illiterate (out of which 93.4 percent lived in rural areas). Out of those who went to school, 58 percent finished only primary school, 6.2 percent high school, 1.5 percent vocational schools, 0.28 percent other higher schools, and only 0.64 percent were university graduates.²⁹ Bequeathed a precarious, both institutional and moral situation, the Romanian educational bodies made consistent efforts to improve it. Concerning the Jewish pupils and students, they were free to frequent both state subsidized schools (in Romanian, Hungarian, or Yiddish), as well as universities, private, or religious schools (which were numerous in Jewish localities).

A much discussed, investigated, and temporized problem between the relevant bodies and the boards or teachers of schools that had Jewish students was caused by the "insistence" of the latter not to substitute Romanian or Yiddish for Hungarian in both secular and religious schools.³⁰ The antisemitism that sporadically appeared in schools and universities was neither an expression of official or governmental policy, nor a manifestation of xenophobia on the part of the Romanian youth, but was caused by representatives of extreme rightist groups. Significantly, in 1935, when Al. Vaida-Voevod proposed the introduction of the "numerus clausus" principle to the Executive Committee of the National-Peasant Party to be included in the party program, the proposal was rejected with an overwhelming majority. I. Mihalache, I. Maniu, Dr N. Lupu, C. Radulescu-Motru, M. Ralea, I. Hudita, and others opposed it. T. Teodorescu-Bratiste wrote about this in the FREE WORD of 9 February 1935: "The reality is this: an entire party spoke out against the numerus clausus: ...young and old, university professors and lecturers (like D. Raducanu), from Wallachia, Oltenia, Transylvania, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, spoke against the numerus clausus, even though it was proposed by a former council and party chairman; if they all flaunted party discipline and said No, then we are entitled to say that it constituted a true referendum... Naturally, the Cuza supporters and other extreme rightists are trying to take advantage of Mr Vaida's proposal. Useless: the manner in which the proposal was rejected shows that it is unacceptable. Which is a gain, a great gain, for true democracy."

In the period between the wars in Romania, the Mosaic religion enjoyed complete freedom of organization through the establishment of the Rabbinate under the successive leadership of Chief Rabbis (Parliament senators) Chaim S. Schor, I.I. Nemirower, and then Al. Safran. Transylvania also had (first in Bistrita, then in Cluj) the Central Israelite Orthodox Bureau, which managed and supervised the religious schools. Three general types of Israelite religious schools existed: Makhsike Torah, for children under the age of 7, or over 7 who did not frequent an elementary school; Talmud Torah, for children who finished 4 classes; Yeshiva, for graduates of the first two schools, considered as theological courses. In 1924 there were 305 such schools, in: Rodna Veche, Sacel, Sapinta, Sighisoara, Zalau, Somcuta Mare, Moisei, Nasaud, Oradea, Sighet, Petrosani, Satu Mare, Simleul Silvaniei, Sibiu (sephardic community), Huedin, Tirgu Mures, Timisoara, Turda, Dej, Viseul de Sud, Gherla, Carei, Cluj, Brasov, Arad, Beclean, Aiud, etc.

In the 1940's the number of such schools increased. The regulations governing them envisaged mainly that the school subjects should be taught in Romanian or

Hebrew and that the students should not be kept away from state elementary schools. For the rest, the respective schools were under the exclusive supervision of the Jewish community and of the Rabbinate. This is what Chief Rabbi Chaim S. Schor wrote in 1924 to the minister of public education, Constantin Angelescu: "You, Mr Minister, have understood the truth and have issued the order under which Jewish students are permitted to frequent these classes, with the obligation of also frequenting a state elementary school. Inspired by the true vocation of an educational leader, you have proven, Mr Minister, that you have an admirable grasp on realities."³¹

The Mosaic denomination also organized Yeshiva classes with a purely religious character, which were run with the approval of the Ministry of Religious Denominations. In all the villages and towns with a Jewish population the communities had synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments. In state schools that had religion on their curriculum, Jewish students were not obligated to attend the respective classes.

A special role in the education of the young generation was played by cultural associations and sports clubs. Thus, in Cluj functioned: the Zionist cultural association "Yoza" belonging to the "Tarbut" school; the national Jewish federation "Zeirei Zion Brothers;" the student societies "Ezra" and "Mizrachi;" the women's cultural society "Jehudit;" the assembly of artisan patrons "Poale Zedek;" the religious society "Chevra Kadisha;" and the sports association "Hagibor." There were also many athletic clubs: "Ivria" in Brasov, "Hakoah" in Arad, "Yehuda" in Sibiu, and "Samson" in Sighet.³²

As for the integration of Jewish intellectuals in the national cultural heritage, the problem is very complex and should not be split into provinces.

In the preface to Dr I. Brucar's first work ("Essays and Studies," Bucharest, 1919), C. Radulescu-Motru took the opportunity to paint a "portrait" of the Jewish intellectual in general lines: "According to a prejudice very widely spread among us, the Jewish intellectual is either a selfish profiteer, if he has a talent to exploit, or a destructive revolutionary, when he is reduced to being a salaried professional." Explaining that this prejudice was not supported by any example, being "imported from who knows where," and presenting the great contribution made by Jewish intellectuals to bringing world culture to our country, the scholar concluded: "The Jewish intellectuals can step into Romania's future with their head held high."³³ Similar observations abound, in various contexts and at various times, in the history of the Romanian culture, science, and art in the period between the wars. Significantly, in the monumental "History of the Romanian Literature," written and published by George Calinescu in 1941, the contribution of Jewish writers and poets to Romanian culture is presented in its true value. Because, alongside the great Romanian writers, the following also distinguished themselves in Romanian literature: Ranetti Roman, Barbu Nemteanu, Camil Balthazar, Issaia Racaciuni, Ion Pribeagu, E. Relgis, G. Spina, Felix Aderca, Ion Calugaru, Benjamin Fundoianu, I. Peltz, F. Brunea-Fox, Ury Benador, Mihail Sebastian, Ieronim Serbu, Tristan Tzara, Sasa Pana, Mara Banus, Sidonia Dragusanu, Aurel Baranga, and many others—in the Romanian language; others excelled in Yiddish or Hebrew literature, such as I. Groper, Efraim Waldman, Itic Manger, Eliezer Steinberg, Al. I. Zissu, H. Sanielevici, I. Trivale (dead on the front in the reunification war), who were also prestigious literary critics; Moses Gaster, Lazar

Seineanu, H. Tiktin, and A. Candrea-Hecht enriched the Romanian folklore and philology sciences.

The brilliant group of journalists and publicists of the generation between the wars--who wrote in the workers, democratic, bourgeois, literary, artistic, scientific, and antifascist press--included, alongside Romanian publicists, many Jewish journalists: H.St. Streitman (editor-in-chief of the National-Liberal Party publication VIITORUL), contributor to the REPORTER; A. Weiss, contributor to DIMINEATA, DREPTATEA, CURIERUL ISRAELIT, and CUVINTUL LIBER; Ilarie Voronca, contributor to FLACARA, VIATA ROMANEASCA, OMUL LIBER, ADAM, and AZI; A. Tudor, contributor to ZORILE, FACLA, and RAMPA; G. Stroe, who wrote for ARGUS; Al. Westfried, who wrote for ADEVARUL and DIMINEATA; Al. I. Zissu at CUVINTUL, VIATA ROMANEASCA, and INTEGRAL; I. Moscovici and I. Pistiner, at LUMEA NOUA and PROLETARUL; Valter Roman at SCINTEA and LUPA DE CLASA; St. Antim, Matei Socor, and B. Branisteanu at the CUVINTUL LIBER, REPORTER, and CLOPOTUL, and many others.

Apart from the Romanian press, in which views were expressed regardless of nationality, there were also a series of Jewish publications at national, provincial, or local level. Newspapers and magazines founded before World War I continued to appear, such as: EGALITATEA, led by the dean of Jewish press, M. Schwarzfeld; CURIERUL ISRAELIT, organ of the U.E.R.; MINTUIREA, organ of the P.E.R., edited by Al. I. Zissu; the weekly INFRATIREA, the magazines HASHMONEA and RENASTEREA NOASTRA; the weekly publication of the Romanian Zionist Executive, NEWS FROM THE JEWISH WORLD, and the COPILUL EVREU, a magazine for children and youth. In the Romanian provinces reunited with Romania there were also the Jewish newspapers UNZER ZETT (Kishinev), OSTJUDISCHE ZEITUNG (Chernovtsy), and UJ KELET (Cluj).

We do not have the means of singling out institutions led or financed by Jews--exclusively or in association--but many sources of information report persons of Jewish origin in the leadership of certain newspapers, publishing houses, printing houses, bookstores, movie houses, etc.

Anachronistic groups, which had been on the fringes of political life until the beginning of the 1940's--such as the League of National Christian Defense, then the National Christian Party (led by A. C. Cuza); the Iron Guard, under its various names, led by C. Z. Codreanu; small nationalistic groups rallied around figures separated from the bourgeois parties (the Romanian Front); the extreme right wings of the German and Hungarian parties--organized themselves into a treacherous 5th column of Hitlerism at the establishment of the Nazis in Germany, and aligned their nationalist-chauvinistic obsessions with the Nazi "program." "The Romanian right," Tudor Teodorescu-Braniste wrote in 1938, "has simply stolen the methods of German Hitlerism... From uniforms to violence, it [the program] is shamelessly lifted from the working plan of Adolf Hitler."³⁵ Thus, the rightist current is the most alien to the Romanian spirit." In his turn, Zaharia Stancu wrote in 1938: "There is nothing for us to imitate and we are not prepared to ape any dictatorship. The Romanian nation has its own ideals."³⁶

Many leading politicians and intellectuals, such as Nicolae Iorga, Virgil Madgearu, Mihail Ralea, Dr Nicolae Lupu, George Enescu, C.I.C. Parhon, Petre Andrei, Victor Iamandi, and others, stood up against the extremist-

chauvinistic organizations. They attacked the racist, particularly antisemitic theories of German Nazism and the xenophobic obsessions of domestic nationalist chauvinists. Referring to one of the antisemitic speeches made by A.C. Cuza in Parliament, in which he had hailed the Hitlerite "solution" of the Jewish problem, University Professor Virgil Madgearu, one of the leaders of the National-Peasant Party, said: "We do not want to hear Hitler's name in this Parliament any more." In his turn, Petre Andrei riposted to A.C. Cuza: "You are not permitted to utter such aberrations;" while Deputy D. Manu said: "Stop parading your nationalism, because it is you who is betraying this national cause."³⁷

The antisemites blamed the Jews for all the ills of the time. While the German antisemites accused them of manipulating France, England, and Italy, who had signed the Paris treaties of 1919-20, and the Hungarian antisemites accused them of "mutilating ancient Hungary," the Romanian antisemites swooned with admiration before all their "brothers" in faith, and drew upon the doctrine and actions of the revisionist block which, among other things, aimed at dismembering Romania. Antisemitism, warned reasonable men at the time, harmed not only the Jewish population, but had profound implications for the entire society. Pondering the idea of patriotism and its forms of manifestation, I.D. Suchianu wrote: "One of its signs [of authentic patriotism] is its revulsion to antisemitism. Before any discussion of the Jewish question, before examining arguments pro and against, before deciding on which side the blame lies, before everything, we must a priori brand as odious the persecution of an entire community... Thanks to it [the Jewish problem] all the generous people of this country are coming out from hiding, all those who believe that the homeland must be improved from the inside, through deeds, and not just on the outside, through words."³⁸

A powerful antifascist and antihitlerite movement developed in Parliament, party meetings, electoral campaigns, public political or cultural events, party press, culture and science magazines, schools, and universities; within this movement, the workers parties and their mass organizations, bourgeois-democratic parties, and other antifascist groups found themselves together on the barricades of the popular antifascist front. Like in the other sectors of political life in Romania, alongside the Romanian antifascists there were many representatives of the Jewish population, organized for this struggle in parties, associations, organizations, or specially formed alliances. The growth of the antisemitic currents of the Iron Guards and Cuza determined the P.E.R. and U.E.R. leaders to form a united front for defending Jewish interests. The Central Council of Romanian Jews was established in January 1936, led by W. Filderman and made up of representatives of the two political groups and of the Mosaic denomination in the person of Chief Rabbi I. Niemerower (for the rest, the two Jewish political organizations preserved their independence of opinion and organization).³⁹

With the expiration of the mandate of Gh. Tatarescu's liberal government, the elections of December 1937 and the short rule of Goga-Cuza, then with the establishment of the royal dictatorship--domestic political events that took place against the background of very serious international developments for the fate of many nations, including the Romanian--certain changes occurred in the life of the Jewish population in Romania, too, both from a legal viewpoint, and in various economic, social, and political sectors. Thus, the

decree-law No 169 of 21 January 1938 on citizenship revision⁴⁰ particularly stirred the Romanian and international Jewish community. According to the decree, the Jews had to bring proofs of which previous laws had exempted them. Only those who had applications and proofs were awarded citizenship, so that in effect the decree was not a "revision," but an act of "citizenship cancellation and renaturalization with retroactive effect." Thus, the Romanian citizenship granted to the Jews in three ways (through individual naturalization, in mass, and by right—by putting their names down on nationality lists in the reunited territories) was severely revised. Throughout the country the Jewish masses were feverishly trying to procure papers; letters, telephone calls, applications, audiences, and other interventions were precipitated by the measures of the Goga-Cuza government.⁴¹

Intensive international activities (diplomatic and publicistic) brought Romania to the attention of public opinion in an unfavorable light.⁴² The DAVAR newspaper of Tel Aviv on 9 January 1938 wrote that the above measures were designed to chase the Jews away from their economic positions; The World Jewish Congress called the attention of the French, British, and American governments—signatories of the 1919 Minorities Treaty—to the fact that the Goga-Cuza government was overtly violating the provisions of the treaty; Samuel Untermyer, president of the World Antinazi League, cabled a warning to O. Goga to the effect that if he implements the antisemitic measures, the U.S. League will boycott Romania; various foreign journalists were coming to Bucharest to demand explanations; Goga received in audience Fischer and Zinger, whom he assured that he will not tolerate antisemitic excesses, and that the measures will only be applied to Jews who obtained their citizenship fraudulently, in view of the fact that Romania could not accommodate the hundreds of thousands of Jews who came after the war from Russia, Hungary, and other countries.⁴³

Only the German and Hungarian press took the opposite position on the Goga-Cuza political episode, commenting at length and unfavorably on the British and French intervention and hinting at the influence of Jewish big finance on the respective governments; they also emphasized England's interested attitude toward the pending problem of Jewish emigration to Palestine.

As for the revisionist press of Budapest, after years of furious attacks on all Romanian governments in the matter of nationalities, it now adopted a more "indulgent" tone; it even vaguely alluded to plans to "settle" the dispute with the Romanians, and criticized the Hungarian leftist press in Romania which attacked O. Goga, putting the "Jewry" on the same place with the "Hungarians." UJ MAGYARSAG of 18 January 1938 stated that the Jews could not be identified with the Hungarians, and that the universities and big industrial enterprises of Transylvania had been invaded by Jews. Although the Hungarians—the chauvinistic-revisionist newspaper added, bending the truth—had lived in Romania 20 years "amid a continual extermination war," no one had defended them! The Jewry had not been persecuted, had minded its business in peace and quiet, uprooted woods, etc., etc., "and only the Hungarians suffered." There was also another type of reaction from Budapest, by leftist newspapers, a reaction criticized by the above publication. PESTER LLOYD of 18 January 1938 expressed the view that the antisemitism of the Budapest government was not well received by the Hungarians of Romania because in Transylvania "many Jews maintained their Hungarian nationality and remained faithful defenders of Hungarian interests," while that great mass of Zionist Jews "who separated from the Hungarian body, still is Hungarian by language and culture."⁴⁴

After the fall of the Goga-Cuza government (February 1938)--the first government in the period between the wars that tried to raise antisemitism to the level of official policy--a paper worked out by the General Commission for Minorities stated that, in Geneva, in the wake of the explanations received, the "Committee of Three" (of the Minorities Section) issued a resolution in which it declared itself satisfied with the understanding shown by the Romanian government in implementing the citizenship revision measures.⁴⁵ Indeed, under the governments in which the major role was played by Armand Calinescu, through the provisions of the Constitution of February 1938 (which maintained the same legal sanction on the problem as the Constitution of 1933), through the tough measures taken against the Iron Guard, the regulations decreed in connection with the nationalities (August 1938), and other measures, the "Jewish question" was shelved for the time being.

As Romania's representative to the League of Nations, Silviu Dragomir (head of the General Commission for Minorities) arrived at an agreement concerning the wishes of Romanian Jews about emigration to Palestine, in keeping with the recommendations of the Conference of Copenhagen of 1938.³⁸ Commenting on the conditions given the nationalities, in August 1938 the social-democratic newspaper LUMEA NOUA listed the rights they enjoyed on the basis of the Constitution and of the laws in effect: the same civil and political rights, the same treatment, and the same guarantees for all the Romanian citizens, regardless of language, race, or religion; the freedom to use the mother tongue in the areas of religion, press, personal and commercial relations, and at authorized meetings; the right to establish and run charity, religious, or social associations, schools, and other educational institutions in the mother tongue; in localities in which they are in the majority, the right to receive a fair share of the state budget for educational, religious, or charity institutions; the right to be educated in the mother tongue in state and public elementary schools; the right to exercise all professions, public functions, etc., like the Romanians.⁴⁷

As was the case during World War I, when World War II broke out international life went into a mold different from that of peacetime. However, in the second war, the Jewish problem was given the aberrant "solutions" we all know about. During 1938-39 the Romanian government resisted the pressures brought to bear by the Reich and by the Hitlerite Saxons of Transylvania, who even made joining the Front of National Rebirth conditional on excluding the Jews from the front and from the economic life. At the beginning of the war, on the basis of the neutrality status adopted by the Romanian government, the Zionist Executive of Romania interceded to obtain legal emigration permits to Palestine for civilian Jewish refugees from Poland. The Romanian authorities acceded to the request, and even stated: "The emigration permits will be granted free of charge... The emigrants may take with them all the possessions they brought along from Poland."⁴⁸

In the summer of 1940, when Romania became completely isolated, the country's rulers, increasingly scared, began to make great concessions to Hitlerite Germany. Economic concessions were followed by political, ideological, and propaganda concessions designed to demonstrate to Berlin that Romania "aligned" itself with the Axis policies. Thus, In August 1940, the government led by I. Gurgutu hastened to issue three decree-laws that imparted a pronounced antisemitic character to the legislation. Some of the provisions of the

Constitution were reformulated, while others were cancelled, and racial criteria were made to govern "national" structures.

The decree-law of 9 august was designed to regulate the legal situation of the Jews according to the criteria of religion, race, and origin of naturalization, and envisaged draconic economic, political, and moral interdictions.⁴⁹ Two additional decree-laws (8 and 29 august 1940)⁵⁰ forbade: marriage between Romanians and Jews; public functions and military careers for Jews; purchase of rural property, and Romanian names. The admittance of Jewish children in schools of all levels was greatly curtailed. Discriminatory distinctions were made between "Romanians by blood" and "Romanian citizens." The only area left "untouched" was the one described as spiritual: freedom of conscience, religion, and religious education of all levels.⁵¹

When it was learned that the government was preparing the above laws, the forum of Jewish communities of Romania filed a petition with the government, accompanied by a documented memorandum, in which it protested the plans to strip 95 percent of Romania's Jews on their civil rights. The memorandum, signed by W. Filderman and I. Brucar on behalf of the U.E.R. leadership, was filed on 7 August. It contained 15 paragraphs on "The Jewish Problem in Romania." The entire file was also forwarded to King Carol II,⁵² but no decision was taken. Carol was in the last days of his reign; in September 1940 the military-fascist regime was established in the country.

The two decades of development and consolidation of reunited Romania (1919-40) constituted a short chronological span, shorter even than one generation. Nevertheless, the noteworthy progress made in all the economic, social, political, and cultural-artistic areas clearly demonstrates the historic significance and the profoundly progressive character of the Great Union of 1918.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Romania on the Path of Building the Comprehensively Developed Socialist Society," vol 22, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982, p 12.
2. "The Great Union of 1 December 98," Bucharest, 1943, pp 109-111.
3. "Debates of the Assembly of Deputies [DAD]," 30 November 1929 meeting, MONITORUL OFICIAL, No 6, p 108.
4. DAD, 13 December 1929 meeting, MONITORUL OFICIAL No 13, p 286.
5. "Senate Debate [SD]," 1 December 1932 meeting, MONITORUL OFICIAL No 7, p 119.
6. Central History Archive [CHA], Royal House section, Carol II, file No 41/1940, p 4.

7. W. Filderman "The Truth on the Jewish Problem in Romania in the Light of Religious Texts and Statistics." Followed by lists of soldiers wounded, prisoners, missing, and decorated in the war for Romania's reunification, Bucharest, 1925, p VII-IX, XVII-XXIII.
 8. MONITORUL OFICIAL No 223, 30 December 1918; No 33, 28 May 1919.
 9. Romanian Constitution, CHA, Royal House section, Ferdinand, file No 1/1923.
 10. SD, 11 December 1929 meeting, MONITORUL OFICIAL No 8, p 94.
 11. "General Census of Romania's Population of 29 December 1930 [GCRP 1930]," vol IX; Structure of Romania's Population, part 5: The Nation, Central Institute of Statistics, Bucharest, pp 376-406.
 12. Filderman, "The truth..." op. cit.; Em.D.B. Vasiliu, "Romania's Demographic Situation. Causes, Consequences, Remedies," Cluj, 1923; I.D. Barzan, "The Evolution and Revival of the National Idea--the Jewish Problem," Bucharest, 1924; N. Popp, "Ethno-Demographic Considerations on Romania's Population," Bucharest, 1937; Sabin Manuila, "Demographic Aspects of Transylvania," Bucharest, 1938.
 13. Manuila, op. cit., 1929, pp 31-37.
 14. MONITORUL OFICIAL No 41, 24 February 1924.
 15. GSRP 1930, pp 376-380, 408-438, 440-470.
 16. CHA, Royal House section, Carol II, file o 74/1930, pp 1-10.
 17. GSRP 1930, pp 744-788.
 18. D. Komorofsky, "The Jewish Element in International and Romanian Economy," in the Almanach of the TRIBUNA EVREEASCA, Iasi, 1937, pp 112-115.
 19. Constantin Gr.C. Zotta, N. Tulceanu, "The Political Parties in Romania, History and Programs," Bucharest, 1934, p 749.
 20. "The National Jewish Party," in PARLIAMENTUL ROMANESC, No 130, 31 December 1933, pp 4-5.
 21. Tully Rozenthal, "The National Jewish Movement in Romania," in the TRIBUNA EVREEASCA Almanach, Iasi, 1937, pp 159-160.
 22. Cl. Blumenfeld, "Mistakes in Jewish Policies," Bucharest, 1929, p 41.
- * Iuliu Maniu justified the agreement by a political formula; namely that he wanted to split the Transylvanian Jews from the Hungarians. In reality, what decided the issue were the personal relations between Al. Vaida-

Voevod and I. Maniu and the Transylvanian Jews, as well as the desire to take them out of the sphere of influence of the National-Liberal Party.

23. Blumenfeld, op. cit., pp 40-53.
24. DAD, 17 December 1929 meeting, MONITORUL OFICIAL, No 16, p 365.
25. SD, 10 December 1929 session, MONITORUL OFICIAL No 6, p 69; 11 December 1929 session, MONITORUL OFICIAL No 7, p 95.
26. DAD, 30 December 1929 meeting, MONITORUL OFICIAL No 6, p 104; Blumenfeld, op. cit., p 30.
27. Rozenthal, op. cit., pp 161-162.
28. Ibid., pp 159-162; Blumenfeld, op. cit., pp 46-53; Marcel Ivan, "The Evolution of Our Political Parties, Figures and Graphs," Sibiu, 1933, p 24.
29. GSRP 1930, pp 312-373.
30. CHA, Ministry of Public Education section, file No 399/1922, pp 35-36; files No 618, 619, 620, 626/1924.
31. Ibid., file No 630/1924, p 85.
32. Ibid., file No 399/1922, pp 35-36; 630/1924 pp 21-95; 619/1924 pp 52-53, 151-154; 630/1924, p 95.
33. Apud: Dr Theodor Loewenstein, "Judaism and Romanism," in the TRIBUNA EVREEASCA Almanach, Iasi, 1937, p 8.
34. C. Barzilay, "Jewish Press in Romania," the TRIBUNA EVREEASCA Almanach, Iasi, 1937, pp 189-191.
35. CUVINTUL LIBER No 11, 18 January 1936.
36. ROMANIAN WORLD, No 522, 11 November 1938.
37. Livia Dandara, "1930: Debates in Romania's Parliament," in MAGAZIN ISTORIC, year X, No 10 (115), October 1976, pp 29-32.
38. CUVINTUL LIBER, No 12, 27 January 1934.
39. Rozenthal, op. cit., p 163.
40. MONITORUL OFICIAL No 28, 22 January 1938.
41. CHA, Royal House section, file No 30/1938, pp 1-155.
42. Ibid., file No 6/1938, pp 21-22.
43. Ibid., file No 31/1938, p 1; 31/1938 pp 9-13, 78-86.

44. Ibid., file No 31/1938 pp 23-24, 74, 90.
45. Archive of the Institute of International Social-Political Studies, section XV, file No 451, vol II, pp 121-124.
46. ROMANIA No 356, 27 February 1939.
47. LUMEA NOUA No 13, 28 August 1938.
48. SEMNALUL No 499, 7 October 1939.
49. MONITORUL OFICIAL No 183, 9 August 1940.
50. CHA, Royal House section, Carol II, file No 35/1940, pp 1-4.
51. ROMANIAN PARLIAMENT No 338-342, 25 August 1940, pp 34-35; 38-40.
52. CHA, Royal House section, Carol II, file No 31-1940, pp 1-2.

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 1, Jan-Feb 85 pp 102-111

[Article by Ion Calafeteanu: "Position of Romanian Authorities on Situation of Jews in Northern Transylvania (March-August 1944)"]

While the first news of the harshened antisemitic policy of the Hungarian government after 19 March 1944* soon crossed the Hungarian borders--explicably so, since the antisemitic measures taken by the Budapest government were generally made public--about the tragedy of the Jewish population in North Hungary and in the territories annexed to it in 1938-41 foreign officials and international public opinion learned only late and through scattered reports that did not permit them to realize its true dimensions. It is, however, to be assumed that even if information had been prompt and complete, the fate of the Jews in Hungary would not have been greatly influenced by those factors.

In point of fact, anticipating the evolution of events, the U.S. and British governments toward the end of March 1944 warned all the governments of the German satellites, but we have every reason to believe that this warning was primarily directed at the Hungarian government, which had just then begun implementing its extreme antisemitic policy. "We have taken note," Anthony Eden stated in the House of Commons on 30 March 1944 in reply to the interpellation of a labor deputy, "of the statement issued on 24 March by President Roosevelt on this issue [concerning the situation of the Jews in Nazi occupied Europe] and it has to be admitted that His Majesty's government is wholeheartedly with the United States in this respect." The British foreign secretary further stressed that "the horrors and crimes will not be forgotten when the German defeat comes. Fortunately," he added, "there have been examples of persons and even administrative bodies in the satellite countries who have resisted the evil example of the Germans and have shown tolerance and generosity." In the hope that such humanitarian attitudes could be encouraged in the future, Eden concluded, "they, too, will not be forgotten on the day of retribution."¹ Unfortunately, these warnings and encouragements did not save the lives of the hundreds of thousands of Jews in North Hungary.²

In this paper, on the basis of Romanian archive documents, mostly original, we intend to inspect the attitude of the Bucharest government toward the situation of the Jewish population in the north-west part of Romania, annexed by the North Hungarians; to show when and to what extent it became aware of the real situation, and what position it adopted; to verify whether this position was influenced by the Romanian-Hungarian dispute in general, and by the problem of Romanian claims on this territory torn from the body of the country under the Vienna Diktat of 30 August 1940 in particular; to ascertain to what extent the fate of the Jews in that part of Romania itself was influenced by its belonging, in the previous period, to the Romanian state, and by the fact that, as of September 1940, this territory was annexed to Hungary.

About the preparation of antisemitic measures in Hungary the Romanian government first learned in January 1944, i.e., approximately 2 months before the act of 19 March 1944. Thus, on 28 January, the Romanian minister in Bratislava cabled to Bucharest that Slovak President Tiso had informed him, "from a German source," that Hungary was about to take antisemitic measures.³ The report, which was very brief, contained no other details, so that the Romanian government did not possess the necessary data to ascertain whether that was a German, a German-Hungarian, or a Hungarian initiative, and what this antisemitic policy consisted of. After Hungary's occupation by the Germans and

the establishment of the Dome Sztojay government on 22 March 1944, relevant information received in Bucharest—both from the Hungarian press and through diplomatic channels—became more detailed and consistent.

Thus, on 28 March 1944, the newspaper TIMPUL noted that "the tone of the Hungarian press and radio broadcasts has become antisemitic, which is significant in view of the fact that, until then, the Hungarians did not appear to be concerned with the racial problem;" on 29 March, the newspaper VIATA carried an item from Zurich on "the implementation of all the antisemitic laws in effect" by the new Hungarian government.

On 30 March, two reports sent by the Romanian minister in Budapest, Eugen Filotti, provided detailed information on the contents of the first antisemitic measures taken in Hungary (exclusion of Jews from the bar and from state positions, interdiction to own cars and telephones, etc.), and in particular stressing "one measure taken on the German model, namely obligating the Jews to wear a yellow star on their chest."⁴ On 1 April, another report informed that all that was only the beginning of the Hungarian government's measures against the Jewish population. The report also reproduced the virulently antisemitic declaration made by Endre Laszlo, under secretary of state at the Ministry of the Interior and in charge of implementing these measures, to the newspaper ESTI UJSAG of 30 March 1944. "The government," he had stated, "intends to pursue to the end actions to solve the Jewish problem on the basis of a coherent plan. The time of experiments and half measures has passed. The Jewish problem in Hungary did not begin with the establishment of the new regime [government]. Hungarian antisemitism is not a political fad or an aping of current political trends and ideas. Hungarian public opinion has been demanding a radical solution for close to a quarter of a century. The Jewry is undesirable to the Hungarian race from both moral, and intellectual and physical viewpoints. It shall be completely excluded from Hungarian life. The new ordinances are not dictated by hatred or intransigence, and are not designed to debase the individual. The purpose of the distinctive marking decreed for the Jews is not to stigmatize them, but is a means of self-defense for the Hungarian nation, since the events of the past months have proven that the Jewish spirit has wrought true ravages among Hungarians of good faith."⁵

In the following period, other reports from Budapest promptly apprised the Romanian government of all the antisemitic measures taken in Hungary: exclusion of the Jews from economic activities, travel restrictions, interdiction to own radio sets, evacuation of 1,000 families from their homes in Budapest,⁶ confiscation of property and valuables, closing down of Jewish stores,⁷ and the establishment of the first ghettos in northern Transylvania.⁸

All this clearly shows that the Romanian government carefully followed, from the very beginning, the evolution of the antisemitic policy of the Horthyist government and its implementation, which went in an opposite direction to the attitude adopted at the time by the Antonescu regime toward the Jews of Romania, toward Jewish Romanian citizens abroad, and even toward the Jews of other countries who, escaping antisemitic persecutions in other parts of Europe, sought refuge in or passed through Romania in search of a haven.

On 31 March 1944, an uncoded cable from the Romanian general consul in Cluj, Bilciurescu, addressed to both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the

Romanian legation in Budapest, for the first time reported that in Cluj, "all the Jews are being rounded up in the streets and in their homes by the German police and taken to an unknown destination."⁹

For almost 2 months, Bucharest received no other information in this respect, until Hungary began massive deportations of Jews to the extermination camps in Poland. On 3 April 1944, Filotti informed the Romanian government of a new Hungarian administrative measure, the meaning of which was not immediately clear, but in which the Romanian government showed major political interest, since it concerned northern Transylvania, too. That was the decision of the Horthy government of 29 March 1944 to appoint a government commissioner for the territory east of the Tisza, which included the territories annexed by Hungary between 1938-40. According to the decree, the government commissioner, attached to the German military command in the area, was to "ensure the liaison between the government authorities and the local civilian authorities across the Tisza on the one hand, and between the first and the German military command across the Tisza, on the other, and to ensure smooth cooperation between the above civilian authorities and the German military command."¹⁰ Thus, a distinction was being made between the western and eastern sides of the Tisza, where the ordeal of the Hungarian Jews began.

Toward the end of April 1944, the Romanian government already knew that part of the Jewish population east of the Tisza had been put in camps and ghettos. In point of fact, on 26 April, even the German radio broadcast an item --which also appeared in the GAZETTE DE LAUSANNE of the following day--to the effect that "over 300,000 Jews from the east and north-east of Hungary" were already in ghettos.¹¹

One month later, on 26 May 1944, a report from the Romanian legation in Budapest dealt in particular with the deportation of the Jews from northern Transylvania. Following the establishment of ghettos in most towns, especially in the territories annexed to Hungary in recent years --the report stated--the Jews from those areas were put at the disposal of the German authorities to be deported. According to the information of the legation, culled from several sources, the arrangement between the Hungarian and German governments affected approximately 300,000 Jews, who were to be sent "to areas in Poland where Jews from Germany and from various other occupied countries had been shipped." The report further provided information on the manner in which the deportation was proceeding: 11 trains a day, with sealed freight cars, loaded with "up to 70 Jews, without distinction as to sex and age" in each car; during the transport, the cars were not open "even to take out the corpses of the dead;" many Jews killed themselves; those deported were allowed to take with them "only a few kg of luggage, the rest of their property and belongings having been confiscated by the authorities." By the date of the legation report, "all the Jews from northern towns such as Sighet, where there had been 14,000, which was almost 60 percent of the population," had already been shipped to the death camps of Poland.

About the significance of these deportations from the viewpoint of Romanian national interests, the report stated the following: "The tendency of the Hungarian government seems to be to thus completely eliminate primarily the Jews from the annexed territories (Transylvania, Maramures, etc.), who were considered to be less loyal to the Magyar state than their coreligionists in

Hungary, and especially in Budapest, who so far have not all been put into ghettos or deported. The Jews of Transylvania and Maramures are also suspected of harboring pro-Romanian feelings. By eliminating them and replacing them by pure Hungarians, the authorities probably intend to achieve a more pronounced Hungarianization of these territories and to consolidate Hungarian domination over them. Viewed in this light, the issue deserves our attention." In support of this assertion the Romanian minister in Budapest also brought an editorial article from the rightist newspaper UJ MAGYARSAG, in which the Jews in the territories annexed by Hungary were accused on having had "an attitude opposed to Hungarian interests during the time of 'foreign' rule."¹² UJ MAGYARSAG of 26 May 1944 wrote that "Everywhere, the Jews adapt not to the people among whom they live, but to the respective state, in order to live as well as possible. We take note of that. At the same time, however, we must draw all the due conclusions, pitilessly and with an unwavering consistency."

The reaction of the Romanian government to the tragical events occurring in the territories torn away from Romania under the Vienna Diktat was gradual: from being selective at the beginning, its support and protection finally extended to practically all (or almost all) surviving Jews in Hungary who appealed to it.

The first category of Jews in whose fate the Romanian government took an interest was that of Jews who held Romanian citizenship. On 19 April 1944, the Romanian legation in Budapest sent a coded cable to Bucharest, followed the next day by a report, stating that the Hungarian authorities have warned several Jews of Romanian citizenship to leave the Hungarian territory henceforth, or be deported.¹³ Gheorghe Davidescu, secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, looking at things only in the light of Romanian-Hungarian relations, reacted with the following decision: "Notification to the Ministry of the Interior, and similar measures toward Jewish Hungarian subjects." Only on 28 May 1944 did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs address General C.Z. Vasiliu, under secretary of state at the Ministry of the Interior, informing him that "the problem of our non-Aryan citizens in Hungary has become very critical," the Hungarian government demanding their "urgent" repatriation, otherwise they risk being interned and deported to Poland. Only 2 days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent another note to the Ministry of the Interior, urgently demanding a decision and recalling Mihai Antonescu's principled decision to repatriate all the Romanian Jews from France to save them from extermination.¹⁴

As opposed to the haste that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began showing for the protection of Jewish Romanian citizens in Hungary, the Ministry of the Interior issued a decision only on 14 June. The decision was favorable, in the sense that it allowed the repatriation of Romanian citizens of Jewish origin; at the same time, however, it added that "in exchange for the repatriated Romanian Jews, we must send to Hungary an equal number of Jewish Hungarian subjects." The director of the Consular Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantin Karadja, immediately instructed the Romanian legation in Budapest to issue visas to all the Jews of Romanian citizenship.¹⁵ Simultaneously, he sent another note to the Ministry of the Interior, stating that "before proceeding to send away the Jews of Hungarian citizenship from Romania, we are of the opinion that Mr vice president of the Council should be approached for precise instructions, for which purpose we deem necessary to

prepare a complete report on the situation, indicating the number of Hungarian Jews in Romania, their legal status, and the counties in which they live." On the edge of the note, Karadja wrote: "We can thus gain time," signaling his intention to save the Hungarian Jews living in Romania from the certain death that would follow their expulsion to Hungary.¹⁶

On 20 June, C. Karadja sent a report to Mihai Antonescu on the entire issue,¹⁷ followed by another, on 30 June, in which he stated that the number of Jews of Hungarian citizenship in Romania was of "50-60." The report added that any decision must take into account, on the one hand, "the interests of the country," in view of the fact that the expulsion of these Jews would create "a new grounds for friction with the current Hungarian government," and on the other hand, "the unfavorable consequences that would follow such a measure by the fact that the future Hungarian government will not fail to notify future British and American governments of the fact that we sent a number of unfortunate Jews to a certain death. The Jews of northern Transylvania are no longer alive," the report stresses, "as Mr Minister Filotti informed be verbally."¹⁸

The Romanian government not only did not sent to Hungary the Hungarian Jews from Romania, but, in the following period, many Jews from Hungary and from other Nazi occupied countries were given transit visas through Romania. According to reliable data, based on the visas issued by the Romanian legation in Budapest, during the first 7 months of 1944, 51,537 Jews received transit visas through Romania, while another 301 visas were requested by the legation but were no longer granted, due to the events of August 1944 in Romania.¹⁹ Many of those were able to immediately leave the country with the aid of the emigration bureau established at the middle of June 1944 and led by Al.I. Zissu. Such an attitude fitted the ideas of the Antonescu authorities on solving the so-called "Jewish problem," not through physical extermination, but through emigration. At the same time, some 5,000-7,000 Jews crossed into Romania illegally.²⁰

The special interest shown by the Romanian authorities for the situation of the Jews in Horthyst Hungary can be more clearly understood if we relate it to the general Romanian-Hungarian relations at the time, in view of the fact that the antisemitic policy of the Horthyst government also hit the Jewish population in the north-west part of Romania, wrested under the Vienna Diktat of August 1940, a Romanian territory that the Bucharest government could not ignore. The holocaust in occupied Transylvania provided the Romanian authorities with an additional opportunity to disclose the true face of the Horthyst regime to the democratic international public opinion, to demonstrate the absurdity of the Vienna Diktat, and to thus pave the way for its cancellation. Thus, through Romanian diplomats in Hungary and through Vespasian V. Pella, the Romanian minister in Berne, the first specific report reached the West, a report that contained verified data, coming from the Jewish population in Hungary itself, and that related all the horrors to which those people were subjected.²¹ "The information contained in the memorandum," wrote Hungarian publicist Katona Bela in his work "Varad a Vilharban," ("Oradea in the Storm") published in 1946, "was the first reliable and relatively detailed information on what was happening in the ghettos. Because, although it was known abroad that Hungary had ghettos, no one could have imagined the horrors that were taking place between their walls..."²² Reports from Romanian sources were at the origin of the international campaign launched to sensitize the governments

of the United Nations and international public opinion and to save the few survivors of the holocaust in Horthyst Hungary.

If that was the situation, then the following questions arise: what is the explanation for the decree-law issued on 29 May 1944 by Marshal Antonescu, under which the death sentence was decreed for Jews of foreign citizenship who illegally crossed into Romania? And what were the consequences of that decree?

In order to answer the first question we must review the specific conditions that brought about its adoption. On 10 May 1944, the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmery sent a report to Ion Antonescu, in which it informed him that the Hungarian gendarmery and border guards, as well as SS troops, were organizing illegal crossings of Jews from Hungary into Romania, for money. Until that date, 14 Jews had been discovered in a German truck (on 3 May, in Feleac), and another 35 persons had been delivered in Turda by 4 May. Annoyed by the behavior of the Hungarian border authorities, particularly since the Romanian-Hungarian relations were under a continuous tension, and in order to satisfy Hitlerite pressures, Ion Antonescu wrote the following decision on the report: "Let it be decreed that the Jews crossing the border illegally will be shot to death."²³ Those were the conditions in which the decree-law of 29 May 1944 was issued.²⁴

On the same day, a note of the Romanian special information service presented the reaction elicited by the decree-law among German circles in Bucharest. "The measures taken by the Romanian government to prevent mass crossings of Jews from Hungary into Romania, in the wake of the antisemitic measures taken by the Hungarian authorities under German supervision," the note stated, "have produced satisfaction at the German legation in Bucharest. It is to be, however, stressed that so far the Romanian border authorities and the Romanian population of Transylvania have intensively supported the crossing of Jewish refugees from Hungary into Romania, and that the implementation of the governmental orders will require particular vigilance." The note also mentioned that "certain German extremist circles" were doubtful of the efficiency of the decree, unless "certain democratizing elements" were removed from the government.²⁵ After 3 years of Romanian-German "collaboration," the Reich representatives to Romania knew very well that many of the governmental measures taken to give them formal satisfaction were never implemented, due to the tacit Romanian resistance at all levels.

Very soon after the publication of this decree-law, official Romanian circles raised objections against it. The objections were supported by logical and well-founded arguments, and not least, even by official viewpoints that accorded with public sentiments, from which Ion and Mihai Antonescu wanted to derive political credit. Thus, in a note addressed to Mihai Antonescu on 10 June 1944, its author* asked for instructions as to whether the decree also concerned former Romanian citizens of Mosaic religion originary from the territories ceded in 1940. The note expressed puzzlement about the fact that the Romanian state border could be crossed by any foreigners, without fear of being shot down, but not by the Jews of northern Transylvania, "although according to the Romanian theory, they were not crossing any border, because the Romanian government views these provinces as Romanian. We hope that orders will be issued accordingly." In point of fact, such orders were necessary because, as the

note stated, "it appeared" that both the Security and Army Corps I were preparing to implement the decree-law.²⁶

These arguments, as well as other interventions against the decree-law, also by Jewish circles in the country, practically determined the Romanian government to give up its implementation before anyone could fall victim to it. The change must have occurred between 10 and 12 June 1944, because on 12 June Dr W. Filderman was handing Antonescu a letter that makes it clear that on that date the problem of the emigration of Jews from Hungary in general, and from northern Transylvania in particular, through Romania, already had the approval of the Romanian government. Thus, the decree-law became pointless, and the Romanian legation in Budapest and the consulates of Cluj and Oradea were instructed to issue transit visas requested by Jews holding Hungarian or any other citizenship. In the letter we cited, W. Filderman suggested to Mihai Antonescu that the Romanian government should officially propose to the Budapest government transit through Romania for Jews who wanted to emigrate from Hungary, describing such a gesture from the Romanian government as "of the greatest political importance." W. Filderman suggested that the emigration should begin in the areas closest to the Romanian border, and then extend to the west in the following order: children missing both parents, one parent, then all children.* He also suggested to increase the percentage of accompanying adults from 10 percent (as had been decided at previous talks) to 30 percent, the order of preference being: Jews from Hungary, then from Germany, Poland, etc., followed by Jews from Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia.²⁷

By 12 June 1944, when W. Filderman sent that letter to Antonescu, contacts had already taken place between the Romanian government and local Jewish circles, at which important decisions had been reached. The talks continued in the following days. On 17 June another meeting was held at the Council of Ministers, attended, aside from Mihai Antonescu, by General Sova, Lecca, and Al.I. Zissu, the latter being in charge of the Jewish emigration. Like at the 21 June meeting (which had been attended by M. Antonescu, Lecca, W. Filderman, Al.I. Zissu and Dr Zimmer), at this meeting, too, Mihai Antonescu attached special importance to the emigration of the Jews from Hungary. At the 17 June meeting, he addressed Al.I. Zissu as follows: "Since we have allowed Jewish refugees to remain in the country, especially recent refugees from Hungary--that is to say, some are from northern Transylvania, but we do not consider them Hungarians, but Romanians--we think that the best way to simplify the matter and to avoid trouble is that you should see to it that they leave the country immediately; also, if there are other refugees in similar conditions they, too, must leave the country right away."²⁸ Mihai Antonescu expressed himself in a similar vein at the 21 June meeting: "I have asked you that the refugees from Hungary and northern Transylvania should enter in any case, so that I do not have to keep them in the country in difficult conditions and dangerous to themselves. You know very well what difficulties there have been and how, at a certain point, I had to intervene to stop certain shipments to the border; but those who stayed, instead of being returned to Hungary, must emigrate. So," he concluded, "it is absolutely necessary that they leave in any event."²⁹

When, on 26 June 1944, the representatives of the International Red Cross to Romania, Charles Kolb and Vladimir de Steiger, appealed to Mihai Antonescu not to implement the decree-law of 29 May 1944, that was already superfluous; Mihai Antonescu was in a position to assure them that the lives of the Jewish

refugees in Romania will not be endangered.³⁰ On the other hand, they were still threatened in Horthyst Hungary, despite the fact that, as a result of domestic opposition, particularly by the Catholic Church, and of pressure brought to bear from the outside by the United States, Great Britain, the Vatican, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the International Red Cross, etc., the government of Budapest had exempted certain categories of Jews who had not yet been deported, from the antisemitic measures. The acts perpetrated against them by certain categories of the population and by public agents made the Romanian charge-d'affaires to Budapest, Dragos Cotlarciuc, conclude that "a large section of the public approve of the measures taken against the Jews, and the Hungarian population has been won over by the anti-jewish movement."³¹ The Romanian government, too, complained about the attitude of the Hungarian government, in view of the difficulties it encountered in connection with the Jews who were under Romanian protection but who nevertheless continued to be sent by the Horthyst authorities to the extermination camps in Poland, and even Jews holding Romanian passports, in the case of whom the Hungarian government did not even reply to the interventions of the Romanian state.³²

After the liberation of the north-west part of the country from the Horthyst and Nazi occupation, the great majority of the survivors of the Nazi extermination camps returned to the country. There were few of them; they joined those who had been left in Transylvania in labor detachments (to which many Romanians also belonged). The Romanian government recognized the Romanian citizenship of all of those, under law No 261 of 4 April 1945 on the citizenship of the inhabitants of that part of the country. "Are and remain Romanian citizens," article I point 1 of the law states, "the inhabitants of northern Transylvania who, according to the laws in effect, had Romanian citizenship on 30 August 1940."

FOOTNOTES

- * On 19 March 1944 the Germans occupied Hungary.
- 1. Foreign Ministry archive [FMA], Problem 33 section, vol 27, pages not marked.
- 2. On the situation of the Hungarian Jews in World War II see: Randolph L. Braham, "The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary," vol I-II, Columbia University Press, 1981; Natanel Katzburg, "Hungary and the Jews," Bar Ilan University, 1981; Professor Vago Bela's article, "The Jews in Northern Transylvania," collection of studies: "Pinkas Hakehilot, Rumania," edited by Jean Ancel, Theodor Lavi, vol II, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, 1910, pp 9-16.
- 3. FMA, section 71, Hungary, vol 65, p 123.
- 4. Ibid., p 35.
- 5. Ibid., p 43.

6. Ibid., pp 51-53 (report No 3,704 of 12 April 1944).
7. Ibid., pp 98-102 (report No 3,980 of 15 April 1944).
8. Ibid., pp 129-130 (report No 4,272 of 4 May 1944).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp 44-45.
11. Op. cit., Problem 33 section, vol 36, pages not marked.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. For the number of Romanian citizens of Jewish origin in Hungary, we have the following data: In July 1941 57 Jews Romanian subjects were registered at the consulate, but--as one document states--there were "certainly" more. A Foreign Ministry report precisely worked out on the basis of the files "The Jews of Budapest, 1944," shows, however, that in the period 15 June-23 August 1944, 266 visas were issued to Jewish Romanian citizens coming from Hungary. Some 14 persons asked to be issued Romanian passports and entry visas to Romania, plus other 70 applications for which the minister requested investigation for the purpose of repatriation (op. cit., vol 10, pages not marked).
16. Op. cit., vol 36, pages not marked.
17. This report was lost in a bombardment, as C. Karadja himself stated in a note. We know, however, that Mihai Antonescu wrote a decision on it, and requested to be told "who rose the question of the expulsion to Hungary as a retaliatory measure." It was in answer to that that Karadja sent the respective report to Mihai Antonescu on 30 June. We must add that the internal regulations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs permitted the director of the Consular Directorate to directly forward reports only to the secretary general, who decided whether to forward them to the minister or not. At the end of 1943, after many failed attempts, C. Karadja went over the head of Secretary General Davidescu and addressed Mihai Antonescu directly in connection with the situation of the Romanian Jews abroad; he played an important role in the decisions on the repatriation of those in Nazi-occupied Europe and threatened by deportation. (Ibid.)
18. Ibid.
19. Op. Cit., vol 10, pages not marked.
20. Asher Cohen, "The 'Halutzim' Resistance in Hungary," in "Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale et des Conflits Contemporains," No 134, 1984, p 63.

21. Mihai Marina, "We Cannot Remain Impassive!" in MAGAZIN ISTORIC, year X, No 6 (111), June 1976, pp 39-41. Could this be the memorandum that the British minister to Berne reported to the Foreign Office on 27 July 1944? Although the British diplomat wrote at a later date, the memorandum informations cover the period till 10 June (and thus precede the arrival of this information in London by over 6 weeks), which coincides in time with the first phase of deportations mentioned in the memorandum carried by "courier" V.V. Pella. Some 335,000 Jews had been deported by 10 July. An American expert in Berne, who dealt with refugees problems, described the information as "reliable" (see Vago Bela's article in "Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust," Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, 1977, p 211).
22. MAGAZIN ... op. cit., p 38.
23. FMA, Problem 33 section, vol 10, pages not marked.
24. MONITORUL OFICIAL, 29 May 1944.
25. FMA, Section 71 Hungary, vol 65, p 140.
- * We do not know the author of this note, which was not signed. The manner in which the problem was approached, its attitude in favor of the Jews, and the fact that the note was found among other documents from the Consular Directorate leads us to believe that its author was C. Karadja.
26. FMA, Problem 33 section, vol 10, pages not marked.
- * Another version--that W. Filderman suggested, but which he himself did not consider too fortunate--was that the emigration should proceed not by zones, but in proportion of 30 percent adults and 70 percent children.
27. FMA, Problem 33 section, vol 17, pages not marked (W. Filderman's letter to Mihai Antonescu of 12 June 1944).
28. Op. cit., (Note on the Council of Ministers meeting of 17 June 1944).
29. Op. cit., (Note on the Council of Ministers meeting of 21 June 1944).
30. Op. cit., vol 10, (Mihai Antonescu's letter to Charles Kolb and Vladimir de Steiger of 30 June 1944).
31. Op. cit., vol 36, pages not marked (Report No 6,127 of 8 July 1944).
32. Op. cit., vol 17, pages not marked (Mihai Antonescu's cable to Vespasian V. Pella, Romania's minister to Berne, 18 July 1944).

12782

CSO:2700/139

YUGOSLAVIA

SFRY YOUTHS PRESSURED TO SKIP MEETING IN ROME

LD092158 Vatican City International Service in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Apr 85

[Text] Here is a report on incomprehensible reactions in a number of places to the participation of young people from Yugoslavia in the international youth meeting in Rome on Palm Sunday. The meeting is listed in the UN calendar of events for International Youth Year.

Young people in the Neretva part of the Archbishopric of Split and Makarska had a great deal of trouble over trips to Rome for the international youth meeting. Before the departure, pressure was brought to bear in their enterprises on many young people who wanted to go to Rome. They were threatened with dismissal and many of them changed their minds at the last moment and decided not to go. A few days before the departure for Rome a circular was received by all enterprises banning annual and sick leave during the pilgrimage. People on sick leave were told they would be subjected to strict checks to find out whether they really were in bed. The head of the secondary school center in Metkovic publicly announced to the students that they could lock all friars and priests in churches and chuck the keys in the River Neretva. Secondary school children were told they were not allowed to go to the pilgrimage and many were frightened and gave up.

The climax of these incomprehensible reactions to the participation of the young in the international gathering in Rome came a few days before Good Friday. Public security officials personally visited nearly all the parish offices in the municipality of Metkovic and imposed a ban, in writing, on any traditional processions on Good Friday. These processions had been held regularly for years in the Neretva area. The ban represented a gross violation of the religious feelings of the people and of their constitutionally guaranteed right to express religious feelings freely. From unofficial sources it is learned that the cause of this ban, which is without precedent in the area, was the recent youth pilgrimage to Rome. Consequently, the traditional beautiful and glittering Good Friday processions were not held in all the parts of the Metkovic municipalities with the exception of Opuzen. Priests were thus forced to use the church yard, because the ban did not extend to church premises.

CSO: 2800/292

YUGOSLAVIA

LJUBLJANA LC DISCUSSES ACHIEVEMENTS, SHORTCOMINGS

LD131752 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1216 GMT 13 Apr 85

[Excerpts] Ljubljana, 13 Apr (TANJUG)--In an extensive, open, and self-critical discussion, which took place during today's annual conference of the LC town organization, Ljubljana communists analyzed the socioeconomic and socio-political circumstances in the town, as well as the activity of the League of Communists last year.

In this context it was stressed that last year, despite aggravated conditions, good results were achieved in the economy, a number of the organizations of associated labor which operated at a loss was reduced and there were fewer losses on the whole. However, good business results conceal a number of contradictions and weaknesses and there was a warning that last year 28 organizations of associated labor in Ljubljana did not set aside one single dinar from their income to expand the material basis of work, and the rate of accumulation of 70 organizations was below 2 percent.

There was also a warning that in complex social circumstances various negative ideopolitical phenomena were becoming much more apparent. Their exponents offer us political-ideological pluralism instead of self-management and their common characteristic is the negation of the social role of the League of Communists. The forms of manifestation are varied and they range from the outstanding subjective analyzing of the questions concerning our past, generalizing the weaknesses and dark sides of the revolution, attempting to rehabilitate White Guards and Home Guards under the aegis of a political reconciliation and generalized attacks on the Yugoslav People's Army to nostalgia for the liberalistic and moralistic visions of a possible social development. These phenomena manifest themselves largely through the views of individuals or smaller groups, but we still do not react to these phenomena sufficiently clearly or resolutely, and particularly not fast enough, as though we cannot clearly define where a democratic dialogue exceeds the bounds of anarchy. Too often we wait, in an opportunist fashion, for someone else to react instead of such as social or cultural workers or journalists. By underestimating these questions we too frequently allow them to be discussed incautiously and away from the organized forms of political activity. This is why an ideological confrontation with unacceptable social phenomena must become a more important part of the entire activity, and to this end we must train that section of the LC membership which has insufficient ideopolitical training and therefore easily succumbs to disorder and chaos and withdraws from the ideological struggle, it was noted, among other things, at the conference.